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**Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic intellectuals**

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The term “new Muslim intellectuals” refers to a new generation and a “new kind of columnist and essayist” appeared amidst the Islamist movement in the 1980s. The book under consideration, originally a Ph D thesis, studies these intellectuals, borrowing the term from Meeker and focusing on their emergence and the peculiarities of their thinking.

The book argues, first, that the social, political and economic conditions developed from the 1950s through the 1980s in Turkey culminated into “the breakdown of the Kemalist ideology’s hegemony,” which in turn led to the emergence of these intellectuals. Then, the study claims that their views constituted an unprecedented and unparalleled critique of Turkey’s modernization project, in particular, and modernity and its products (science, technology, democracy, capitalism, socialism etc.), in general. It is asserted that unlike their predecessors in Turkey, and peers elsewhere in the Muslim world, they firmly and totally reject accommodation with modernity in favor of a social, political and cultural order informed and shaped purely by Islam.

The work is structured around these two arguments. Following an introductory chapter that studies the “Kemalist ideology” and “its breakdown,” the

second and third chapters examines the biographies and discourses of the selected intellectuals: Ali Buluç, İsmet Özel, Rasim Özdenören, Ersin Nazif Gündoğan and İlhan Kutluer. The fourth chapter, the last before the conclusion, compares these intellectuals with their predecessors in Turkey (Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Necip Fazil Kısakürek and Sezai Karakoç) and contemporary Muslim thinkers elsewhere in the Muslim world (Muhammed Arkoun, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Abdolkarim Sorough.)

The author deploys a resourceful material such as interviews and original writings of the intellectuals along with various second hand studies on Islamist movements in Turkey. While the former enables the book to give a detailed account of the new intellectuals’ ideas on a number of issues ranging from Westernization to democracy; from capitalism to science and technology, the latter helps to build the historical background to their emergence.

Despite the rich material it presents, the book does not advance an original argument nor throws a new light to the emergence of the new intellectuals and their pattern of thinking. Since it lacks a robust analytical framework and solid conceptual handles, it unfortunately falls short of previous works on the subject, which had already made the main arguments of the book through finer analyses.79

Weak causal connections seem to constitute a major obstacle for the book to construct convincing arguments. Particularly, the causal connection between the “breakdown of the Kemalist ideology’s hegemony” and the rise of the new Muslim intellectuals is not clearly established. The study enumerates a number of developments, which led to “the breakdown” and the subsequent emergence of the intellectuals: “the alienation of the neglected rural people, their exclusion from the benefits of rapid capitalistic development, and the inability of the secular westernization project to accommodate local religious and cultural structures with the values of the West”; “the political vacuum created by the demise of the national developmentalism paradigm, the bankruptcy of socialism and ideologies of the 1960s, and the advance of globalization”; “relatively tolerant attitudes of the state towards religious activities since the 1950s with demise of the One-Party era; improvements in educational facilities; unbalanced and unequal economic growth and rapid industri-
alization together with fast urbanization due to increasing social mobility during the 1960s and 1970s; ...the adoption of Turkish-Islamic synthesis and consequent ‘islamization of secularism; together with economic and political liberalization...a multicultural open democratic society....” (pp. 191-192). This is actually a laundry list of macro social, economic and political developments in Turkish history, which directly or indirectly influenced every political group in Turkey. As such, neither the macro historical developments, nor the breakdown of Kemalism explain the specific emergence of the new Muslim intellectuals. While the book recognizes the fact that “political and ideological contestation” could be observed in different milieus as a result (or as a symptom) of the breakdown (p. 30), it does not draw its logical consequences for the argument it presents.

Moreover, the causal connection between the intellectuals and the breakdown of Kemalism assumes that the society is homogeneous and the new intellectuals’ ideas constitute a reflection of the discontent of this homogeneous society. Despite occasional references to the “rural people” (p. 191) or to “some parts of the middle class” (p. 5), the book, as its title also suggests, essentially refers to the Turkish society (p. 38). It is maintained that the new Muslim intellectuals came to be “the ideologues of these disappointed, resented, and unsatisfied people, and Islam served as ‘the uniting bond, the common social-moral context, and the common language’” (p. 192). However, Turkey has had a very colorful political and intellectual landscape since the 1950s and in the 1980s and 1990s, there were various other Islamist (e.g the Risale-i Nur Students, the National Outlook movement parties) and Muslim democrat (e.g Girişim magazine) groups and individuals, whose diagnosis and prognosis of the ills of the Turkish modernization process overlapped, at least partially, with that of the new Muslim intellectuals. There were also various liberal, left and nationalist parties, movements and publications critical of the regime, which agitated in the public sphere with lesser reference to religion even though they included avowedly Muslim members (not to mention Muslim and non-Muslim religious minorities). Considering the fact that as a whole these groups had followers or sympathizers that may well amount to millions, the birth of the new Muslim intellectuals and their criticism of modernization, democracy, Kemalism etc. cannot be considered as an aggregation of Turkish society’s social, political, economic and cultural problems which surfaced by the breakdown of the official ideology.

Last but not least, the causality that is established between the breakdown of the Kemalist hegemony and the emergence of the new intellectuals models
the state as a homogeneous entity invariant under political, social and economic changes. In other words, except for paying a lip service to the existence of rival Kemalisms and a short treatment of the state’s increasingly liberal attitude towards religion since the 1950s and the adoption of Turkish-Islamist synthesis following the coup of 1980, the book essentially studies the Kemalism of the single-party regime: its contradictions and the discontent that it had created. While it underlines the fact that the new intellectuals perceived the Kemalist ideology as monolithic and unchanging (p. 4), the book itself treats the state, the official ideology and state-society relations no different than these intellectuals.

As a result of these problems related to variable selection and causal connections, two questions are left unanswered regarding the new Muslim intellectuals’ emergence. Why did not the members of other Islamist groups, who shared a similar, if not the same habitus and similar misgivings regarding the Kemalist regime, and who lived in the same temporal and spatial context, subscribe to the total rejection of modernity and its products? Why did the new Muslim intellectuals, as individuals, choose this path rather than other options (other brands of Islamism, liberalism, socialism, nationalism) which were available to them as much as to others? A theoretical approach which would climb up and down the ladder of abstraction between above mentioned macro factors and micro histories of the intellectuals would help to determine the particular social and political events and processes that gave rise to these intellectuals in the Islamist field in particular, and the political field in general.

The stronger aspect of the book is its comparative approach which is designed to underline the new Muslim intellectuals’ peculiarities within the “Islamic revival process in the Middle East” (8). It is argued that both their predecessors in Turkey and peers elsewhere in the Muslim world had influenced these intellectuals. The latter shared certain similarities with the former two, but were also unique due to “social, political, and historical circumstances” (9).

The comparison with the new intellectuals’ predecessors in Turkey claims that the new Muslim intellectuals differed from them in their total refusal of modernization paradigm. The earlier thinkers and activists, while criticizing the Turkish modernization for being an imitation of the West, adopted a mirror paradigm themselves and promoted political, economic and technological advancement guided by Islamic traditions and resources.

The comparison with the contemporary Muslim thinkers from other countries, on the other hand, demonstrates that “[w]hereas [the non-Turkish speaking intellectuals] are intensively concerned with philosophical and epis-
temological issues and debates on the Qur’anic exegesis and Islamic tradition overall, the current Muslim intelligentsia in Turkey are more involved in the reclamation of Islamic values in the social, political and cultural life and criticism of the West and modernity” (p. 179).

Both comparisons are very detailed and informative. They help to see the unique position of the new intellectuals in the Muslim world. However, one of the major arguments generated from them, which is the uniqueness of the new intellectuals’ line of thinking in the context of Turkish Islamism, is not novel.80 In addition, the book lacks a convincing justification for the particular selection of non-Islamist Muslim intellectuals from the Middle East as objects of comparison within the context of “Islamic revival.” It is suggested that the selected predecessors in Turkey and peers elsewhere in the Muslim world were “the most significant representatives of their genre and at the same time the contemporary Muslim intellectuals in Turkey are mainly influenced and inspired by them” (p. 139). While the book makes this case perfectly clear for the forerunners in Turkey, it is difficult to observe any intellectual affinity between the new Muslim intellectuals and their “counterparts” in the Middle East apart from their critical stance vis-à-vis the West and positivist ideology. On the contrary, as the comparative analysis reveals, though unintentionally, they constitute rival lines of Muslim thinking.

On the one hand, at least three out of the four chosen examples of Middle Eastern intellectuals were extremely critical of Islamist thinking, let alone being an Islamist. As the book itself acknowledges, they were engaged in epistemological and theological discussions on the primary sources of Islam and criticized the Islamist views which dismiss democracy, secularism and scientific reasoning on religious grounds.

On the other hand, the new Muslim intellectuals rejected modernization in its totality and advocated the establishment of a state and society based on a quiet “orthodox” reading of the Koran, Hadith and the Sunnah. This perfectly matches with both a flexible and a narrow definition of Islamism. The former would cover those who were engaged in a public struggle that is through a party, movement or publication, to directly or indirectly influence the state and society through religious signs and symbols. The latter would include those who carry out similar activities through a literal and stringent interpretation of the Shari’at.

While the book brings into the picture the tension between the two schools of thought represented by the Turkish and the Middle Eastern intellectuals, it does not analytically acknowledge its existence. Consequently, not only it forgoes the fact that both versions of Muslim thinking can be found in each country, but also establishes hasty causalities between factors peculiar to each country and the appearance of respective thinkers.

Specifically, it is maintained that the authoritarian regimes, the struggle with “superstitious, ignorant fundamentalists...or with dogmatic and a narrow-minded, monolithic clergy class,” and a history of colonial rule, which exist in the Middle East but absent in Turkey, accounts for the differences of the contemporary thinkers in the Middle East from their Turkish peers (p. 179). In addition, these contemporaries are considered as more “equipped with deeper, firsthand knowledge and observation of the West” (p. 180). This analysis does not go beyond stating the obvious in the biographies of these two groups of Muslim thinkers: they were different because they happened to be born in different countries and they had varying degrees and forms of experience with the West and its culture.

The causal connection between the enumerated factors and the Middle Eastern intellectuals’ position neglects the fact that their countries have their share of Islamists, whose line of thinking converges more with that of the new Muslim intellectuals in Turkey: a literal and stringent interpretation of Islamic resources, a rejection of accommodation, though in differing degrees and ways, with what they consider as Western values. Since the macro factors which influenced the selected intellectuals from the Middle East also forms the background of their compatriot Islamists, the explanation regarding the differences between the Middle Eastern thinkers and the new Muslim intellectuals loses from its power.

Finally, a remark regarding the intellectual journey of the new Muslim intellectuals since the 1980s imposes itself. The book does not address the changes that the new intellectuals and Turkey have gone through during the last decade. In 2002 and 2007 general elections, the Muslim Democrat Justice and Development Party (the JDP), came to power taking the majority of the votes. While the new government engaged in a series of democratization and capitalist development reforms with an eye on the prospect of EU membership, the “new” Muslim intellectuals began to adopt diverging attitudes from their past and from each other. For instance, even a short research in the internet demonstrates that while Ali Bulaç became an ardent supporter of the JDP’s reforms writing in newspaper columns and appearing in TV programs, İsmet
Özel adopted an increasingly Turkish nationalist position and even a chauvinist attitude towards ethnic and religious minorities.

In conclusion, while *Muslims in Modern Turkey* provides the reader with a rich and meticulous compilation and summaries of the available first and second hand resources on the new Muslim Intellectuals, it is not equally successful in offering an in-depth and fresh analysis regarding their emergence and uniqueness within the Muslim world.

İpek Gencel Sezgin

**Aşık**

Elif Şafak

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İstanbul: Doğan Kitap Yay., 1. bsk. Mart 2009, 419 sayfa.

Modern Turkey is the site of a powerful Islamic revival, with a strong intellectual elite dedicated to the overthrow of secular modernism. Why have modern Muslim intellectuals turned against the ideals of Kemalism on which the modern Turkish nation-state is founded? What does this reveal about the future of Turkey? And how are Islamic intellectuals in Turkey affected by developments in the Middle East?

Muslims in Modern Turkey is the first book to analyze this phenomenon, tracing the evolution of Muslim intellectual thought from the 1980s to the present day. This is a review on Muslims in modern Turkey: Kemalism, modernism and the revolt of the Islamic intellectuals. By Sena Karasipahi. View full-text. Scholars and intellectuals on both sides of the divide faced serious consequences for their positions: Åsmail Åkrâs publisher was brutally murdered by Mustafa Kemal’s lead bodyguard, Seyyid Bey was sidelined from power after justifying the new Turkish regime, and Mustafa Sabri lived in double exile in Egypt. Islamic and modern Western values, assisted the Muslims of Republican Turkey to embrace democracy and establish good relations with the West. Post-war Turkey’s peaceful interaction with the West via free markets and international institutions must have been a factor. Muslims in modern turkey: Kemalism, modernism and the revolt of the islamic intellectuals * by Sena karasipahi. F. Ahmad. Journal of Islamic Studies 22 (1):89-91 (2011). Authors. Faisal Ahmad. Islamic History, Islamic Identity and the Reform of Islamic Law: The Thought of Husayn Ahmad Amin. Nadia Abu-Zahra - 2000 - In Ronald L. Nettler, Mohamed Mahmoud & John Cooper (eds.), Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond. I. B. Tauris. Institutionalization of Islamic Communities After the Desintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Geoff Eley - 1987 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 1987 (71):187-197. Analytics. Added to PP index 2016-06-30. Start by marking as Want to Read: Want to Read saving… Want to Read. And how are Islamic intellectuals in Turkey affected by developments in the Middle East?