Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions”

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In a speech delivered on Christmas Eve 2004, Hu Jintao introduced a new set of “historic missions” for the Chinese armed forces. These missions constitute one part of a broader revision of the PLA’s “strategic guiding theory,” derived in large measure from Hu Jintao’s overall ideological guidance on “scientific development.” This paper will examine the timing, content, dissemination, and implementation of the “historic missions,” which is a useful test case of Hu’s relationship with the PLA as reflected in military political work.

Summary

On 24 December 2004, Hu inaugurated his recent elevation to chairman of the Central Military Commission by unveiling a set of pathbreaking changes in the orientation of the PLA known as the “new historic missions.” This paper makes three points: (1) the “new historic missions” are not the centerpiece of Hu’s contribution to military thought, but instead a subordinate manifestation of his “scientific development” concept in the military and part of a much broader revision of the military’s “strategic guiding theory”; (2) the “new historic missions” concept was not immediately adopted within the PLA, but has been slowly propagated through the political work system and has finally achieved universal recognition; and (3) the “new historic missions” now constitutes the primary vehicle for the “post-Taiwan” modernization strategy of the PLA and is therefore a critical linchpin of the party-army relationship.

Introduction to the “New Historic Missions”

With the attention paid to “new historic missions,” it is tempting to posit that this concept is Hu Jintao’s proposed “contribution” to military thought, to be placed on the revolutionary mantel alongside the existing pantheon of “Mao Zedong Military Thought, Deng Xiaoping’s ideas for army building in the new stage, and Jiang Zemin’s ideas on national defense construction and army building.” However, these missions appear to constitute only one part of a broader revision of the PLA’s latest “strategic guiding theory” under Hu Jintao’s leadership. Instead, Hu’s contribution begins with the overall ideological guidance on “scientific development,” first introduced at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. Authoritative propaganda materials are very clear about the conceptual hierarchy, describing “scientific development” as an “important guiding strategy for national defense construction and army building,” with the “new historic missions” described as a logical manifestation of the use of the “scientific development” method to understand the changing international military and security environment.
“new historic missions,” otherwise known as the “three provides, and one role” are defined as follows: “(1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position, (2) providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development, (3) providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and (4) playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.”

To understand the significance of these new missions, it is important to place them in the historical context of previous guidance to the military. As official propaganda materials describe, each of China’s paramount leaders has sought to define the mission set for the PLA:

During the revolutionary war years, Mao Zedong figuratively epitomized the function of the army as “a fighting force, a working force, and a production force.” In the new period of reforms, opening up to the outside world, and the socialist modernization drive, Deng Xiaoping called on the army to shoulder the sacred responsibility of consolidating national defense, resisting aggression, protecting the motherland, and protecting the peaceful labor of the people and to participate in national construction. Following the development of the situation, Jiang Zemin further proposed that the army must provide a powerful and forceful guarantee to national security, unification, and the socialist modernization drive.

The “new historic missions,” by contrast, are derived from China’s current set of domestic and international requirements, which include both traditional concerns about political stability and resolution of territorial integrity issues like Taiwan as well as new requirements and challenges created by China’s increasingly global interests and entanglements.

Tracking the Propagation of “New Historic Missions”

The “new historic missions” concept has now been thoroughly disseminated throughout the PLA, and the mantra has been repeated by the senior military leadership, the GPD-led propaganda apparatus, and the services. While the “new historic missions” theme is a critically important change in the orientation of the PLA, the progression of events is also a primer on how to effectively inject a new “meme” into PLA political work. While Hu’s original December 2004 speech is not publicly available, multiple references confirm its existence. While the December 2004 Defense White Paper and the 1 January 2005 Liberation Army Daily New Year’s editorial do not mention the term specifically, available media and bibliographic evidence suggests that the term was coming into widespread usage by the time of the National People’s Congress in March 2005. Not only did Hu Jintao include the phraseology in his comments to PLA delegates, but a full-length book devoted to the subject was published in the same month by the People’s Armed Police Publishing House, suggesting that the “new historic missions” concept had been circulating in political work circles for longer than previously suspected and a great
deal of preliminary theoretical research had been completed. This preparation was also reflected in a July 2005 article in the Party theoretical journal *Qiushi* that appeared under the byline of Beijing Military Region Commander Zhu Qi. By the fall of 2005, the “new historic missions” mantra and its status as a manifestation of “scientific development” had become a standard feature of military propaganda, appearing prominently in the canonical Army Day editorial on 1 August.

With the CMC’s approval and under the guidance of the General Political Department, the National Defense University hosted a theoretical workshop on the “new historic missions” in Beijing from 20 to 27 September 2005. The entire senior leadership of the Central Military Commission, as well as senior civilian leaders attended the meeting. CMC participants included Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou, Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, Chen Bingde, Qiao Qingchen, and Zhang Dingfa. Civilian attendees included Chen Liangyu, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee; Yu Zhengsheng, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, and leaders from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Development and Reform Commission, and relevant departments of the PLA General Staff Department. The participants received briefings from experts and scholars from the National Defense University and the Institute of Marine Development Strategy under the State Oceanic Administration, who gave topical reports at the workshop regarding acceleration of the development of east China, promotion of the rise of central China, international strategic structure, and China’s security situation.

From a civil-military perspective, the 1 October 2005 National Day editorial in *Liberation Army Daily* marked a new high point in the military political work system’s efforts to personalize the “new historic missions” as Hu Jintao’s deliberate effort to redirect the strategic planning of the Chinese military. First, the message established that the change was a consequence of Hu’s analysis of the changing international situation:

> At present China is facing a period of important strategic opportunity. Our army building is also in a new development period. Chairman Hu has scientifically judged the historic bearings of national development and army building in the new century and new stage, and explicitly proposed that the army should provide important force guarantee for the party in consolidating its ruling status, provide strong security guarantee for safeguarding the important strategic opportunity period in national development, and provide effective strategic backing for safeguarding national interests, and play an important role in preserving world peace and promoting common development. These “providing three things and playing one role” express the new demands of the party’s historic tasks on our army, match the new changes in China’s security situation, reflect the new requirements of national development strategy, adapt to the new trend in the world revolution in military affairs, grasp the major all-round and
fundamental problems in army building, and further make clear the
development direction for national defense and army building.

The editorial then linked the “historic missions” theme to Hu’s broader ideological and political themes in party work:

Earnestly shouldering our historic mission in the new century and new stage is of extremely great significance for comprehensively building a well-off society, speeding up the historic process of socialist modernization, and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Finally, the message began to lay the groundwork for adding Hu’s concept to the pantheon of Mao, Deng, and Jiang’s contributions to military thought, though still being careful to assign it the lower profundity of an “exposition”:

The officers and men throughout the army must earnestly study and profoundly appreciate Chairman Hu’s important exposition, have a completely clear picture of the important historic tasks assigned us by the party, state, and people, and make efforts to succeed in adapting to the new situation, shouldering the new missions, fulfilling the new tasks, and achieving new progress.”

Following this statement, the military science system then embarked on an 18-month sustained effort to operationalize “scientific development” and its manifestation in the new historic missions, devoting special sections to the subjects in seven almost consecutive issues of China Military Science between September 2005 and April 2007. The ramp-up in coverage can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1
Frequency of Articles in China Military Science Discussing “Scientific Development” or “New Historic Missions” or “Diverse Military Tasks” or “Military Guiding Theory”

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On cue, specialized training sessions also began to appear in media coverage, such as the November 2005 “New Century, New Period Chinese Historic Missions Special Rotation Training Session” for PLA General Logistics Department Army and Division Leadership Cadres.\footnote{11}

In 2006, the “new historic missions” campaign gained even more steam. The 1 January 2006 New Year’s Day editorial in Liberation Army Daily continued the themes of “historic missions” as the manifestation of “scientific development,” and made an especially strong case for the “profound” ideological contribution as the legitimation of Hu Jintao’s central leadership:

We must closely unite around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as general secretary, hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory and the important thinking of the “Three Represents,” profoundly carry out Jiang Zemin’s thinking on national defense and army building, carry out and implement a series of important directives for army building, regard the concept of scientific development as the important guiding strategy for national defense and army building, uphold new concepts, clarify new standards, master new skills, uphold an energetic spiritual status and pragmatic working style, advance with the times, forge ahead for progress, and struggle to complete the historic mission given to our military by the party and the people in the new period of the new century.\footnote{12}

Senior military leaders also continued to echo these themes in their own comments. At the March 2006 National People’s Congress, for instance, CMC members Liang Guanglie, Li Jinai, and Liao Xilong all mentioned “new historic missions” in the very first sentence of their published commentary.\footnote{13}

Directly following the March 2006 NPC, however, the military political work system kicked the “historic missions” propaganda effort into a higher gear, launching a full-scale General Political Department education campaign on the subject. The core of this campaign was a series of four “staff commentaries” appearing in Liberation Army Daily, which were also used as the content for unit-level political study sessions. The first commentary set the stage, alerting the rank and file that the “new historic missions” would be “a significant issue for military-wide political work this year.”\footnote{14} The second commentary was a highly detailed and systematic analysis of the relationship between “scientific development” and the “new historic missions.” The article first identified the

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Table 1 (continued)
centrality of the “scientific development” concept for all ideological work in both the Party and the PLA:

The scientific development concept is the guiding strategy for advancing comprehensive development in socialist economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, and social construction and is an important guiding strategy for strengthening national defense and army building.\(^{15}\)

The message went on to clearly explain that “historic missions” is clearly subordinate to and derivative of “scientific development”:

It may be asserted that our military’s new historic mission in the new period of the new century is based on the scientific development concept and is an inherent meaning that lies beneath the theme of using the scientific development concept to dominate army building. Therefore, in order to promote this educational campaign, we must regard the scientific development concept—which is the important guiding strategy—as the overarching theme of this campaign.\(^{16}\)

The article then went on to describe the objective factors compelling a revision of the PLA’s missions:

This historic mission reflects the new requirements on our military given by the party’s historic tasks, suits new changes in the national security situation in our country, reflects the new requirements given by the national development strategy, and is in line with the new trend in global military development.\(^{17}\)

Finally, the education campaign would not be complete without a set of model cadres for emulation. In this case, the campaign was important enough to require three model cadres: Yang Yegong, Ding Xiaobing, and Hua Yiwei. Yang’s lesson for the rank and file was to treat “the mission as more important than lives and regard responsibilities as more important than the Taishan Mountain.”\(^{18}\) Ding Xiaobing, by contrast, reminds us to “unite personal ideals with goals of army building, write a resplendent chapter of the people’s lifelong unswerving struggle, and make extraordinary achievements by working in ordinary work posts.”\(^{19}\) Finally, “Hua Yiwei’s valuable spirit of improving his [medical] skills and better and continuously improving his comprehensive quality is really worth emulating today, when the entire military is speeding up the transition from mechanization to informatization and is endeavoring to improve the ability to fulfill the historic mission of our military for the new period of the new century.”\(^{20}\)

Other institutional highlights of 2006 include the May 2006 CMC endorsement of scientific development concept as “guiding principle” for the military, the examination of “scientific development” and “new historic missions” at the Politburo’s 33rd collective study session,\(^{21}\) the August 2006 GPD circular on studying Hu Jintao’s 25 July speech on CCP history that talked about the relationship between the Party and PLA’s respective
historic tasks, the August 2006 GPD circular on studying “Selected Works of Jiang Zemin” that clearly sought to institutionalize Hu Jintao’s contributions to military thought as much as laud Jiang’s prior contributions, an August 2006 Qiushi article authored by the General Political Department, an August editorial in Kongjun Bao in which the Air Force asserts that their role “will become more prominent” and “shoulder more arduous tasks,” additional meetings under the Second Artillery and the Navy to study and endorse the concepts, and the first appearance of the ideas in a document pitched toward foreign audiences, the December 2006 Defense White Paper.

The year 2007 was marked by important modifications of these ideological precepts, and preparations to institutionalize them in the documents of the 17th Party Congress in fall 2007. One important addition to political work was an increasing focus on the concept of “diverse military tasks,” introduced first in March 2006 at the National People’s Congress as a category of military tasks that included both combat and non-combat actions designed to address both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Over the course of 2007, the concept appeared in military media with much greater regularity, such that the 1 August 2007 Army Day editorial discussed “diverse military tasks” at length with no mention of “historic missions” at all:

We should further enhance our sense of crisis and sense of mission; improve our ability to respond to varied security threats and accomplish diverse military tasks through the practice of pushing ahead the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics and making proper preparations against military struggle; and ensure that we can consistently remain true to our mission and make a success of our mission under all manner of complex circumstances.

The emphasis on “diverse military tasks” continued at the 17th Congress itself, where a main slogan was “raise the ability of the army to deal with all kinds of security threats and to complete diversified military tasks.” At the same time, the “new historic missions” concept was added to the PRC constitution, which now exhorts the Party to “earnestly ensure the PLA to accomplish its historic missions in the new era.” Most important, however, the military propaganda apparatus began to introduce an even more critical revision to the military’s overall “strategic guiding theory.” An ideological centerpiece of this effort was a three-part series in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue exploring the features of the new framework, which begins with “scientific development” as the core and includes the “new historic missions” as an important pillar. The primary challenge for the “guiding theory” was identified in Jiefangjun Bao’s 1 January 2008 New Year’s editorial as the “two incompatibles”:

the main contradiction in our army building is still that the level of our modernization is incompatible with the demands of winning a partial war under informatization conditions, and our military capability is incompatible with the demands of carrying out the army’s historic missions in the new century and new stage. In resolving the main contradiction of “the two incompatibles,” we must continually enhance
our capability to deal with a variety of security threats and fulfill diverse military tasks.\textsuperscript{33}

To correct these deficiencies, the PLA issued a new Outline for Military Training and Exercising (OMTE) in January 2008, with the following specific guidance:

Pay close attention to and thoroughly tackle training geared toward specific missions and tasks. Step up tactical and technical training and strengthen confrontational training as well as actual-troop, real-equipment, and live-ammunition drills; give prominence to training geared toward specific missions and tasks like air defense of strategic points, border defense, coastal air defense management and control, and dealing with sudden incidents; and step up non-combat operational training like combating terrorism, safeguarding stability, dealing with sudden incidents, safeguarding human rights, safeguarding peace, and disaster rescue and relief and raise troops’ ability to deal with various kinds of security threats and accomplish diverse military tasks.\textsuperscript{34}

Political pressure was maintained at the March 2008 National People’s Congress, where military delegates were told that it was imperative to earnestly carry out Comrade Hu Jintao’s important expositions on national defense and army building under the new situation, take the scientific outlook on development as the important guideline for national defense and army building, focus on fulfilling all-roundly the historical mission of the army in the new century and the new period, uplift the army’s capabilities in countering various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks, be resolved to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and offer powerful support for building a moderately prosperous society in every respect.\textsuperscript{35}

By the 1 August 2008 Army Day editorial, entitled “Comprehensively Raise Our Army’s Ability to Fulfill Its Historic Mission—In Commemoration of the 81st Anniversary of the Establishment of China’s PLA,” the political work structure declared that “the ability to carry out the historic mission has been explicitly improved.”\textsuperscript{36} At the same time, however, the factors motivating the need for new historic missions was assessed to have become much more serious:

Traditional security threats continue to exist and have undergone new developments, while non-traditional security threats have gradually escalated. The factors of instability and uncertainty affecting national security have increased, presenting higher demands on the ability to comprehensively fulfill our army’s historic mission in the new century and the new phase.\textsuperscript{37}
As a result, the editorial highlighted an “inconsistency between military ability and the demands to fulfill our army’s historic mission in the new century and new phase.” At the same time, 2008 had been marked by critical non-military challenges to the PLA’s capabilities, including a debilitating snow and ice storm and the Sichuan earthquake, both of which were exemplars of the military’s new “diverse military tasks.” The 1 October 2008 National Day editorial lauded the PLA for its efforts, softpedaled criticism of its failings, and declared that it “has achieved major progress in the development of weapons and equipment, and its capabilities to deal with various security threats and accomplish diversified military tasks have been significantly enhanced.”

Conclusions and Implications

Available Chinese-language media evidence strongly suggests that Hu Jintao, beginning in 2002, has successfully inculcated his ideological framework of “scientific development” within the Chinese military political work system, using it as the basis of a new “strategic guiding theory” for military affairs. Within this theory, two of the most important concepts are the “new historic missions” and “diverse military tasks” for the PLA, which are derived from Hu’s “scientific” assessment of the changing nature of China’s domestic and international security environment. In other words, Hu has translated the theoretical mechanisms of his ideological framework into a new operational orientation for the armed forces, retaining the core missions of defense of the CCP and national sovereignty while adding a wide range of new contingencies compelled by Beijing’s increasingly global set of engagements and entanglements. As a result, Hu has also articulated a new set of justifications for continued resource priority for PLA modernization, particularly in light of the growing rapprochement between China and Taiwan. PLA planners now have a conceptual framework for broad requirements, ranging from defense of sea lines of communication for energy security to international peacekeeping operations. In this way, Hu has side-stepped a possible conflict between party and army, precluding the need for a “peace dividend” as cross-Strait relations become more peaceful, and providing new scenarios for an even broader modernization program.

Notes

2. My understanding of the revisions to the PLA’s “strategic guiding theory” as well as the “new historic missions” have benefited greatly from discussions with PLA expert Tim Heath.
4. Jia Yong, Cao Zhi, and Li Xuanliang, “Advancing in Big Strides from a New Historical Starting Point—Record of Events on How the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission Promote
6 Jia Yong, Cao Zhi, and Li Xuanliang, “Advancing in Big Strides from a New Historical Starting Point.”
7 Huang Guozhu, Cao Zhi, and Li Xuanliang, “Hu Jintao Emphasizes at the Full Session of the Delegation From the People’s Liberation Army the Necessity of Performing the Historical Mission of Our Armed Forces in the New Century and New Stage and Striving To Open Up a New Horizon in the Building of National Defense and the Modernization of the Armed Forces; Guo Boxiong Presides Over the Session; Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caibou, Liang Guanglie, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, Chen Bingde, Zhang Dingfa and Jing Zhiyuan Also Attend the Session,” Xinhua, 13 March 2005.
21 Guo Boxiong, “Cherish the Memory of the Red Army’s Great Achievement, Carry Forward the Revolutionary Traditions,” Xinhua, 19 October 2006.
22 “General Political Department Circular Demands Whole Army and Armed Police Seriously Study and Implement General Secretary Hu’s Important Speech, Unremittingly Study the History of the Chinese

23 “PLA General Political Department Issues Circular Demanding that the Whole Army and Armed Police Earnestly Study the ‘Selected Works of Jiang Zemin’,” *Xinhua*, 16 August 2006.

24 General Political Department, “Firmly Establish the Scientific Development Concept as an Important Guiding Principle for National Defense and Army Building,” *Qiushi*, 1 August 2006, No.15.

25 “Obeying the Party’s Orders, Marching Ahead With Giant Strides—Marking the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA,” *Kongjun bao*, 1 August 2007.


27 Cao Zhi and Chen Wanjun, “Hu Jintao Emphasizes When Meeting Deputies to 10th Navy CPC Congress, Follow the Principle of Integrating Revolutionization, Modernization, and Regularization, and Forge a Powerful People’s Navy that Meets the Demands of our Army’s Historic Mission; Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, and Xu Caihou Attend,” *Xinhua*, 27 December 2006.


29 I am indebted to PLA expert Tim Heath for my understanding of the meaning of “diverse military tasks.”


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

He articulated a new era with the historic mission to "realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation." For its implementation, Xi laid out a timeline with three major target dates: By the Party Centenary in 2021, China should "finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects." Shortly after his arrival at the party base in Yan'an in 1935, Mao became chairman of the Military Commission and undisputed leader of the fraction of forces surviving the mythologized march. By early 1949, the party controlled most of the core Han heartland, ensuring its victory in the civil war. Accordingly, the New Historic Missions that Hu Jintao ordered in 2004 added a new layer of outward emphasis for the People’s Liberation Army.
