Can Faith Be More Than a Side Show in the Contemporary Academy?
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I am a sociologist by training and a dyed-in-the-wool empiricist by temperament, but the role of religion in the academy is not one that can be addressed from a firm empirical base. From time to time, one hears arguments that students are much more interested in religion or more comfortable expressing their faith on campus now than they were, say before the tragedy of September 11, 2001, or that faculty on secular campuses are more accepting of religious believers than they were a generation ago. We are tantalized in these speculations by the occasional result from national surveys of college freshmen or by reports of enrollments in religious studies courses.¹ There are also the valuable historical studies that George Marsden, James Burtchaell, and others have done, or the more contemporary studies of Conrad Cherry, Richard Hughes, or John Schmalzbauer.²

Yet, whenever I approach this topic wearing my empiricist hat, I feel much less confident than I do about almost any other aspect of American religion. Generalizations about church attendance in the wider population or about the effects of religious convictions on voting are hard enough to maintain; those about what is happening on campuses are even more difficult. In the absence of good empirical evidence, I nevertheless want to present a possible scenario of how the role of faith in the academy may have changed over the past four or five decades.³

The Marginalization of Religion

According to the historian Diane Winston, the study of religion has, until fairly recently, been on the sidelines or marginalized and probably remains so on most campuses.⁴ There may be opportunities to study religion, but these are in seminaries that have no formal connections to colleges or universities, in the occasional divinity school (such as at Yale or Harvard) that is part of a university but is viewed by the university’s central administrators as a relic that might just as well cease to exist, or perhaps in a religious studies department or program that attracts few
students and is poorly funded. The study of religion may also be marginalized by virtue of flourishing more at small church-related colleges than at large public universities.

This view of how the study of religion is marginalized is similar to what other scholars have suggested about the role of faith or the possibilities for expressing sincere religious convictions in the academy. These possibilities are also marginalized, again at seminaries or on church-related campuses, or through campus ministries or in private late-night dorm room discussions that have little relation to what goes on in the classroom. The challenge, then, according to Winston and others is to mainstream the study of religion or the expression of faith by initiating centers, funneling foundation money into curricular initiatives and research, promoting new campus ministries, hosting conferences that bring together interested scholars, and seeking innovative ways to change the thinking of faculty and students and thus the climate on college and university campuses. I want to elaborate on this image of side show to center stage, perhaps redefining it slightly, and then in that context examine its implications.

The marginalization of religion in the academy took place, if we follow George Marsden, over a fairly long period. We need not trace that history here, other than to note, as Marsden suggests and as Christian Smith has recently examined sociologically, that the secular trend came about partly through strategic compromises and power plays. It was not just a gradual epistemological shift. At the same time, the change was indeed epistemological as much as it was political. Clergy and church boards lost control over the purse strings and administration of major colleges; Christianity also ceased to be regarded as having a particular corner on the truth.

It will probably be helpful to jump from the longer-term history to a more recent decade, the 1960s, since that period is within the personal memory of those of us who were students or faculty at the time. As an image with which to think about the marginalization of faith in the academy, the 1960s can be taken as a kind of extreme case. In the society at large, the presidency of John F. Kennedy helps to bring this image into focus. Under Kennedy's leadership, the nation's elites eagerly imagined that we would conquer the moon and space travel by applying the principles we were learning from science and engineering. We also imagined that we could conquer communism by applying scientific principles to warfare, to our military campaigns, and to foreign policy, and our military involvement in Indochina became the test case for that vision. Although Kennedy is sometimes remembered as the president who gained political respectability for American Catholics, it is just as accurate to recall that Kennedy presented himself as someone who happened to have been raised Catholic, much in the same way someone might have been raised Irish, and promised that whatever personal religious convictions may have come from that upbringing would never influence his conduct in public office. This is not to suggest any criticism of Kennedy; it is only to recall something of the cultural climate of the era. The official mood was in many ways continuous with that of the 1950s, but also different. For instance, if we remember Eisenhower as the president who, as Herberg reminded us, argued that any old faith would do, we also need to recall that Eisenhower publicly supported the so-called Freedom Declaration advanced by the National Association of Evangelicals—a declaration that American freedom depended on our faith in God—and carried on the tradition of declaring an annual national day of penance and prayer.
In American higher education, the shift in mood from the 1950s to the 1960s was also evident. The GI Bill brought veterans to campuses in the 1950s who were older than the typical college student, who had experienced the rigors of war, and who were often supporting families of their own. Polls conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s showed that Americans with college educations were more likely to attend church or express orthodox religious views, whereas surveys a decade later showed those with college educations were now less likely to exhibit these kinds of religious commitment.\(^7\) Just as in Washington, the mood on campuses emphasized the virtues of science and technology. Money was being lavished on physics and chemistry departments and on engineering schools. Majoring in science or engineering was a sure way to obtain employment at General Electric, Dupont, or a similar company. In the social sciences, modernization was the reigning orthodoxy. It suggested that societies would gradually modernize as a result of technological innovation and economic development and in the process politics would become more rational; religion, along with other superstitions, would cease to matter. Students studied classical philosophy and Shakespeare for wisdom that preceded or transcended the teachings of particular religious traditions and through anthropology or philosophy learned that there were universals in ethics and in social behavior that could be understood rationally and apart from particular ethnic or religious traditions.

All of this was reinforced by the fact that the United States was indeed making progress in developing atomic energy, launching satellites, inventing new consumer products, and keeping the Soviet Union at bay. Having weathered the Great Depression and World War II, it was easy to believe that science, positivist social science, and rational thought were the wave of the future. Even if there were doubters and critics who raised questions about the uses of atomic weapons or other technological innovations, we knew we had inherited a brave new world and that if religion had a place in it, it was more as a way of sustaining ourselves emotionally than as a source of truth or public policy. By the end of the 1960s, as college campuses mushroomed with the influx of baby boomers, church attendance in the nation at large was down dramatically from its 1958 high and most studies showed that the longer students were in college and the more elite institutions they attended, the less religious they were.

**The Emergence of Postmodernism**

Also by the end of the 1960s, though, a new mood was emerging that would become more prominent during the 1970s and 1980s. Some have referred to this new orientation as postmodernism, a term that if too sweeping in generality and significance did at least capture the sense in some quarters that the universals sought and claimed in modernization theory would never be found.\(^8\) At a more popular level, the protests against the Vietnam war that began in earnest at the end of the 1960s were accompanied by questioning of the very applications of science and technology on which presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon had pinned their hopes for American victory. Some broader questioning of epistemological assumptions also came about with the drug culture and with campus experiments with new religious movements.

More significant for the longer-term, however, was the emergence of what has subsequently been
called identity politics. The civil rights movement evolved between the late 1950s and the early 1970s from a quest for inclusion to a struggle for racial identity. The quest for gender equality followed a similar trajectory, as did the subsequent move toward greater equality for gays and lesbians. These movements deeply affected American campuses. Colleges that had been the exclusive or nearly exclusive preserve of white males became more inclusive along lines of race and gender. Opportunities expanded for people of color to gain advanced degrees and for women to pursue a wider variety of careers. New institutional arrangements also appeared: African American studies programs, women’s studies departments, Third World centers, Asian American student organizations, and so on. The underlying epistemological shift was that more legitimate claims could be made for the role of cultural traditions in shaping knowledge and for multiple approaches to knowledge. The ensuing debate about ways of knowing was evident in a variety of fields: in social philosophy in the famous debate between Habermas and Gadamer, in which the former argued for the ascendancy of rational speech acts and the latter emphasized the embeddedness of values in cultural traditions; in philosophy of science in the shift from a Popperian vision of positive knowledge to Feyerabend’s anarchic vision, Latour’s social constructivism, or even Kuhn’s emphasis on paradigms and puzzle solving; in education from the shift from Stanford-Binet measurements of IQ to Howard Gardner’s arguments about multiple intelligences; and in literature in the new popularity of Derrida and Jamison and the reactions of more traditional defenders of the literary canon such as Alan Bloom. It is in this context that we must understand the changing role of religious studies and expressions of faith.

It is probably overstated to suggest, as some have, that the advent of postmodernism, if it can be called that, was the first step toward a new appreciation of the truth of Christianity, Judaism, or other religious traditions. That was probably so only for those who reacted against the seemingly radical relativism of postmodernism. But the epistemological uncertainty, not to mention the dynamic campus politics that accompanied it, did create opportunities for rethinking the place of faith in the academy. If it was now legitimate to be African American or gay, and to argue that there were special ways of knowing that might come from emphasizing one’s racial tradition or approaching literature through the lens of queer theory, it also became more legitimate to be Catholic or Jewish or Presbyterian. Exactly how it was legitimate was of course unclear and for that reason became a matter of debate and was worked out differently in different settings. But at least the opportunity for discussion and for new arguments and programs became possible. It became possible, for example, to argue that:

- Having a religious studies program at a state university might be just as legitimate as having one in gender studies;
- Having a campus religious group that was recognized by the administration might be as acceptable as a group for gays and lesbians;
- Including a course on the Protestant Reformation in the history department curriculum might be just as valuable as one on the French Revolution;
- Encouraging students to talk about their religious backgrounds in a seminar could be just as useful as prompting them to discuss their ethnic heritage or where they grew up;
And sending one's son or daughter to, or deciding to teach at, a church-related college where Christian values could be openly discussed could be just as beneficial as being at some larger institution dominated by “secular humanism.”

In short, the academy started to acknowledge the value of diversity and in so doing opened up opportunities for expressions of faith to be part of that diversity.

**The Current State of Religion on Campus**

There is a problem, however, with describing all of this as a linear shift from one campus culture or epistemological paradigm to another. A more accurate description would have to acknowledge that American higher education is currently a mixture of both of the scenarios I have just described. Moreover, these different understandings of scholarship are institutionalized in different parts of the typical campus, and this pattern of institutionalization deeply affects how faith can be expressed and religion understood.

The view that knowledge is best achieved through science and reason remains firmly institutionalized in the natural sciences, in engineering schools, and in more recent additions to the curriculum such as computer science, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and genomics. These are the components of the typical campus that require the greatest financial investment and that benefit most from government grants and corporate partnerships. They are also the most attractive programs for wealthy alumni—especially those trained during the governing ethos of the early 1960s—who wish to be associated with cutting edge breakthroughs in scientific research. The same emphasis on scientific methods and rational thought is usually evident in economics departments and increasingly in political science departments and public policy programs dominated by rational choice theories of human behavior. The same emphasis is often evident as well in philosophy departments that feature analytic philosophy and in ethics courses that look for rational, context-free principles of ethical argumentation. The more pluralistic orientations to knowledge that are associated with postmodernity are typically institutionalized in the humanities. History and literature departments include courses on the distinctive contributions of ethnic traditions or gendered perspectives, not the physics or materials science department. Specialized programs in African American studies, Latino studies, Asian American studies, or gender studies are taught by faculty in the humanities and located in those administrative divisions. The same is true of religious studies departments or interdisciplinary programs or centers for the study of religion. The social sciences, for their part, remain the most likely to be epistemologically divided. Whereas economics and political science may be governed by rational choice approaches, anthropology is more likely to incorporate the cultural perspectives of the humanities and sociology is more likely to be divided between positivists and ethnographers who are only united in their respect for empiricism.

There are at least two important implications of this institutional patterning for the expression of faith and the study of religion. The first pertains more to secular universities than to church-related colleges, although it probably applies to some of the latter as well. It has to do with the power dynamics of the typical campus. Power is ultimately vested in those parts of the university
that emphasize science and rational argumentation. The big money is there, the cutting edge discoveries are there, the claims to be advancing knowledge into new frontiers are there, and so are the needs for new facilities, the requirements for funding, and the opportunity to invest in students who will pursue remunerative careers. Although these parts of the university may be burdensome in terms of money and administrative time, and are by no means without their own problems, it is easy for administrators to make the case that this is the kind of knowledge that universities should be producing.

The other part of the university—the part that deals with history and tradition and ethnic identity and religion—is a necessity, and is recognized as such by most administrators of liberal arts institutions. But it is often a political necessity more than anything else. It involves starting a new program to meet the demands of some newly organized student constituency, or maintaining an old department even though one wonders if there is any possibility of learning anything new in that discipline. These are the departments and programs that are maintained because they offer service courses for the cultural enrichment of undergraduates and because they may train a very small number of graduate students and an even smaller number who actually get jobs. Being associated with this part of the university means that religious studies programs or campus ministries are likely to be supported, but often more because of campus politics than because of genuine enthusiasm.

The second implication is that religion and faith commitments have largely become matters of cultural tradition and have ceased being about truth. The trivially obvious meaning of this implication is that no self-respecting physicist would argue that there is anything special to be gained by framing a theorem in physics from a Christian or Jewish perspective rather than from any other perspective. Less trivially obvious perhaps is the fact that an economist who happened to be a Christian could still value the insights of rational choice theory and a sociologist who happened to be Buddhist could examine census figures the same way any other sociologist could. More interesting is the likelihood that religion will be studied as a cultural object, as it were from the outside, rather than as a valuable perspective that one might try to understand from the inside. Thus, a class on Christianity would be more likely to examine its historical development than to challenge students to consider whether they actually found Christianity believable. Or a course in sociology of religion might include a film about wiccans, but certainly stop short of encouraging students to consider becoming one. These are simply academic conventions that we take for granted. So is the idea that there should be a rather impenetrable fire wall between however faith may be discussed in the classroom and however it may be practiced in one’s personal life. In the classroom, the acceptable mode is to teach about religion, leaving the teaching of religion and the practice of faith to be promoted by chaplains, campus clergy, or student ministries.

I should note here that if religious studies has become more acceptable within humanities and social science programs, if only as a nod to cultural diversity, this is a significant change from at least one perspective. That perspective comes from comparisons of religious commitment among faculty in various disciplines from some surveys conducted in the late 1960s and 1970s. Those studies showed that faculty in the humanities and social sciences were much less likely than
faculty in the sciences, engineering, and applied fields (such as business and education) to be religiously involved or religiously oriented. The reason, as I have argued elsewhere, may have been that the sciences, engineering, and applied fields were more clearly codified, either as scientific pursuits or as professional roles, and thus could be compartmentalized more easily from one’s private life, whereas the humanities and social sciences were less codified and thus spilled more readily into scholars’ personal lives (some, for instance, claimed they were “intellectuals” and thus could not separate their academic from their personal lives). Whatever the interpretation, the humanities and social sciences seemed least “musical” with respect to religion, to borrow Max Weber’s famous image. If religious studies are now more acceptable among those fields, that is worthy of note.

Yet, another small piece of evidence is also relevant. This is from a national survey of the general U.S. public that I conducted in 2003. This survey focused on attitudes toward religious diversity. It showed that college graduates, and especially those who had majored in the humanities or social sciences, were especially likely to regard all religions as being equally true, rather than considering any one of them to be uniquely true. In short, religions were viewed as interchangeable cultural traditions.

Returning momentarily to the image of movement from side show to mainstream, then, we see, if what I have outlined here is correct, that faith and religion in the academy may have more opportunities to overcome marginalization now than a generation ago. But this change can also be viewed as a kind of devil’s bargain, for the process in no way suggests that faith and religion will again become center stage in American higher education. Instead they become articles of personal biography, aspects of some community or group’s cultural history, rather than anything resembling truth.

There are, of course, exceptions that must immediately be acknowledged. At some church-related colleges it is possible to believe that the truth taught at secular universities is so biased as to not be truth at all. In that sad state of affairs, the search for truth in what remains of the Christian community becomes a heroic struggle. There are also more widely accepted ways of accommodating to the current situation by redefining what we mean by truth, about which I will say more in a moment. My point here is only that we should not exaggerate the opportunities presently available for somehow moving religion and faith once again into the academic mainstream. Both the politics and the epistemology of higher education suggest that the study of religion and personal expressions of faith will remain on the margins.

**Accommodation, Resistance, or Intentional Reframing**

What, then, are the possible strategies by which faculty and students who remain committed to the idea that faith should matter can put that commitment into practice? One possibility is to accept as valid the situation in which we find ourselves and try to be responsible members of the academic community within that framework. We might call this a strategy of accommodation. A second possibility is to deliberately question the given situation and indeed put ourselves in a kind of countercultural position in relation to it. We might term this a strategy of resistance. There may
also be a third alternative, which I will come to in a few moments, a strategy of intentional reframing.\(^{11}\)

The strategy of accommodation is, I have to acknowledge, sufficiently attractive that I find myself consciously or unconsciously following it much of the time. On this view, the truth that we know from science and from reason is accepted as that which the academy ought to be concerned. As people of faith, we may regard it as partial and yet consider it the most that is humanly possible at any point in human history. Reality is thus seamless enough that people can have some common understanding of it whether they follow one particular faith tradition, a different faith tradition, or none. If the ways of God, so to speak, are ultimately beyond human knowing, then they are not fully disclosed to any particular faith tradition, any more than they are to science or philosophy. There are, however, aspects of truth that may be better preserved and communicated in religious language and through communities of religious narrative than through such other media as science and philosophy.

By broadening the meaning of truth in this way, we come, then, to an appreciation of the place of religion and faith in the academy. Just as music or literature should be part of the academy, so should religion. In likening religion to music and literature, though, we largely accept the institutional realities that characterize the present-day academy. Music appreciation and literary criticism may be usefully taught in the classroom, but musical performance and the production and consumption of literature may require additional venues, such as conservatories, recording studios, book stores, and book discussion groups. So with religion. Classroom instruction may enhance the life of faith by conveying knowledge, examining the conditions under which people seek faith, and criticizing expressions of faith in relation to some normative standard. But the actual practice of faith occurs elsewhere. Discussions about religion, therefore, are appropriately included in the academy, but do not take the place of private devotion, campus ministries, and houses of worship in the wider community.

The strategy of resistance takes the realities of human evil and the limitations of given social arrangements more seriously. If accommodation is a kind of priestly acceptance of the academy, resistance adopts a more prophetic orientation to it. This orientation has recently been advocated by Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman, who argues that mainstream higher education serves the liberal nation-state, which is antithetical to Christendom, and thus requires Christian scholars to adopt a stance of prophetic pilgrims speaking in a pagan wilderness.\(^{12}\) The prophet is always more confident than many of his or her fellow travelers that he or she knows the ways of God. In the prophetic view, certain formulations of truth are more true than others, and some may have been granted by special dispensation to particular individuals or communities. The prophet usually takes an oppositional stance toward some particular aspect of business as usual (such as the tenure and promotion system or the prevalence of quantitative methods in his or her discipline). The prophet also seeks an alternative institutional base in order to separate himself or herself, so to speak, from the corrupting influences of the world. The church-related college may be one such institutional base. Another may be a formally organized network of like-minded scholars, such as a society of Christian sociologists or an association of Muslim political scientists. Yet another may
be an informal group, such as a gathering of faculty or students that meet periodically for discussion and support, much in the same way that a women’s consciousness group or a dissertation writers group does. An oppositional group of this kind probably questions or feels aggrieved by the prevailing status system within its discipline or on its campus. It thus seeks reform and possibly redress. It finds value in writing and lecturing for venues outside the mainstream. It probably does not hope to overthrow the prevailing world views it encounters in the academy, but it may hope to bring in perspectives that would otherwise be overlooked.

The third alternative, which I refer to as intentional reframing, represents a kind of middle way between accommodation and resistance. It is for this reason harder to describe. Like the accommodationist approach, it accepts much of what goes on in the academy. It accepts, for example, most of the methods of inquiry that have developed over the years. At the same time, it recognizes that the pursuit of knowledge is always flawed by self-interest, academic politics, and other human limitations. It therefore adopts an intentional stance of questioning or even skepticism in its consumption and pursuit of higher learning. To employ the other meaning of the phrase “faith in the academy,” this approach does have faith in the academy in the sense that it trusts the academy, up to a point, to be an institution that has proven over the years to be effective in generating and transmitting knowledge. It trusts the laws under which colleges and universities are chartered and accredited, for example, and anticipates that these laws will work reasonably well under most circumstances to guard against fraud and deception. It has faith that such conventions as academic freedom or the processes by which tenure and promotion decisions are made will in most cases be fair and conducive to good scholarship. But, just as faith in the democratic system of government always requires citizens to reserve granting absolute faith to their representatives, so faith in the academy is similarly tempered. One is reminded that intellectual integrity always includes a critical element. In a word, one questions as well as accepts. And the stance from which one questions is, for a person of faith, grounded in the convictions associated with that faith. These are convictions that generally precede a person’s involvement in the academy or at least transcend it. They are normative convictions about what is important in life and about how to conduct one’s life with the utmost of integrity.

For persons reared in the Christian tradition, the paradoxical nature of so many of the biblical teachings may, as Richard Hughes has suggested, be especially conducive to an intellectual style that acknowledges complexity. Paradoxical thinking is capable of both accepting and rejecting, of saying “yes and no” rather than “yes” or “no,” and thus may be especially conducive to grappling with complex issues and with keeping the discussion of those issues going. But the question of whether one’s questions or instincts are better, as a result of being grounded in faith, than someone else’s is a red herring. The more important question is whether a person who wishes to live according to his or her faith is seriously striving to live up to those desires. For some, it may require intense participation in a faith community, especially one outside the academy, to gain the support needed for a commitment of this kind. For others, introspective withdrawal may be more effective, and for still others it may be that becoming absorbed with a particular author or following the inspiration of a mentor in one’s field provides the support required.

To end on a more personal note, the relation of religious faith and the life of scholarship and
teaching has, for me, not been one that I could formulate in any concise statement about faith and learning or that I could equate with any particular revelatory experience. It has been, rather, one of periodic troubling or unsettling. There have been times, for instance, when I have been guided mostly by puzzlement over the tensions seemingly inherent in the human condition. How can such self-interested people as we clearly are also find it within ourselves to care deeply, even sacrificially, for others? How does a society that has so much inertia built into it manage to reinvent itself enough to face new challenges? How do we render the drudgery of the usual workaday world meaningful enough to believe we are also pursuing our higher values? I have tried to keep my eye on some of the enduring questions that have been raised by previous generations of social theorists, reading their work less for lasting answers than for validation that these are indeed enduring questions that must be addressed anew by each generation.

If faith is in these ways a kind of goad that pushes me to ask difficult questions, it is also a source of reassurance. The danger in being puzzled by large questions or being troubled by the problems one witnesses on such a devastating scale is believing that one’s own small efforts should make a considerable impact toward answering those questions or resolving those problems. The reality is rather that what any of us does matters very little. And yet this is where the idea of faith being embedded in community becomes reassuring. The idea is not so much that one feels better by virtue of constantly having other people around to stroke one’s ego or salve one’s wounds. That touchy-feeling idea of community is, I fear, one that religious leaders sometimes promote in hopes of encouraging involvement in their particular congregations, and, if so, it is one that will sooner or later prove disappointing, even to them. The better view of community is one that acknowledges the inevitable interdependence in which we are all engaged and the necessary limits that imposes on any of us. Accepting those limitations requires humility and that, in turn, is probably the most important reason for faith.

Endnotes

1 Megan Rooney, “Freshmen Show Rising Political Awareness and Changing Social Views,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* 49 (April 25, 2003); mentions that only 41 percent of freshmen currently include developing a meaningful philosophy of life as an important value, down substantially from comparable figures in the 1960s; although the question does not pertain directly to religion, it casts doubt on claims that college students are suddenly searching spiritual answers in higher proportions than in the past.

The arguments I present here are indebted much more deeply than I can acknowledge in specific references to participating with forty other scholars in a four-year seminar organized by James Turner and Nicholas Wolterstorff and sponsored by the Lilly Endowment; many of the contributions to that seminar have been collected in Andrea Sterk, ed., Religion, Scholarship, and Higher Education: Perspectives, Models, and Future Prospects (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).


More often than not, when we take a single verse out of its native context, we end up misinterpreting the verse. In the context of Matthew 17, Jesus rebukes the disciples for their weak faith and says that even if they had mustard seed-sized faith, they could command the mountain to move. Contextually, the mountain must refer to the demon that was afflicting the man's son. Jesus tells His disciples that, if their faith was stronger, they could have commanded the demon to leave the boy, and it would be so. Faith that can move mountains is not meant to imply a faith that can literally move literal mountains. The point Jesus was making is that even a little bit of faith the size of a tiny mustard seed can overcome mountainous obstacles in our lives, between faith and reason in the life of the follower of Jesus Christ and how they relate to the ancient tension between the confluence of the Hebraic and Greco-Roman ways of looking at the world, examining why the two ideas are not contradictory or in tension, but showing that they are, two aspects of the same comprehensive worldview. Human Reason. There is a structure by which the world is understood. There are methods for logically. Good faith is a blanket clause under which courts develop standards of fair and honest behavior. It gives ample discretion to the judiciary and entitles a court to narrow down the interpretation of statutes or contracts and even to deviate from. Still, despite such concrete dogmatic forms, in the jurisdictions where the good faith principle is recognized, it is accepted that such general principles should be used as a last resort, if and only if the formal rules of the contract law lead to absurd consequences. If the good faith principle is a monster, as scholars (Zimmermann and Whittaker 2000) once claimed, it has been domesticated as a farm animal. Faith is confidence or trust in a person, idea, deity, religion, or any specifiable belief that is not based on proof. While some have argued that many forms of faith are opposed to reason, proponents of faith argue that the proper domain of faith concerns questions which cannot be settled by evidence, and that rationality and faith are complementary aspects of human perceptual and imaginative capacities. The word faith is often used synonymously for hope, trust, belief, or a religious tradition. I am far more interested in exploring how the producers of the comic books and films use their Superman narratives as a means to work out personal, cultural, religious questions and issues by using the Superman mythos as a site for religious play and creativity. Perhaps an even more important phenomenon is the role Superman plays in the lives and imaginations of his audience. By applying different approaches and methods from the humanities and the social sciences, I demonstrate the multiple ways that Superman and his use by the culture fulfill religious functions and contributes to a broader r...