Introduction

September 11, 2001 has made Americans painfully aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attack. The US reaction—invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of war against global terrorism—has been accompanied by a variety of diplomatic and military initiatives in various parts of the world, from Colombia to the Philippines, Georgia to Uzbekistan, Yemen and Sudan. To help rout the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, Washington revived its Cold War alliance with Pakistan. It also promoted the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, partly as a mechanism for strengthening its partnership with Moscow in the War on Terrorism.

The United States has also made an effort to rally the UN and Arab states to support the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, with its state-sponsored terrorism and implicit threat of development and use of weapons of mass destruction. Partly in recognition of the destabilizing effects of the Israeli-Palestinian Arab conflict on most Arab regimes, the administration of George W. Bush has taken a proactive role in efforts to find a peaceful solution to that conflict. It has also taken the lead role as mediator in seeking to stave off war between India and Pakistan over the latter’s sponsorship of mujahedin terrorist attacks against the Indian-held portion of Kashmir.

Other nations have also taken new initiatives connected with efforts to combat terrorism. Led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the members of the Arab League have offered to make peace and enter into normal relations with Israel in exchange for
its withdrawal from the territories captured in the 1967 War and the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state. Muammar Qaddafi has renounced Libya’s terrorist past by accepting responsibility for the blowing up of the Pan-Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland and offering compensation to the heirs of the victims. In so doing, Qaddafi hopes to shed Libya’s pariah status and to secure the lifting of the US embargo.

Russia has agreed to monitor closely the nuclear materials and technical aid that it is providing to Iran in connection with the construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushayr along the Persian Gulf. In its relations with East Timor, Indonesia is seeking to make amends for the atrocities committed by its troops in the unsuccessful attempt to head off the independence that territory. (However, Indonesian armed forces continue to terrorize the villagers of break-away Aceh province.) President Pervez Musharraf has obligated his government to put a stop to the terrorist training activities that have long been conducted by extremist Islamic institutions within Pakistan.

Does this post-9/11 anti-terrorism ferment, coupled with the end of the last vestiges of the Cold War, portend a fundamental change in US geopolitical strategy and behavior? Specifically, how valid is the view held by many US policy-makers that the greatest danger to global stability is now posed by global terrorism rather than by the geopolitical competition between and among sovereign states which seek to further their own economic, political and military security interests?

The thesis of this article is that the current political alignments made by the United States in pursuit of the War on Terrorism are short-term expedients. These may mask the more fundamental geopolitical forces and structures that bear upon the processes of global equilibrium. The forces of globalization strongly influence state behavior and in some instances erode national sovereignty and override national boundaries. However, the geopolitical system of varied regional and subnational frameworks within which geography and international politics interface continues to revolve around national states. It is the actions and behavior of the state that holds the keys to world stability, not the deeds of transnational terrorist networks.

In dealing with the topic of geography and US foreign policy, most political geographers are not loath to use the term ‘geopolitics’, although certain disclaimers are necessary. Contemporary geopolitics is not to be confused with the classical geopolitical view of the world as the struggle between land-power vs sea-power, or with long-discredited German geopolitik. Nor should it be identified with the deterministic use of geographical space in formulating foreign policy, which is the

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geopolitics that gave birth to the ideas of ‘Containment’, the ‘Domino Theory’, ‘Linkage’ and ‘Lynchpin’ states. These concepts were imbedded in Cold War realpolitik, and survive as one of the rationales for promoting expansionist US foreign policies on a global scale. A recent expression of the realpolitik approach is Henry Kissinger’s foreign policy prescription that calls upon Washington to take steps to ensure that no power emerges regionally or globally that can unite with others against the United States.

A definition that reflects a mainstream political geographical view of geopolitics is: ‘the analysis of the interaction between geographical settings and perspectives, and international politics’. The phrase ‘geographical settings’ is used in the broadest sense to embrace physical, economic, socio-cultural and political spatial features, patterns and lines of connection.

In conducting geopolitical analysis, this writer takes an approach that is regional and developmental, combining spatial theory with geographical area content in its application to foreign policy-making. The approach treats the world’s geopolitical structure as an evolving system composed of a hierarchy of levels—from the geostrategic realm through the geopolitical region, national state and its sub-national units. The states themselves are ranked by orders of power.

Hierarchy is used here in the spatial sense—from the macro- to the meso- to the micro-level. Politically, hierarchy operates quite differently. A national state (the meso-level) may dominate the geopolitical region within which it is located, and forge the framework of a geopolitical realm. In a decentralized national state, a metropolitan region, province or state may be the driving force that shapes national policies and, in turn, the destinies of geopolitical regions and realms.

The national state system continues to be the dominant component within the world geopolitical structure, although national sovereignty is increasingly influenced and qualified by regional and global geopolitical forces. It consists of five orders or levels. The first consists of major powers—the United States, the collectivity of states embraced by the European Union, Japan, Russia and China. These all have global reach, serving as the cores of the three geostrategic realms.

The second order of states consists of regional powers whose reach extends over

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much of their respective geopolitical regions and, in specialized ways, to other parts of the world. The third, fourth and fifth levels are those states whose reach is generally limited to parts of their regions only. In assessing the strategic importance of states, policy makers need to recognize their appropriate levels of power, still keeping in mind that lower-order states are capable of upsetting the system by serving as terrorist bases.

The rank of a nation in this hierarchy can be assessed through a number of measures. The higher the scale that is reached on the following criteria, the higher the level of power.

• Critical mass of human and material resources including numbers, quality, variety, geographical access, and level of technology and culture.
• Nuclear technology
• Degree of national cohesiveness, based upon social, religious, cultural, ethnic and racial factors, and sense of national history. Size and centrality of a dominant group’s location relative to that of minority groups, as well as the former’s command of communication networks, can be used as a measure of cohesiveness in the face of heterogeneous populations. Political stability/instability is another such measure.
• Political, military and economic energy levels, from high surplus, to maintenance, to minimum survival. Surplus energy can be defined as what is available to a state to expend beyond its borders, measured in such terms as size and quality of armed forces and high-technology weaponry needed to project national power and further national interests abroad; military and economic foreign aid and investments; size of embassy and other mission staffs; diplomatic and commercial exchanges; and international organizational activities devoted to promoting foreign links.
• Geographical range based on global and regional locations and effective reach to other orders of the hierarchy.
• Pattern and density of networks of international trade, political and cultural links.
• Degree of openness to new ideas and economic strategies which characterize the national system.
• Economic, political and military strength relative to neighboring states.
• Clarity and consistency of goals and strategy for wielding influence beyond its border.
• Number and complexity of international issues, including conflicts, that a state can handle simultaneously, as a measure of its political scope, maturity and options.
• Perception or self-image as to rank in the hierarchy.

Although power rankings suffer from being somewhat mechanistic, they are commonly used in international assessment. The attempt here has been to include a num-

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ber of value and political behavior characteristics that reach beyond the traditional emphasis on population, area, economic resources and military capacities. Such a ranking method cannot account for idiosyncratic factors like the length to which the dictator of an impoverished country, such as North Korea, will go to influence regional and even global events through threats of war, support of rebellions and offering a base for terrorism.

The increased importance of second-order, or regional states has come at the moment in world history when major powers have begun to distance themselves from regions which they no longer consider vital to their own national interests. Second-order powerdom is a reflection of the inherent military and economic strength of a state relative to its neighbors. It is also a function of its centrality or nodality in regional transportation, communication and trade. As important as any of these factors, however, is the ambition and perseverance of the state, not only to impose its influence on others, but to persuade them of their stakes in regional goals and values. Egypt’s geopolitical strength in the Middle East derives in great measure from its leadership within the Pan-Arabic movement.

Another criterion for measuring the strength of a regional power is its ability to gain sustenance from one or more major powers without becoming a satellite. Second-order powers continually strive for economic, political and military independence from first-order states. While these goals may not be fully attainable, independence in one sphere, such as technology or resources, may act as a counterweight to dependence in another sphere, such as the military or the economic. A second-order power also derives strength through extra-regional political-military alliances, trade or ideological links. When India took the lead in fostering the concept of Third World neutrality, its inherent power was increased by its global influence.

Membership within an order reflects the geopolitical power status of a state at a particular period of time. The orders are dynamic, as states shift across or within orders as a result of either cataclysmic events or evolutionary change. Thus the implosions of Yugoslavia and Congo have removed them from the regional power ranks. (In the case of Congo, the causes are both the corruption of the Mobutu regime and deep ethnic divisions.) Brazil has moved to the forefront of second-order states, while Argentina is now at the bottom of the order as a result of recent fiscal mismanagement and populist nationalist economic policies, as well as its earlier ill-fated invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) in 1982. India is making rapid progress towards becoming a first-order power owing to the growth of its high-tech industry and Pakistan’s instability, although the conflict over Kashmir continues to be a drain on its energies.

Geopolitical structures—the global framework

The Maritime Realm, within which the United States is the dominant power, currently includes as its geopolitical regions North and Middle America, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, the Asia-Pacific Rim, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Map 1). This realm, or major geostrategic plate, is characterized by relatively free
exchange of trade, ideas and people, relatively open migration flows and commitment to market economies, and is linked strategically by water.

Another realm, the Eurasian Continental (Heartlandic), is dominated by Russia and includes within its periphery the bordering parts of Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, in addition to the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Much of this periphery is now subject to Western penetration efforts. Historically, with the exception of Peter the Great’s drive to westernize Czarist Russia during the first quarter of the 18th century, the realm has been characterized by isolation and the drive for self-sufficiency.

During the Communist era, Stalin’s focus on the primacy of the Soviet state prevailed over Trotsky’s calls for giving priority to the international Marxist revolution. Moscow’s Cold War strategy of supporting Communist regimes and movements in many parts of the developing world represented a shift away from the Stalinist outlook. However, failure to change the inefficient and bloated state-owned economic system, combined with the strains of Soviet military initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, Cuba and Afghanistan, led to the ultimate collapse of the USSR.

In today’s Russia, a balance is being struck between the forces for national exclusiveness and those promoting international links. Building upon Boris Yeltsin’s hasty privatization of the economy, Vladimir Putin has pursued military accommodation with the United States and NATO, and liberalization of the economy through attracting foreign investment and seeking admission to the World Trade Organization. If the pendulum swings too far in the international direction without marked domestic economic improvement, or if Russia’s security appears threatened, the swing back to continentalism may be anticipated.

The East Asian Realm, which is led by China, also embraces North Korea and the Indochina region. The realm has both a landward and a maritime orientation. Until the Sino-Soviet schism, East Asia was a geopolitical region belonging to the Heartlandic Realm. China’s mixed landward and seaward character, evinced by regional differences in geographical setting, language, culture, economic outlook and political values, may lead eventually to a nuanced form of geopolitical division within that country whereby the south and central coastal region becomes a quasi-state. This region, which is known as the ‘Golden Coast’, pulsates with economic vitality and growth and is the source of China’s rapid rise as an exporting state.

South Asia is an independent region that has not yet matured geostrategically to the level of a realm. As India increases in power, it will gain the capacity to extend its geostrategic reach over the South Asian landmass and the western coastlands of the Indian Ocean, as well as the lands that front the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Under these circumstances, the present South Asian region is likely to evolve into a separate plate which would be known as the Indian Ocean Realm.

Caught between the present three realms and South Asia is the Middle Eastern Shatterbelt, which is geopolitically fragmented both by domestic and intra-regional conflict, and by pressures from major external powers. During the Cold War, Sub-

\[\text{Cohen, S.B.} \ Geog\text{raphy and politics in a world divided, op. cit., 85–88, 251–287.}\]
Saharan Africa also became a Shatterbelt because the United States, the USSR and various European powers intervened directly or through regional and extra-regional surrogates to maintain or overthrow regimes. With the collapse of the FSU, the African region reverted to the Maritime Realm.

‘Compression Zones’ differ from Shatterbelts in that they have become torn apart by internal conflicts, rooted in national tribal and ethnic rivalries, but are unaffected by the intrusions of major extra-regional powers. Since the end of the Cold War, Central Africa and the African Horn have emerged as Compression Zones within Sub-Saharan Africa—a region that has become geostrategically marginal to the world’s major powers, and especially to the United States. Some areas that link realms or geopolitical regions, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, serve as bridges and may be described as ‘Gateways’.

The world geopolitical system is dynamic, and structural changes are constantly taking place within and amongst its parts (Map 2). Thus China emerged from satellite status within Continental Eurasia to form a separate realm. Within the Maritime Realm, both Western Europe and the Asia–Paciﬁc Rim have achieved near-partnership status with North America, except in the area of military power, especially high-tech weaponry. Much of Continental Eurasia’s periphery (Russia’s ‘Near-Abroad’) is changing in response to United States’ military and economic penetration efforts in Eastern Europe, Georgia and Central Asia. As a consequence, this periphery may become converted into either a Shatterbelt or a Gateway.

There is a strong relationship between a nation’s foreign policy-making and geopolitical structure. Structures reﬂect such geographical dimensions as distance and access, patterns of resource use, trade, capital and migration ﬂows, levels of technology, and cultural/religious differences. As these dimensions change, foreign policy must adapt to them. For example, the ﬂow of capital and the out-sourcing of manufacturing from Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the United States to Coastal China, has forced these four countries to adapt their foreign policies to accommodate the new economic reality. Beijing, in turn, has adopted more ﬂexible policies on economy and trade, and in foreign affairs.

**United States foreign policy and geopolitical structure**

United States’ foreign policy takes place within this global framework. Washington’s long-range policy planners often fail to take into account the dynamic nature of the earth’s geopolitical structures, although anticipating the changing nature of the geopolitical system should be an essential element of policy-making. While structural changes are not precisely predictable, their trend-lines provide invaluable tools for crafting foreign policy. These trend-lines show an evolution toward an international

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system whose proliferating parts are increasingly specialized and integrated at global and regional levels.

Unfortunately, the developmental process does not erase divisions between or within states. Indeed, in the short-run, it often exacerbates such divisions. As favorably located areas between and within national states flourish and others lag, economic gaps may widen, thereby increasing domestic and international political tensions and divisions. A prime example is the widening gap between China’s flourishing ‘Golden Coast’ and its backward North and Interior. In addition, global and regional free trade in food products undermines traditional agriculture. In many of the least developed and developing countries of the world, this results in increasing rural poverty which, along with lack of security in remote areas, contributes to large-scale rural migration to cities that cannot provide jobs, housing and an adequate urban infrastructure for the newcomers.

Foreign policy-making is also complicated by the contradiction between long- and short-term goals, and by the need to put out brush fires. This is a special challenge for the United States. As the world’s sole hyper-power, it bears major responsibility for taking the lead in maintaining global stability in the face of constantly erupting conflicts. However, short-term policies often do not lead to long-term equilibrium. The dilemma is that immediate objectives may require policies of expedience that are at variance with long-term strategic goals. Political and military leaders may declare objectives to be short-term, while masking their real goal, which is long-term involvement. Or they may be dragged inadvertently into such an involvement out of indecisiveness, hubris or unforeseen domestic pressures.

The most dramatic example of having to act with immediate short-term responses is Washington’s reaction to the September 11, 2001 cataclysm. In its War against Global Terrorism, the United States has enlisted a disparate coalition, many of whose members are themselves plagued by terrorism and/or employ terrorist methods against opposition groups. The Bush administration has declared its intention to pursue the war against all terrorist groups as a long-term policy. Its immediate focus has been the perpetrators of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks—the Al Qaeda network that was based in and protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the countries that now may be harboring the network.

In seeking to mediate the Palestinian Arab–Israeli conflict, however, Washington has had to negotiate with Palestinian Arab terrorist leaders, as well as with Israel. As a result of both these conflicts, the US has found itself in league with authoritarian regimes that themselves may employ terrorist methods against opposition groups or have supported outside terrorist movements. It remains to be seen whether Washington will apply pressures against such regimes, once the current emergency has passed.

To help gain the short-term objective of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying the Al Qaeda base in that country, Washington renewed its military alliance with Pakistan, providing it with weaponry and economic aid. This had to be done in spite of Islamabad’s past role as the main supporter of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, and the safe haven that many of these fleeing Afghan terrorists have found in Pakistan. Moreover, the high degree of internal insta-
bility within the country that derives from the struggle between extremist Islamic movements and the military regime makes Pakistan a shaky long-term partner in the fight against terrorism.

The alliance with Islamabad increased the pressures upon the United States to try to stave off another war between Pakistan and India in June 2002 over Kashmir, by trying to persuade Islamabad to rein in Pakistani-based terrorist attacks aimed at ousting India from the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir. In restoring its ties with Pakistan, Washington runs the risk of undermining the prospects for forging a partnership with India, the increasingly dominant core country within South Asia, and with which it has begun to develop important military ties.

Despite serious communal strife between extremist Hindus and Muslims, India remains the world’s largest democracy, with nearly one-fifth of the world population. This includes the substantial, educated middle class that has provided the scientific, technical and entrepreneurial basis for India’s development into a major center for high-technology in the computer and bio-technology fields.

It is estimated that up to one-fourth of all Silicon Valley small-scale companies are owned by Indian or Chinese immigrants to the United States. Many of the Indian émigrés play a vital role in the growth of sophisticated high-tech industries in their mother country. These entrepreneurs are a major source of capital investment and the transfer of leading-edge technology to the enterprises that have sprung up in such Indian centers as Bangalore and Mumbai—a process which contributes more broadly to the strengthening of ties between the United States and India.

In trying to juggle its relationships between Pakistan and India, it is important for Washington policy-makers to take into account the likely emergence of India as a world power and the core of a new Indian Ocean Realm. Such a realm could act as a counter-balance to Chinese pressures against the southern portions of the Asia-Pacific Rim, from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore to Indonesia (Map 3).

**Terrorism and nation-state proliferation**

The War against Terrorism has created other policy dilemmas. While terrorism is often practiced by religious extremists or ideological movements of both the Left and the Right striving to overthrow existing regimes, it is also a weapon widely used by separatists seeking independence or full autonomy. Many of these irredentist movements have their origins in the disputes over boundaries that were established by colonial empires and carved out of territories that had been drawn up without regard for ethnic, racial and religious borders. This often resulted in splitting previously cohesive peoples and/or clustering disparate and hostile groups within a single sovereignty.

Over the past half century, the number of sovereign nation states has quadrupled from 45 to approximately two hundred. The demise of colonialism has been the main force behind this proliferation, supplemented in the 1990s by collapse of Soviet and Yugoslav Communism.

This process of proliferation has far from run its course. In many ways, the end
of the Cold War and the impact of globalization and regionalization have strengthened drives for separatism. The capacity of authoritarian regimes to hold their countries together and suppress dissident movements has been diminished, both by the waning of Communism as a ‘glue’ to hold states together, and by Western withdrawal of its military and economic backing of former anti-Communist dictators. Support of democratic institutions, freedom of speech and human rights by the United States and like-minded powers, may also aid irredentist movements in countries under authoritarian rule.

There is growing danger that, in its zeal to enlist states in the War against Terrorism regardless of their governance structure, Washington may revert to the discredited Cold War policy of supporting repressive authoritarian regimes. At a minimum, it may look favorably on attempts to subvert democratically elected regimes which are not to its liking, as was the case in the failed coup in Venezuela in April 2002.

Another pitfall is looming in Colombia. The United States is now providing large-scale military and economic aid to Bogota in an effort to eradicate coca and opium poppy production, and thus put a halt to the flow of cocaine and heroin into the US. However, in this war against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other left-wing terrorist groups, there is a danger that Colombian President Alvaro Uribe may become overly dependent upon right-wing militia forces which are also terrorists and narco-dealers. This might well subvert Washington’s goal.

The forces of globalization and regionalization are widely held to be the antitheses of nationalism. Certain economic, cultural and social forces frequently do undermine national values and weaken the idea of national sovereignty. However, other transnational forces can be harnessed by irredentist national movements to help them to gain independence or quasi-independence. Separatists may receive financial support from outside religious or ethnic movements, and use global communications, travel and trade channels to secure weaponry and manpower. They may also exploit the international media to elicit support for their cause. Global and regional religious ties are increasingly important in this process, as they reinforce faiths that have become the driving forces of nationalism in so many parts of the world. Thus, in what at first glance may appear to be a contradiction, globalization and regionalization often reinforce deeply-rooted ethnic, religious and racially-based nationalism to further the developmental process of state proliferation.

With the continuation of irredentist struggles and the elimination of the vestiges of colonialism, as many as 50–75 new, fully or quasi-sovereign entities may be added to the world community of states. This on-going world-wide struggle for national independence has profound implications for US foreign policy-making. Concomitant with the objective of eradicating global terrorism, it is essential that Washington generate new policy approaches that encourage separatist movements to negotiate their goals peacefully. In many cases, American pressures, sanctions and rewards by themselves will not be able to dictate peaceful resolutions of irredentist conflicts. Nor is the United Nations alone equipped to shoulder such a task.

On the other hand, a hands-off policy by Washington that simply awaits the implosion of many countries, is a recipe for global instability. The challenge is to find
new mechanisms for mediating these separatist disputes, based upon a partnership of effort among the United States, other major and regional powers, the United Nations and regional organizations. If such mechanisms are not developed, the world system will have to cope with many new ‘failed’ states that will fall prey to political chaos and economic collapse.

The ‘failed state’ is an unfortunate consequence of the proliferation process. Such states are deeply divided, war-torn, and lacking in national cohesiveness, whose governance institutions have collapsed to the point of anarchy or near-anarchy. Internal divisions have become so entrenched and have lasted for so long that they defy international and regional efforts at amelioration.

Models for addressing the ‘failed state’ syndrome include the proposed full-scale nation-building effort for Afghanistan, the NATO peace-keeping initiative in Bosnia, and the form of UN trusteeship that stabilized East Timor until it was able to hold national elections in May 2002. Even though East Timor is now formally independent, it will continue to require considerable international support to help it develop its offshore oil and gas reserves and to create a modern infrastructure. It remains to be seen how permanent these remedies will be. Up to now, the international community has lacked the capacity and geopolitical motivation to mount and then maintain such operations in most of the world’s failed states. It is more likely that massive intervention will continue to be pinpointed only toward lands that are global geopolitical flash points. Elsewhere the burden will be left to regional powers to try to mediate conflicts and restore domestic stability.

This need not be the case, however, for states that are on the verge of emerging. A strategy of early identification of emerging states would permit advance preparation by international and regional bodies to implement comprehensive infrastructure development programs within these prospective states as soon as, or even prior to, independence. This could help ward off potential political instability, and prepare such states to become viable members of the world community when they gain independence. Timely and effective international action could include commitment to technological and capital support for building and maintaining water, sanitation, health, transportation, communications and education infrastructures. Such comprehensive development efforts would require that, when new states emerge, their fledging governments demonstrate a ‘best effort’ to share responsibility for these programs, with agreed upon international monitoring and auditing. This is especially critical for countries with valuable resources that might be siphoned off by ruling cliques.

Such a strategy may be evolving as part of the recent US efforts to mediate the Palestinian Arab-Israeli conflict. The Bush administration has put forth the idea of a long-term, internationally-funded effort supported by the US, EU, UN and Arab states that would immediately set to work to build the physical, political, economic and social infrastructure for an interim Palestinian state. Such an interim state might be established even before a final agreement is reached between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs on territorial boundaries and ong-term security arrangements with Israel. Other candidates for timely intervention are those less developed parts of southern
Europe that suffer from economic and social backwardness and have strong separatist tendencies. These include Sicily, Corsica, Crete and, potentially, a unified Cyprus.

The independence of certain dependent territories that lie within the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Northwest Africa may also be anticipated. These include the Azores, the Madeira Archipelago and the Canary Islands. They all need comprehensive economic development aid and warrant early attention.

In breakaway territories that contain valuable mineral, land or water resources, or whose independence would block access to the sea, resolution of conflicts could be facilitated by arrangements to share the resources with the current sovereign entity and/or to guarantee transit rights. Areas in which such an approach might be effective include the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, southeastern Nigeria and South Sudan, all of which contain the major oil deposits of their countries. Significant energy reserves are also to be found in Xinjiang, Yakutia and natural gas-rich Aceh, where separatist sentiment is very strong. Another emergent state may be the Kurdish homeland in southeastern Turkey which commands the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. These waters are being tapped by Ankara through a giant dam and reservoir system supplemented by a series of small dams and hydroelectric plants to serve the needs of industry and agriculture in the southeastern and southern parts of Turkey.

In cases where conflicts are resolved through the creation of highly autonomous quasi-states, resource sharing and access must be guaranteed. China’s ‘Golden Coast’ is the heart of the country’s modern industrial growth. Beijing could ill afford to lose this revenue base without some sort of long-term agreement to share the region’s earnings should it become a quasi-state. Where fully independent states emerge, the need to work out resource-sharing and transit-rights formulae would probably require international or regional guarantees. The problem is less acute in those separatist areas located within the EU or NAFTA. If Catalonia or Vascongadas were to become sovereign or quasi-sovereign states, their economic patterns are unlikely to change because they will still be completely open to Spain in terms of movement of goods and people, as well as to the rest of EU, and would share the Euro currency. This would also be the case for Quebec which, if separated from Canada as a quasi-state, would continue to remain linked to it through NAFTA. Northern Mexico, another quasi-state candidate, would also retain links with the rest of Mexico through NAFTA.

In certain instances, states that have separated from one another or from a larger entity may eventually form confederated regional structures to serve their self-interests, especially economic ones. This is also the case for existing states that seek to maximize the benefits of inter-state cooperation. Parts of the former Soviet Union that might ultimately form confederations include the Baltic states or Estonia and Latvia; a Slavonic ‘Antata’ (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and possibly Moldova and Kazakhstan); and Greater Turkestan (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan). Other examples of possible confederations include China-Taiwan (or China-Taiwan-the ‘Golden Coast’); Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; Syria, Lebanon and what may remain of Iraq should it lose its Kurdish North; and Greek and Turkish Cyprus.
In the resolution of conflicts, the geopolitical structure of realms and regions is an important consideration in establishing mediating partnerships and in identifying the leadership of these partnerships. The United States is not necessarily best equipped to be the lead mediator in many of these disputes. For example, Washington has failed in its various attempts to impose a solution in the Arab–Israeli conflict, despite extraordinary efforts that recently included winning the support of moderate Arab states in the search for a Palestinian Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Greater progress might be made if the US were to involve the EU fully as a partner in the process, rather than pushing it into a secondary role as is now the case. Palestinian Arab mistrust of Washington would balance off Israel’s charges of European bias in favor of the Palestinian cause. The differences in peace-making strategies between the US and Europe would also have to reconciled through advance consultation if the two approached the mediation process as partners.

In the India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, where three geopolitical realms converge, the involvement of Russia and China along with the US and the UK is highly desirable. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has anything to gain from the continued threat of war between their two nuclear neighbors, and would benefit from regional stability.

Irredentism is strong in the Muslim southern Philippines, especially in the Sulu Archipelago (centering on the island of Basilan) and in southern Mindanao, and the region is plagued by continuing turmoil. In addition, northern Luzon is plagued by a small Maoist terrorist group. A joint mediation effort by the US, Japan and Australia would add strength to the peace-making process and perhaps facilitate the emergence of Southern Philippines as a quasi-state that may then ultimately gain statehood.

The proliferation of nation-states produces many new sovereign and quasi-sovereign units with specialized economic, socio/cultural and strategic functions. Their viability and prosperity depend upon becoming integrated with other components of the regional and global system as quickly as possible. Some may serve as bridges or gateways between, as well as within regions, while others may help to create shatterbelts or compression zones. A sound policy for the United States is to help develop the positive, specialized economic and social qualities of these new entities, as well as those of existing states, as a means of achieving greater equilibrium within the global system.

Let us turn now to specific foreign policy decisions faced by the United States in other parts of the world, in the context of their geographical underpinnings.

The Eurasian Continental Rim

Eastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia constitute an extensive zone that rims much of the Eurasian Continental Realm. The zone separates Heartlandic Russia from Maritime Europe, the Middle East Shatterbelt and, in the southeastern corner of Central Asia, the East Asian Realm and South Asia. This Continental periphery was until recently fully integrated politically and militarily with the Heart-
landic Realm. Until 1991, 14 of the zone’s current independent states were republics within the Former Soviet Union. A number of Eastern and Central European Communist satellite states also lay within the strategic grip of the FSU.

This zone is in the process of geopolitical restructuring. The outcome of the restructuring depends essentially upon whether Russia, the EU and the United States adopt policies of accommodation or competition. If accommodation is the path taken, then this intermediate belt can become an important gateway between the Maritime and Eurasian Continental Realms, as well as a bridge between East and South Asia and the Heartlandic Realm. If, however, the major Maritime powers see Russia’s periphery as a field over which to compete for influence, then it will become a shatterbelt that would become geographically linked to the present Middle Eastern Shatterbelt via Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

**Eastern Europe**

A case in point is the proposed expansion of NATO deep into Russia’s European periphery. Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have all applied for full membership consideration at the NATO summit of November 2002 in Prague. Proponents of such expansion argue that this would protect Eastern Europe from the possible resurgence of Russia, and diminish the historic threat of Germany to the region by tying the two together militarily within the broader Atlantic Alliance framework. Moscow’s perception is quite different, for it has viewed the proposed expansion as a strategic threat to its national security. Slovenia and Slovakia would provide NATO with a land bridge from Poland, through Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia to the Adriatic Sea and Italy. Their admission represents no threat to Russia. However, with the exception of Albania and Macedonia, the other candidates for membership are located astride the Baltic or Black Sea approaches to Russia, or adjoin its European Southwest, and are strategically vital to Russian security.

President Clinton’s pledge to support the aspirations of the three Baltic countries to join NATO when he signed a Charter of Partnership with their three presidents, was a politically-motivated gesture, without due regard for Russia’s security concerns. Until recently, NATO’s European leadership has been more cautious about their admission. Now that Moscow’s objections have been muted as a trade-off for gaining greater access to Western capital and markets, prospects for their inclusion have increased.

It was predictable that Moscow would react negatively to the proposed penetration of NATO into the eastern Baltic from which Alliance forces would overlook St. Petersburg and isolate Kaliningrad. Even if Russian opposition to admission of the Baltic states has now become less strident, its fundamental security concerns remain. Should relations between Moscow and the West deteriorate in the future, the Baltic state members of NATO would be vulnerable to destabilization through Moscow’s ability to provoke unrest amongst the Russian populations of Estonia and Latvia. Nearly one-third of Estonia’s population is ethnic Russian and is concentrated in Tallinn, the capital, which is 40% Russian, and in the northeastern part of the country
adjoining Russia. The population of Narva, the Estonian border city that is only 100 miles from St. Petersburg, is 90% Russian. Latvia’s population is over one-third Russia. It is spread throughout the country and constitutes the majority of the population of the main urban centers, including the capital of Riga. This makes Latvia especially vulnerable to potential upheavals by ethnically Russian citizens backed by Moscow.

Russia has not yet ratified its border treaties with Estonia and Latvia, linking the signing to the human rights of the Russian minorities. In Estonia the issue is the threat of denial of voting rights to Russians and their descendents who settled in the country after its incorporation into the USSR in 1940. There is tension over official language laws in both countries, inasmuch as many Russians do not speak the native language.

Only in Lithuania are the Russians a small minority (under 10%). However, in the capital, Vilnius, Russians and Belorussians make up one-fourth of the total population and could also prove a source of instability should Moscow choose to put pressure on a Lithuanian government. For the present, relations between Moscow and Vilnius are cordial. Lithuania has simplified procedures for granting citizenship to their Russian inhabitants, and trade with Russia, its main trading partner, is on the rise.

In the deliberations that are taking place within NATO, the potential vulnerability of the three Baltic states to Russian pressures should be kept in mind. The possibility that these states could drag NATO into a crisis with Moscow may appear remote in this period of harmony and partnership between Russia and the Atlantic Alliance. However, leadership and national policies change. What, for example, would NATO do should Russia decide to return short-range nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad as a means of putting pressure on the Baltic states, which, as members of NATO, would have recourse to its collective security provisions?

Moscow has already taken steps to enhance its security interests in the Baltic by constructing a large oil export terminal at Primorsk, one hundred miles northwest of St. Petersburg at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. The facility is connected to a newly completed pipeline that is the first section of the Baltic Pipeline Project. This project will expand the present pipeline system to open up large-scale exploitation of the Timen–Pechora oil and gas reserves of Russia’s Arctic Far North, and better serve the fields of West Siberia and some of Kazakhstan.

Continued expansion of a by-pass system could negatively impact Baltic state economies. A substantial share of Russian oil exports now move through Baltic Sea terminals in Latvia and Estonia. The largest of these terminals, Ventspils in Latvia, alone takes 15% of Russia’s petroleum shipments. The Primorsk terminal will facilitate the expansion of the country’s overall production, and, in an emergency, bypass the Baltic State transit-ways. In addition, Russia has enlarged St. Petersburg to

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become its largest port with the goal of reducing its dependence on dry cargo ports in Estonia and Latvia.

Russia’s strategic concerns also focus on Ukraine, whose eastern border juts into Southwestern Russia, and on Belarus which is the bridgehead to Moscow. Ukrainians, sometimes called ‘Little Russians’ share racial, linguistic and religious ties to the ‘Great Russians’ of Russia, as do the ‘White Russians’ of Belarus. These three Eastern Slavic countries formed the medieval kingdom of Kievan Russia (10th–13th century), and both Ukraine and Russia view Kiev as the historic political cores of their respective national existence. Russians call Kiev, which was the first seat of the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan, the ‘Mother of Cities’. Belorussians continue to identify themselves culturally, ethnically and religiously with their Russian neighbors, and many even call for reunification with Russia.

Despite substantial economic aid to Ukraine from the United States, Moscow continues to be Kiev’s major trading partner, and, up to now, has maintained stable and reasonably close relations with its neighbor. While there is strong pro-Western political movement within the country, domestic pressures to apply for NATO membership have decreased, and the results of the April 2002 national elections suggest that relations with Moscow will not change appreciably. For recent Ukrainian governments, the priority has been and continues to be admission to the European Union.

An important factor which links the fates of Russia and Ukraine geopolitically is the geographical merger of the heavily industrialized Donets Basin and the Dneiper Lowland of Eastern Ukraine, the country’s economic and population core area, with the Russian core. The economic ties between the two neighbors are reinforced by the Ukraine’s role as the transit-way for pipelines that export 90% of Russia’s vast natural gas resources to Western Europe, supplying 25% of the latter’s total market needs. The transit fees earned by Kiev are important to its economy, and by-passing the country with new lines that would extend across Belarus, Poland and Slovakia, would represent a significant financial loss that Ukraine can ill afford.

Moscow views the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine, which has the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, as a serious security threat. Were this to take place in the face of Russian opposition, Moscow would be in a position, as it is in the Baltic states, to destabilize the country by encouraging the secession of its Russian populace in the heavily industrialized portions of Ukraine (Kharkiv, which is one-third ethnic Russian, and the Donets Basin, where Russians are nearly half the population), and in Crimea. The strategic significance to Russia of Crimea (the official name of which is ‘Republic of Crimea’) is underscored by the agreement that was made with Ukraine in 1997, whereby the latter’s sovereignty over the peninsula was recognized in exchange for Moscow’s right to continue to base its Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol. Ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the population of this Ukrainian autonomous region. Moldova is also subject to Russian pressures because the majority of the population of its eastern part, Transnistria, is Russian or Ukrainian, and its inhabitants have already created a pseudo-state there.

The strategic threat of NATO expansion into these western borderlands of Russia could add urgency to Moscow’s interest in forging a geostrategic alliance with Beijing. President Vladimir Putin is using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (whose
members are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as a vehicle to strengthen its partnership with China, while simultaneously building its ties to the West.

Russia is currently in a weakened state, but given its size, central location within Eurasia, wealth of resources and educated population, this is likely to be temporary. Oil has already begun to lead the way to the country’s economic recovery. With 10% of the world’s petroleum production, Russia has become the world’s second largest exporter of petroleum, most of which goes to Western Europe, whose imports come essentially from Russia and the Middle East. Shipping Russian oil to markets requires enlarging its seaport capacity to handle super-tankers, as reflected in plans to develop a major port at Murmansk. It also requires building new pipelines or enlarging existing ones to reach European and world markets. In addition, Moscow has recently signed oil and gas exploration and production agreements with Baghdad, which will enhance its role as an energy power when UN sanctions against Iraq are eventually lifted.

Whether Eastern Europe is to become a Shatterbelt or a Gateway region depends very much on the decisions that the West is poised to make on the applications that most of the states of the region have made for admission into NATO and the EU. An immediate issue is the security threat that Lithuanian membership in both bodies poses for Kaliningrad, which may become a flash point in Russian-Western European relations. Formerly East Prussia’s Konigsberg region, Kaliningrad is Russia’s enclave on the Baltic Sea that is surrounded by Lithuania and Poland. Russia’s main Baltic naval base and headquarters of the Baltic fleet is located at Baltisk on the outskirts of the port city of Kaliningrad.

Current agreements with Lithuania guarantee freedom of movement of people and goods, including energy pipelines, across Lithuanian territory to and from Russia via Belarus. Should Lithuania join the EU, limitations such as visa requirements are scheduled to be imposed upon travel to and from Kaliningrad. While citizens of EU member states may move freely within the Union, movement from countries outside the EU is tightly monitored. Similar restrictions might be placed upon the transit of goods unless the EU waives some of its regulations, as it did for the non-member Swiss to travel within the EU.

NATO membership for Lithuania would complicate matters still further. Currently Russia enjoys military land and air movement across Lithuania that is not subject to oversight by Vilnius. As a member of NATO, Lithuania might have to limit such movement. It could also become a forward staging base for the Atlantic Alliance, cutting off the Russian exclave and severely compromising its security. Under such circumstances, Moscow might well counter by repositioning short-range nuclear weapons within Kaliningrad.

To protect its enclave, Moscow might mount a campaign for a ‘Kaliningrad Corridor’ cutting across either a 70 mile-long strip of southwestern Lithuania to the

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Belarus border near Grodno, or a 150 mile-long strip across southern Lithuania to Belarus and thence to Minsk. The prospect of a demand for such a corridor conjures up the ill-fated Polish Corridor and Germany’s demands for the return of this corridor that was one of the sparks for World War Two.

Just as Kaliningrad could be the first step in the emergence of Eastern Europe as a Shatterbelt, so could it also be a catalyst for conversion of the region into a Gateway, should compromises be found on EU regulations, and Lithuania be accorded a relationship with NATO similar to the one now held by Russia, rather than as a full member. Moscow has already established Kaliningrad as a Special Economic Region whose goods are imported on a duty-free basis, and the port at Kaliningrad has been deepened to handle larger cargo vessels.

The Kalinigrad of today is an isolated, impoverished region where smuggling of goods is rife and the future is uncertain. Should it become a ‘Europort of the East’, serving Russia, Belarus and northern Ukraine, it could serve as the northern hub of a new Eastern European Gateway Region.

The focus of NATO’s Prague summit meeting of November 2002 is its consideration of new membership applications from the nine eastern European countries. The alternative to accepting these applications is to invite these states to join as members an expanded NATO-Russia Council. The accord signed by Moscow and the 19 NATO member states on May 28, 2002 grants Russia equal partnership in discussions and actions over such security issues as military cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, regional peace-keeping, counter-terrorism and civilian emergency planning. It reserves for NATO full control over such core military decisions, including its commitment to collective defense, the use of troops to defend nearby nations, and the admission of new members.

Bringing the Baltic states, Ukraine and other East European countries into the Council on a par with Russia would allay Moscow’s fears of their becoming NATO forward bases that could threaten Russia’s security. It would also relieve these relatively impoverished states of the burden of having to modernize their armed forces so that they can be fully integrated into NATO. Ukraine already enjoys a ‘Special Partnership Charter’ with NATO (signed in 1997), and the shift to membership within the NATO-Russian Council could be easily made.

Embracing the countries of Eastern Europe within the Council would facilitate their prospects of serving as economic and cultural gateways between Russia and the West, whether or not some of the Eastern European states achieve their goal of becoming members of the EU eventually. Were the Baltic states to join the Council rather than NATO, they would advance their case for Moscow’s continued use of their territories as oil, gas and general cargo transit-ways.

Trans-Caucasus

No geopolitical discussion of the rest of Russia’s periphery can take place without reference to oil and natural gas. The future development of these resources in both the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia is of great interest to the West. To Russia,
these regions are important in terms of both their energy reserves and their strategic military value.

The extensive Russian military involvement in the affairs of Georgia and Armenia during the past decade reflects the depth of Moscow’s strategic interests in the Trans-Caucasus. For its part, Washington has made considerable efforts to expand its influence within Georgia through foreign aid and in support of Western oil interests seeking to build a pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan, across Georgia to the Black Sea.

Most recently, the United States accepted an invitation from the Georgian government to send a military mission to train Georgian soldiers in combating Chechnyan and foreign mujahedeen guerrillas operating in the Pankisi Gorge which adjoins Chechnya. (Georgian Muslims have also joined in the Chechnyan struggle.) Although Prime Minister Putin later down-played the significance of this move, Moscow’s initial opposition to the presence of American soldiers so close to its borders reflects its concern that this is part of Washington’s long-term strategy of penetrating the Trans-Caucasus.

The Georgian government has been calling for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from its territory. One of the pressures that Moscow is able to apply in this regard is its role in Abkhazia. This Georgian Autonomous Region, whose economy is based upon agriculture and health resorts, lies between the Black Sea and the Greater Caucasus range in the northwestern part of the country. In the civil war of 1992–93 waged by Abkhazian rebels seeking independence, 260,000 Georgians were driven out. The Russians brokered a peace agreement that left Abkhazia’s formal status in doubt. Since then Russian troops stationed within the region have maintained an uneasy calm. The independence claimed by the victorious Abkhazian rebels remains unrecognized internationally, and the region’s government-in-exile operates from Tblisi, the capital of Georgia. Whether Abkhazia does eventually break away depends to a considerable extent upon Georgia’s maintaining positive relations with Russia, rather than adopting a pro-Western, anti-Russian stance.

Azerbaijan is also on Washington’s agenda, as Western oil companies actively negotiate with the Azerbaijani government to develop Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves. In apparent recognition of Russia’s strategic advantages within the region, Washington turned down Azerbaijan’s request for military and diplomatic support in its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region—the enclave within southwestern Azerbaijan populated mainly by Armenians. (Armenia is closely allied with Russia militarily.) Instead, the US has joined Russia in trying to negotiate a peace between the warring Caucasus states over the future of the region, which has been under of Armenian control since the cease-fire of the early 1990s.

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Central Asia

Central Asia is the third part of Russia’s peripheral zone. The vast oil and gas reserves of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan drew the Clinton administration into embracing the entire Caspian Sea region as a strategic and commercial objective. This represents a major geopolitical challenge to Russia, which has historically considered Central Asia to be its ‘backyard’ and essential to its security. Moreover, Russia has agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to expand their oil and gas industries and pipeline networks.

The war in Afghanistan, which has required strong support and acquiescence from Moscow for US use of air and ground force bases in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, has deepened American involvement in Central Asia. This has been reinforced by Washington’s promises of economic and military aid to the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments. However, Russia holds a superior strategic position in this land-locked region. The United States would be at a major disadvantage militarily and politically were it to seek to establish a permanent military presence within Central Asia. Substantial Russian populations live in North and East Kazakhstan and in Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is dependent upon Russian troops for protection against rebel Islamic fundamentalists.

Moscow has also helped Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to curb the threat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)—an Uzbek-led coalition that includes Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Uighurs. This militant extremist movement has focused its operations in the densely populated agricultural and industrial Fergana Valley of eastern Uzbekistan, which spills over into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The initial goal of the IMU was to establish a Islamic republic within Uzbekistan. However, in 2001, it expanded its sights to embrace the creation of a Central Asian Islamic Republic, changing its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan.

United States actions in Central Asia stemming from the war in Afghanistan, have raised the ‘short-term vs long-term’ policy question in this region. Is Washington’s goal simply to help carry the war against the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda to a conclusion and to assure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic future? Or is this the prelude to a long-term US strategy for penetrating Central Asia in a new ‘Great Game’ in competition with Russia for influence over the region and its tempting energy resources? 12

It would be a prudent policy for the United States to recognize Russian strategic dominance there, and to include Russian oil companies in the cooperative development of the region’s energy reserves and pipelines. One line with joint Western, Kazakh and Russian participation has already been constructed through Russian territory to Novorossisk on the Black Sea. However, other oil and gas lines under consideration by Western oil interests would by-pass Russia to run from Baku through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, to the latter’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The

Western Consortium that has been established to build the Baku–Ceyhan lines, has approached leading Russian oil companies with an eye to their becoming investors—a positive sign in developing a policy of accommodation. Another pipeline project under consideration would extend from Central Asia through Iran, although such a project is currently an anathema to Washington.

If the United States is to opt for making Central Asia a Gateway rather than a Shatterbelt region, it should withdraw its military forces as rapidly as the situation in Afghanistan permits, and refrain from becoming involved in local Central Asian politics. Making every effort to enlist Russian partners in the varied energy development projects would reinforce the region’s prospects of developing into a gateway.

**Emerging Geopolitical Structures**

Map 3 illustrates significant global and regional geopolitical changes that may be anticipated in the coming decades. United States’ policy-makers should be alert to their implications.

- Probable emergence of an Indian Ocean Realm dominated by India.
- Expansion of Maritime Europe and the Maghreb into Anatolia, the Levant and northeast Africa. This would form a new geopolitical region, which I have chosen to call **Euromediterranea**.
- Eastward extension of a reconstituted Middle East Shatterbelt into western Pakistan because of the implosion of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This could lead to the creation of a new state of **Pakhtoonistan**.
- Emergence of both the East Asia Coastal Seas and the Caribbean as gateway regions.
- Development of a South America Southern Cone geopolitical region as a distinctly independent force within the Maritime Realm.

**The South Asia realm**

For half a century, India pursued a policy of neutrality in global affairs, but one that had sought and received support from Moscow to balance the Cold War military alliance between Washington and Islamabad. The end of the Cold War has presented an opportunity for building a strong working relationship between the US and India. Such a relationship would be undermined, however, should the United States once again become deeply committed to long-term economic and military support of the Pakistani regime as a result of the exigencies of the War against Terrorism. Failure to forge a partnership between Washington and New Delhi could eventually compromise America’s strategic position within the Indian Ocean, where its naval and air forces now enjoy unchallenged freedom of movement, but are in danger of being ousted from nearby Middle Eastern bases.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is a weak and unpredictable long-term ally for the United States. It may well implode because of its internal ethnic, linguistic and religious schisms. In such circumstances, its western Pashtun fringe could break
away to merge with the Pashtun sections of eastern and southern Afghanistan to form an independent Pakhtoonistan.

The addition to the world geopolitical system of an Indian Ocean Realm, led by India, would create greater balance amongst the system’s geostrategic realms. If US foreign policy is to be determined by geopolitical realities, it should strive to create close military and economic ties with India as soon as the War in Afghanistan winds down. US-India army and navy joint exercises have recently been initiated. They are likely to be expanded because the two countries have common security interests in the Indian Ocean. While Moscow remains New Delhi’s main arms supplier, Washington could win greater influence by providing the Indian military with specialized high-tech equipment. Even with closer strategic relations between India and the US, however, New Delhi is not likely to allow itself to become a pawn in US-Sino relations. Instead it is likely to steer an independent course as leader of the world’s fourth geostrategic realm, balancing off Russian, Western and Chinese interests, and thus contributing to global equilibrium.

Euromediterranea

The prospect of expanding Maritime Europe and the Maghreb into a new Euromediterranean geopolitical region that would include the lands of the eastern Mediterranean, holds profound geopolitical implications for the United States. The major burden for Maritime Realm strategic political and economic responsibilities in these lands would shift from the US to Maritime Europe. Emergence of the possible new region hinges upon the following eventualities:

1. Turkey’s admission to the EU (which depends in part on the resolution of its Kurdish problem and human rights issues), and Ankara’s continuing market-oriented economic reforms that would link it more closely to the European and global economies.
2. Resolution of the Cyprus dispute. If the island is to become a reunified state, a Greco-Turkish condominium over a confederated Cyprus/North Cyprus state might first have to be established as a step towards an eventual federated Cypriot state.
3. Modernization of the Egyptian economy and democratization of its governance structure to address Western Europe’s concerns. This would strengthen Cairo’s leadership role within the Arab lands of the Levant and northeast Africa.

The emergence of Euromediterranea is also dependent on the resolution of Arab–Israel conflict discussed below. Rationale for this development is geopolitically compelling. The links between Maritime Europe and the geographically contiguous countries of the eastern Mediterranean have a strong cultural and historic basis. Contemporary ties are strengthened by Europe’s role as the major trading partner of these lands, and as the destination for substantial emigration from such countries as Turkey, Egypt, Libya and the Levant. This is in addition to the larger Muslim population that has emigrated to Europe from the countries of the Maghreb.
The European Union’s capacity to become the leading force within the Levant has been enhanced by its progress toward economic parity with the United States. Building a separate European Rapid Defense Force, as is planned by the Europeans, would strengthen Europe’s influence within the eastern Mediterranean coastland states. Europe has both the capital and the technical know-how to develop the sophisticated armaments industry that an independent force requires. Should it gain the military capacity to match its economic power, Maritime Europe would be especially well positioned to play a partnership role with the United States within the eastern rim of the present Middle East.

For Washington, a Euromediterranea could mean a reduction in its current military and economic aid programs to Israel, Egypt and Jordan, to be replaced by Maritime European assistance. At the same time, the United States would be relieved of some of its diplomatic and political burdens within the Levant, especially those related to mediating and then enforcing a peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Washington would do well to engage the EU as a full partner in mediating the conflict, given the dilemma that it faces in taking a position that can satisfy both Israel, to whose security it is firmly committed, and to the Arab world that is so strategically important for its oil and pivotal role within the broader Muslim world.

Palestinian Arab-Israeli Conflict

A requisite condition for the creation of Euromediterranea is the Resolution of the Palestinian Arab–Israeli conflict through establishment of a Palestinian state in nearly all of the West Bank and in Gaza. Such a state would include ‘al Kuds’—the Arab portions of East Jerusalem which would serve as the capital of Palestine, Haram al Sharif and the Muslim quarter of the Old City. Optimally, the infrastructure and economy of Jewish and Arab Jerusalem would be integrated to provide for functional unification of the city and its Metropolitan reaches. Evacuation of most of the Israeli settlements beyond the ‘Green Line’ would also be required, as would compensation for the Arab refugees. Many could be relocated to Palestine, and a token number to Israel.

President Bush has proposed a Palestinian state contingent upon electing new leadership, democratic governance structures, revamped security agencies and a sustained fight against terrorism. He urged Israel to freeze settlement activities and withdraw its troops to pre-Intifada positions while the Palestinians initiate these reforms. Boundaries and other aspects of sovereignty would be provisional until negotiations on a final agreement based on UN resolutions 242 and 333 are concluded. They call for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories to secure and recognized borders. The proposal, which President Bush felt could be implemented in three years, is premised on the ousting of Yassir Arafat and other present leadership, to be replaced by leaders ‘uncompromised by terror’. It is uncertain whether a free election would

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produce leaders prepared to wage war against Arab rejectionists, or whether an Israeli
government headed by Ariel Sharon would negotiate abandoning the settlements. Any
final agreement would have to involve relocating up to 75,000 West Bank Jewish
settlers living in dozens of villages, and all 6500 in Gaza’s 15 settlements.

The opponents to peace in both camps now exert great influence—the Arab
extremists continue to dream of destroying the Jewish state; the aim of Israeli extrem-
ists is the ‘transfer’ of all Arabs out of the West Bank.

On the other hand, there are forces that might move both sides towards compro-
mise and peace. The cycle of terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliation has wrought
devastation upon major Arab urban areas, and the large number of deaths, human
suffering and economic privation suffered by the Palestinians cannot be indefinitely
endured. Similarly, the Intifada that has lasted since September 2000 has placed an
enormous psychic strain upon the daily lives of Israelis, in addition to the hundreds
of lives lost in terrorist bombings and the deterioration of the economy. Moreover,
the offer by the Arab states to have peace and normal relations with Israel in return
for a Palestinian state should allay some of Israel’s regional security concerns, and
is a new factor in the negotiations equation.

It is possible that the current blood letting will continue to escalate until both
sides agree to peace negotiations out of mutual exhaustion. However, neither the
West nor the Arab states can afford to permit matters to drift to that point. Intensified
efforts to mediate the conflict through US intervention have been generated by the
West’s fears that continuation of the conflict will increasingly undermine its relationship
with Arab oil states and the Muslim world as a whole. The Middle East is
Europe’s main oil provider, and Saudi Arabia is the second largest foreign supplier
to the United States, accounting for 8.5% of total US oil consumption in 2001. In
addition, the United States is concerned about retaining access to its air, naval and
ground bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the Gulf States, as well as to
line up Arab support for possible military actions against Iraq and continued commit-
tment to the War on Terrorism. Particularly worrisome to Washington are the threats
of possible overthrow of the Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian regimes.

A reconfigured Middle East shatterbelt

Should the western rim of the Middle East become geopolitically reoriented to
Europe, the Middle East would take a different outline. Such a reconstituted Shat-
terbelt would consist of the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian/Arab Gulf, Iraq, Iran and
Afghanistan. In addition, the region’s eastern border might be extended to include
Pakistan’s Pashtun areas.

This eastward extension may be anticipated because neither Afghanistan nor Pakis-
tan are cohesive national units. There is a strong likelihood that, despite the extraordi-
nary efforts by the Allied powers to rebuild Afghanistan as a unified state, it will
not be possible to overcome the ethnic, tribal and spatial divisions that have torn
the country apart. The internal fragmentation is reinforced by pressures from Iran,
Pakistan, Central Asia and Russia. With the defeat of the Taliban, the Pashtuns have
lost control of the country to a coalition in which the Northern Alliance plays a
prominent role. Hamid Karzai, who was overwhelmingly elected President of a transitional government by a Loya Jirga (national assembly), is a Pashtun. However, Northern Alliance leaders, particularly Tajiks from the Panjshir Valley, control key governmental coalition posts, including the army and foreign affairs. Should the northerners continue to play a dominating role in the government after the national elections scheduled for June 2004, the majority Afghan Pashtuns might be tempted to join their trans-border kinsman, who, for decades have sought independence from Pakistan.

Pakistan, too, may implode as a result of the pressures of Islamic extremism, as well as Pashtun separatism, and the inability of its military regime to contain these forces. The outcome could be the emergence of a Pakhtoonistan that straddles a mountainous 800-mile borderland between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This state would include the Pashtun tribal areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan, in addition to those of western Pakistan from just north of Quetta in northern Baluchistan, through the Federally-administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province.

US policy-makers should have contingency plans to disengage from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One consequence of withdrawal from Afghanistan is that without the use of that country as a base of operations, any long-term policies aimed at penetrating Central Asia would be almost impossible to fulfill.

In a restructured Middle East Shatterbelt, Europe is likely to share more of the responsibilities now shouldered by the United States for protecting the Maritime Realm interests there, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean. A major factor in such a shift of responsibilities is that, along with Japan and other Asia-Pacific Rim countries, Maritime Europe is far more dependent on oil imports from the Middle East than is the U.S. Also, as previously noted, pressure is mounting in Arab countries, not only from Islamic fundamentalists, but also from general public opinion for the withdrawal of American forces from their bases in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian/Arab Gulf. Loss of such bases would increase Washington’s dependence upon secure positions located within the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

New gateway regions—East Asian Coastal Seas and the Caribbean

Emergence of an East Asia Coastal Seas Gateway region would bring about far-reaching change in the world geopolitical system. Such a region would include China’s ‘Golden Coast’, which extends along China’s southern and central coastal areas from Hong Kong and Guangzhou to Shanghai. Together with Taiwan and a unified Korea, the region would link an important part of the Asia-Pacific Rim and North America to the East Asia Realm and the Russian Far East.

The economic growth of the ‘Golden Coast’ continues to benefit from capital inflows from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, and the outsourcing of manufacturing from these countries, as well as from the United States. This maritime-oriented part of China is very different from the country’s North and Interior, economically, culturally and linguistically. The gap between the country’s continental and maritime regions has widened as the North has been devastated by the collapse of its outdated
and inefficient heavy industry, and the Interior is impoverished by rural over-population and foreign farm imports. As Communism loses its grip over the country, nationalism may prove an adequate substitute in binding the North and the Interior together, but it is not likely to become the driving force within the ‘Golden Coast’. There, economic prosperity based upon integration with the world market system, access to Asia-Pacific Rim capital markets, and close ties with the Chinese immigrant communities of the Maritime World, will probably move it in the direction of becoming the core of the new Gateway region.

In all likelihood, the ‘Golden Coast’ would not break away from North and Interior Continental China as an independent state, but would seek quasi-independent status in confederation with China. Confederation with China would also be the logical path for Taiwan. In the case of both the ‘Golden Coast’ and Taiwan, a ‘Hong Kong Plus’ model might be the vehicle whereby they could enjoy the freedom that Hong Kong now has in economic affairs, and also exercise a modicum of political independence, such as through UN membership and authority over local government. In military and over-all security matters, however, they would have to accept tight control from Beijing, and follow its lead in international politics.

Current US diplomatic and economic policies toward China, including Washington’s support of Beijing’s admission to the World Trade Organization, contribute to the emergence of this Gateway. Washington would face a grave dilemma in its relations with China should Beijing resist mounting pressures and unrest within the ‘Golden Coast’ and Taiwan for a more independent status.

The Caribbean is another potential Gateway region, bridging North and Middle America, Euromediterranea, and South America. In Latin America, it is important to distinguish geopolitically between Mainland Middle America (Mexico and the seven Central American countries); the Caribbean region (the islands and the northern part of South America that fronts on the Caribbean Sea) which is geographically part of Middle America; and the rest of South America (the northern Andean states and the ‘Southern Cone’ consisting of Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile). In general, United States’ geopolitical influence within Latin America is greatest in Mexico and Central America and decreases with distance, with the exception that much of the Caribbean is as close to the US mainland as is Central America. However, Caribbean proximity to the United States is offset by the region’s ease of sea access to Maritime Europe via the southwestward flowing Atlantic Ocean currents from Europe and the eastward-returning North Atlantic Drift.

Hispanic/Indian Mainland Middle America is most closely tied to the United States economically and politically. The bulk of its trade is with the US, which is also the source of most of Middle America’s foreign investment capital. The outsourcing of American industrial production and dollar remittances received from immigrants residing in the United States have drawn the region inextricably close to the US. The creation of NAFTA in 1994 and the increased flow of immigration have intensified the geopolitical integration of Mexico, Mainland Middle America’s sole regional power, with its northern neighbor.

A reflection of this integration is that Mexico ranks with China and the EU as top trading partners of the United States. Another measure is that the political bound-
ary between northern Mexico and the US border from Texas to California has been replaced by a broad cultural and economic zone that straddles the two countries. Moreover, Mexico’s political orientation towards the United States has changed profoundly. From 1929 to 1997, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) pursued a policy of independence from the US and opposition to ‘Yankee Imperialism’. As an expression of its neutrality, Mexico was the only Latin American country to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. With the defeat of the PRI in the national election of 1997, and assumption of the Presidency by Vicente Fox in 2000, the tradition of neutrality has been abandoned in favor of close ties with Washington.

In contrast to Mainland Middle America, the Caribbean is a region of considerable cultural, racial and political diversity, with balanced ties to both the United States and Europe. The largest and most important Caribbean states, Cuba and Venezuela, have taken political courses independent of the United States. In addition, the small islands which are mostly European dependencies continue to trade heavily with Europe and attract tourists from there as well as from the United States. While the U.S. is the leading trade partner of such larger island states as Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (as well, of course, of Puerto Rico), their trade with Europe is also important. Because of Washington’s sanctions against Cuba and its loss of Moscow’s economic support, Havana’s trade is mainly with Europe.

In many ways, the Caribbean already functions as a gateway to the US mainland. The negative side is the region’s role as passageway for drugs, smuggled goods and laundered funds and as a tax shelter haven. On the positive side, the Caribbean attracts tourists and economic investments from the US and Europe, and provides oil storage and trans-shipment facilities for goods moving to the North American mainland. The majority of the Caribbean’s emigrees find their way to the US, although considerable numbers of natives of Jamaica, Suriname, Guayana and the island dependencies have migrated to their present or former European colonial countries. Moreover, the United States has served as safe-haven for hundreds of thousands of Cubans who fled the Castro regime, and is a popular destination for the flight of capital from Venezuela, which has suffered from both economic and political instability.

Caracas and Havana have drawn closer together since Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez launched his ‘popular revolution’ that would mirror the Castro Cuba model. The degree to which this effort will succeed is questionable, given the considerable opposition that Chavez has encountered from the Venezuelan middle class and the military, as well as the dependence of the Venezuelan economy upon trade with the United States. However, in a post-Castro, post-Chavez era, Venezuela and Cuba, along with Puerto Rico, could form a geopolitical triangle that would provide the framework for the Caribbean Gateway.

An independent or quasi-independent Puerto Rico would continue to enjoy close relations with mainland United States. These ties are reinforced by the political weight of the mainland Puerto Rican community, as they are for the Cuban émigré community that has settled in the US. To avoid being dominated geopolitically by the United States, the Caribbean Gateway would be able to exploit its balanced ties
to Europe and South America. Moreover, as some of the region’s small, colonial territories gain their independence in the on-going process of de-colonization, they will become more open to trade with the entire Atlantic basin, rather than only the original colonizing powers, thus expanding the potential of the gateway.

**South America Southern Cone**

The Caribbean Gateway would also serve as a bridge for a prospective new geopolitical region—the South America Southern Cone. This geopolitical Cone would include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia and the Amazonian sectors of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The region would be organized around Brazil, which has the largest economy in Latin America, as that country develops into one of the world’s most important powers. Its sheer size, resource base, economic weight, and military strength relative to its neighbors, would enable it to dominate all of the Amazon basin and the countries of the La Plata estuary.

Argentina no longer rivals Brazil economically, militarily or in size of population. Despite its fiscal collapse of 2002 that was brought on mainly by economic policies driven by nationalistic populism, the country’s long-term prospects for restoration to regional power status are favorable. Argentina is rich in natural resources, has a large, educated middle class, and a tradition of national self-confidence which, while shaken by its recent economic misfortunes, should speed its revival as a regional power.

Because Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay are so closely tied to Europe culturally and economically, there is little likelihood that US efforts to create a Latin American Free Trade Zone will undermine the geopolitical independence of the Cone. Instead, the Cone will probably evolve into the Atlantic Basin’s third, albeit lesser, geopolitical region.

The era of US dominance of Latin America is past. Emergence of a Caribbean Gateway and a cohesive South America Southern Cone, could lead to a reinvigorated Atlantic Alliance, reinforcing the Maritime Realm as a whole. While the United States will continue to dominate its North and Middle American geopolitical region and to lead the Maritime Realm, the strengthening of the realm’s other regions will add new energy and stability to the realm and the world system as a whole.

**The Future of the Asia–Pacific Rim**

A number of factors could cause the Asia–Pacific Rim to contract geographically. A unified Korea that is encompassed within the framework of the East Asia Coastal Seas Gateway, might become detached from the Rim to take up an intermediate geopolitical role between the East Asia Realm and the Asia–Pacific Rim region. The loss of the rebellious, natural gas-rich and fundamentalist Islamic province of Aceh, which commands the northern end of the Strait of Malacca, could be the catalyst for the implosion of Indonesia. Such an implosion, together with the expansion of the Indian Ocean Realm, would also affect the geographic extent and cohesiveness of the Asia–Pacific. Nevertheless, under the leadership of Japan, along with the Phil-
ippines, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, the Rim would remain a cornerstone of the Maritime Realm. It would also derive strength from an adjoining Coastal Seas Gateway Region.

The geopolitical relations between Japan and the United States have been dominated by the latter since the end of World War Two. This is not only because of the American role in rebuilding the devastated Japanese landscape and economy and Tokyo’s Cold War fears of the FSU and China. It has also been influenced by the nature of Japan’s post-war economy that became so heavily dependent upon exports to the United States.

Since the mid-1990s, Japan has begun to be weaned away from its overwhelming dependence upon trade with the US, not only because of the impact of the American recession on its import of Japanese manufactured goods, but also because Japan itself is in the throes of a fundamental economic restructuring. Confronted by high wages and labor shortages, Japanese manufactures are shifting their production operations to other Asia-Pacific Rim countries and to China. Earnings from overseas investments in 2002 exceeded merchandise export earnings, and manufacturing’s share of Japan’s GDP has dropped to 20%. Continuation of this trend, with increasing focus on innovation in the design and marketing of high-technology, high-quality products and financial services, mirrors US economic structural trends, where manufacturing now accounts for only 15% of the GDP. The main difference between the two economies is that the United States will continue to have a powerful agricultural sector, while Japan depends upon food imports.

As Japan’s economy becomes increasingly similar to that of the US, the two countries become more competitive in the search for manufacturing outsourcing and financial investment opportunities. Economic competition might encourage Tokyo to adopt a more independent geopolitical course in international affairs, especially with issues that concern the Korean peninsula, China, Indonesia and the Middle East—the latter being Japan’s major oil supplier.

While China has become Japan’s second largest trading partner, Tokyo remains firmly linked geopolitically to the Maritime Realm. An important geopolitical question is whether the collapse of Chinese Communism, followed by the introduction of liberal democracy might create the conditions for a geostrategic realignment that would link East Asia and the Asia-Pacific Rim in a new geostrategic realm led by the Chinese and Japanese core. While this is always a possibility, it is unlikely. The cultural, political and historical character of Japan and the other insular and peninsular portions of the Asia-Pacific Rim have developed within a maritime setting that differs fundamentally from that of self-contained, largely continental China, reducing the prospects for such a realignment. Despite the benefits of increased commercial relations with China, the largest share of global economic opportunities for the Asia-Pacific Rim are likely to remain are within the Maritime Realm.

Another factor working against the possible merger of the two regions is their lack of symmetry in size of area and population, the threat to the Rim of being overrun by waves of Chinese immigrants, and Beijing’s overwhelming military strength. Japan and its Asia-Pacific Rim neighbors are likely to continue seeking the American military shield as a guarantor of national and regional independence. This
would apply even if the constitutional changes being considered by the Japanese parliament were enacted, enabling Tokyo to take military action in the event of emergencies or threats of imminent attacks. The current pacifist constitution permits the military to be used for self-defense only. The proposed security bills reflect Tokyo’s readiness to accept greater regional defense responsibilities, as was evinced in its willingness to send naval vessels to the Indian Ocean during the US invasion of Afghanistan.

In sum, the geostrategic forces that bind the Western Pacific to the United States through American sea and air power, as well as the common interests in free exchange of ideas, peoples and good throughout the maritime world, should be strong enough to keep the Asia–Pacific Rim within the maritime fold.

A more independent international political and economic course for Japan will not weaken the Maritime Realm geopolitically. Rather, in tandem with Maritime Europe’s increasingly independent posture, this will lead to a more balanced, multi-polar geostrategic realm within which Washington’s propensity to take political and military initiatives without consulting its allies is likely to be curbed.

Conclusion

The geopolitical world envisaged by this author is based upon an interdependent geopolitical structure that offers the promise of greater equilibrium than was experienced during the past century. Such a structure would be strengthened if the United Nations were to effect institutional changes that reflect the international system’s increased hierarchical specialization and complexity. The UN’s organizational readjustments should give greater voice to the rising number of major and regional powers, and limited voting weight to a new class of quasi-states. Consideration should also be given to providing political voice to regional bodies, such as the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur and ASEAN, which have emerged as significant political-economic forces within the world system.

An increase in the number of the world’s major and regional powers as well as strengthening of global and regional organizations will not eliminate disturbances from the system. Global terrorism and irredentist wars will continue to cause considerable turmoil, requiring vast expenditures in human and material resources and in political energy. This will place strains on the international system, but will also help to integrate it, as common needs to stabilize the system override sovereign interests.

As the world’s political nodes continue to increase and gain greater cohesion, and the networks formed by these nodes expand the number of alternative connecting routes, the international system should be more capable of absorbing the shock of disturbances, by-passing blockages caused by local upheavals through the use of these alternative pathways.

In an increasingly complex geopolitical world, where international relations are influenced but not dominated by forces of globalization, political power will be more widely dispersed and hierarchy weaker. No single state, region or realm can expect
to be dominant, so that a US foreign policy of unilateralism, grounded in the assumption of American global political and economic hegemony, is basically flawed. Recent unilateral actions taken by Washington that have raised concerns among both allies and foes include: rejection of the Kyoto Protocol; allowing the 1972 US-Soviet ABM Treaty to lapse; refusal to ratify the International Criminal Court Accord; imposition of quotas on steel imports; and massive increases in subsidies that will enable low-priced US agricultural exports to undermine farm production throughout the developing world. The EU has been outspoken against the steel quotas, and, in reaction to the abandonment of the ABM Treaty, Russia has announced that it is no longer bound by START II, the 1993 multiple warhead missile accord.

These concerns have been fanned by such rhetoric as the threats implied in President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ reference to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and Washington’s announcement, without adequate consultation with European allies, of intentions to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Despite subsequent softening of this rhetoric in response to objections by its European allies and Arab states, the episode has furthered resentment against Washington’s unilateral style, and reinforced the need for leadership based on consultation and partnerships.

Adding to these apprehensions is the disquieting revelation that the Pentagon is considering development of a low-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear bomb has evoked widespread negative reaction. The threat to develop such a weapon would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the recent US-Russian Arms Control Treaty of May 24, 2002, which calls for each side to reduce its current warheads to no more than 1700 to 2200 by the end of 2012. While the warheads need not be destroyed, but only deactivated, the accord represents an important new strategic relationship between the two powers which could be threatened by the development of low-yielding bombs.

Finally, the US State Department’s annual report on global terrorism which singles out Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Cuba and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism, may undermine various current efforts to reduce the support of terrorism by some of these states. While specific identification may be intended to frighten these states into abandoning terrorism, it could have the opposite effect of strengthening their hostility towards the United States. Particularly unfortunate is specifying Iran as a potential target, given the need to encourage reformist elements within that country.

All of the above reinforces the need for Washington to exercise a leadership based on consultation and partnership. The war in Afghanistan has required a multi-lateral effort, as will military actions to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the campaign against global terrorism. The same applies to mediating the Arab–Israeli conflict, and to future efforts in which the United States is called upon to exercise leadership.

The suggestions in this paper have been offered as guiding geopolitical principles for US foreign policy-makers to examine. Summaries of the main principles are as follows:

- Facilitating the conversion of the Russian periphery into a Gateway region, rather than turning it into a Shatterbelt. For Eastern European states this means substituting membership in the NATO–Russia Council for membership in NATO.
tiating both EU membership as well as NATO partnerships should take into consideration Moscow’s strategic concerns of the Kaliningrad exclave. This involves guaranteeing freedom of transit across Lithuania between Russia and Kaliningrad for civilians, commercial goods and military forces and weapons. For the periphery to become a Gateway also requires avoiding a new ‘Great Game’ between the West and Russia over control of oil and gas resources in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia.

- Recognition that Maritime Europe has an equal economic and strategic stake in the current Middle East Shatterbelt, and offering a genuine partnership role to the EU in crafting policies aimed at resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, and in issues affecting relationships with Iraq and Iran. As joint mediators, the Americans and Europeans, with inputs from Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UN, would have to reconcile their current differences to present a common approach so that the Arabs and Israelis would be unable to play one mediator off against the other.

- Anticipating the emergence of Euromediterranea as a new geopolitical region that will include the Levant and eastern North Africa, so that the United States may no longer play the lead Western role that it now plays in this part of the Middle East.

- Formation of a strategic agreement with India to provide an Indian Ocean safety net that will be especially vital if American bases in Saudi Arabia and the Persian/Arab Gulf should be lost.

- Preparation of contingency plans for the implosion of Pakistan or Afghanistan. These would include replacing, or at least matching Russia as the main source of export of high-technology weaponry to India, and pressing the urgency of Turkey’s membership in the EU.

- Furthering the development of the Caribbean region as a Gateway rather than attempting to maintain it as an ‘American Lake’.

- As states continue to break up, encourage the establishment of federations that would eventually join the separate parts together, particularly along economic lines. This would apply especially to large states that may implode, such as Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia. A federated system might also benefit the four existing southern states of Central Asia federated in a ‘Greater Turkistan’, the Baltic States and a ‘Slavonic Antata’ (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine), with the possible additions to the former of Kazakhstan where Slavs are a substantial minority, and to the latter of Moldova where ethnic Russians and Ukrainians have a substantial presence.

- Amelioration of the conflicts that revolve around the efforts of separatist groups to create sovereign or quasi-sovereign states by negotiating advance arrangements between these prospective entities and the states from which they will emerge to provide for the sharing of valuable resources and transit-ways. This could be facilitated by early outside mediation efforts, along with economic development assistance prior to as well as following attainment of full or quasi-sovereignty by separatist movements.

- Greater attention to Sub-Saharan Africa and South America despite their geostrategic marginality in the global power equation. The Maritime Realm powers have an interest in addressing the deep-rooted economic, health and political ills of
these underdeveloped portions of the world, not only on humanitarian grounds, but out of self-interest in containing the global impact of disease, drugs, terrorism and illegal immigration.

- Support for regional powers in recognition of their capacities to help bring political, economic and military stability within their regions. South Africa and Nigeria are at the forefront of mediating conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt and Turkey can assist in efforts to stabilize parts of the Middle East Shatterbelt, and Brazil can lead economic development within the Southern Cone.

- Anticipating adjustment of US foreign policies towards Taiwan, South Korea and China, in the event of the emergence of a new East Asia Coastal Seas Gateway region.

The 21st century is likely to become the ‘Global Century’, not either an ‘American’ or a ‘Pacific’ one. As the ‘first among equals’ of the great states, the United States will be challenged to apply its strength and power in international affairs with wisdom, determination and consistency, while mindful of the limitations, as well as the responsibilities inherent in the exercise of this power. Better understanding of the dynamics of the present geopolitical structure of the world and anticipating changes in that structure can help the United States to meet these challenges.
The foreign policy of the United States is officially conducted by the President and the Secretary of State. Less formal foreign policy is conducted through exchanges of citizens and other government officials, through commerce and trade, or through third party states or organizations. United States Foreign Policy is marked by the country's large economy, well-funded military, and notable political influence. In the coming year, the United States and Europe may have an opportunity to overcome some of these challenges not by looking backward and reverting to old assumptions and policies, but by advancing a renewed and progressive transatlantic relationship. This paper proposes five specific goals for U.S. foreign policy that aim to advance such an agenda while strengthening shared U.S. and European interests. 1. Pursue joint action with Europe on climate change as a top foreign policy priority. Geopolitical and Domestic Realities in 2021. Geopolitical realities in 2021 will provide even greater urgency for reviving the transatlantic relationship. Both Democrat and Republican U.S. foreign policy experts agree that America's unipolar moment is over. Academic and political establishment in the United States traditionally abides by two approaches towards the implementation of foreign policy. That is isolationism, on the one hand, and globalism (internationalism), on the other. The article deals with geopolitical concepts of U.S. foreign policy, which preconditioned global expansion of that country on the international arena, such as the moving concept, the concept, the concept, the concept, the concept and etc. Considering the aggressive nature of the U.S. foreign policy, the analysis of the above concepts allows to considering the latter as being the geostrategy, which is aimed at establishing the new world order. I know that foreign policy can sometimes feel disconnected from our daily lives. It's either all about major threats - like pandemics, terrorism - or it fades from view. That's in part because it's often about people and events on the other side of the world, and it's about things you don't see - like crises stopped before they start, or negotiations that happen out of sight. At our best, the United States is a country with integrity and a heart. That's what makes us proud to be Americans and why so many people around the world have given everything to become Americans. That includes members of my own family, and many of your families, too. Such geopolitical realities allowed the first president to lay down the marker for American foreign policies from the late eighteenth century to the mid twentieth, a fact that encouraged the phenomenal growth over time to "superpower" status. The United States, however, was anything but pacifist and sent its military (mostly naval, marine) forces overseas on over 100 expeditions prior to World War I. Sometimes they would stay overnight, sometimes for years, but almost always removed from European involvement. These were undertaken within the confines of Washington's message of 1796 and scrupulously avoided the country being drawn into the incessant intermural rivalries of the "Old World."