Chapter Four


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This chapter investigates two interconnected relationships. The first relationship is between two competing principles of colonial urban policy, segregation and gentrification. Keeping with German precedent, the British colonial government segregated Dar es Salaam into three zones, corresponding with neighbourhood economic activity, housing standards and—implicitly but quite plainly—racial groups. At the same time, however, the colonial government also championed urban improvement through securing conditions for greater capital investment, a policy which this chapter terms ‘gentrification’.1 These two policies came into conflict along the spatial border where Africans and Indians met. Relations between Indians and Africans in Dar es Salaam form the second relationship at the heart of the chapter.2 This relationship imbued colonial urban policies with political meaning. A policy of segregation eventually yielded to one of gentrification as Dar es Salaam’s Indian community outgrew its narrow commercial ‘zone’ and expanded into African-designated areas such as Kariakoo. Lacking the financial resources and political will to maintain the ‘racial integrity’ of African neighbourhoods, the British colonial government abandoned spatial controls of racial zoning for economic controls of managing urban living costs. In a most peculiar legacy, the discarded urban policy of segregation provided a language of political empowerment and invective for Africans fearing that Indian-led forces of gentrification would dispossess poorer households in established African neighbourhoods.

Dar es Salaam’s urban policy was grounded on the racial legal codes of the colonial state. From the ashes of German policy, British officials rebuilt a legal structure grounded on distinctions between Europeans, Indians, and Africans in order to restructure spatial and economic interaction among these groups after formally taking control over Tanganyika in 1919. Nominally intended to protect the interest of African ‘natives’, the administration of these laws revealed two competing colonial visions for urban Africa—one that
contemplated state-guided urbanization driven by non-African commerce and capital improvements, and another that contemplated the systematic protection of Africans from non-African market forces. This division manifested itself in the pursuit of competing priorities among British officials, some of whom sought to raise public health standards by encouraging non-African expansion, while others sought to protect African-held urban and peri-urban areas by championing segregationist and protectionist policies. Of at least equal importance, African and South Asian initiatives in many cases ran far ahead of either administrative vision, and there emerged a distinctly reactive and ad hoc character to inter-war urban administration.

The British administration’s land, credit, and trade policies ideally bifurcated Tanganyika’s population between African ‘native’ producers living largely on communal lands, and European and Asian ‘non-natives’ confined either to urban areas or estates alienated during German rule. In 1920 the new administration formed a Central Building and Town Planning Committee to oversee Dar es Salaam’s reconstruction, and this committee adopted almost all German precedents. Seeking to secure a separate European residential area yet finding legal racial segregation ‘impracticable’ as well as in conflict with the government’s trusteeship mandate from the League of Nations, the committee dropped explicitly racial references and retained ‘a standard to which all new buildings must conform’, which ‘will secure the “same advantages”’ as de jure segregation.’ The close proximity of the residential (i.e., European) Zone I and commercial (i.e., Asian) Zone II, however, divided by only a single street along which expensive buildings already stood, imposed formidable costs to executing segregationist public health prerogatives, and obviated plans to create a second ‘neutral zone’ to complement the first such zone, between Zone II and the ‘native’ Zone III, created in the late German period. ‘Segregation for Europeans and Asiatics in Dar-es-Salaam, and probably also in Tanga, appears to be impracticable’, the Land Officer concluded in 1920. ‘There does not appear to be anything, however’, he continued, ‘to prevent segregation of other races from natives’.5

Building and sanitation codes provided the first of two major tools officials utilized to segregate Dar es Salaam.6 Structural improvements to already-standing ‘native’ houses in Zones I and II were forbidden in 1920.7 Beginning in 1923, the government offered Africans new plots in Zone III (the ‘native’ zone) in exchange for quitting their plots in the European and Indian quarters. Many accepted but were slow to move, and in 1928 the government ordered them to demolish their old houses within six months.8 The cornerstone of the new administration’s segregationist urban planning in Dar es Salaam was the renewal and re-clearance of the old German sanitary corridor or neutral zone.9 The majority of Africans evicted were relocated to Ilala, a new residential quarter in Zone III laid out in 1930; ‘non-native’ evictees were left to their own devices.10 The neutral zone itself (Mnazi Mmoja today) was reserved for non-European sporting purposes. Urban land policy was the second major tool used to restructure and segregate post-war Dar es Salaam. German titles had granted either leasehold tenure or restricted ownership, a tenure similar to freehold.11 Plots with stone buildings were given renewable
government leases usually lasting thirty years, while plots of makuti huts were given annual tenancy renewable year to year. This annual renewable tenancy was known colloquially as kiwanja tenure, named after the kiwanja (Swahili, ‘plot’) tax that the German administration had charged urban residents in addition to an annual house or hut tax. During the 1920s, the new British administration lacked sufficient records and deeds, and thus payment of kiwanja tax implied recognition of tenancy. In order to raise revenue collections and building standards in ‘non-native’ areas, however, the new government proposed to replace kiwanja tenure with a Rights of Occupancy tenure system. Rights of Occupancy tenancies required that structures on leased plots conform to the Township Authority’s grid layout and be worth an agreed-upon value. In Zone II, these tenancies usually called for two-storied, permanent stone structures with water-borne waste disposal. Colonial officials considered South Asians the worst sanitary offenders in town, and hoped that conversion to a Rights of Occupancy system would raise sanitary conditions. In 1926, the government launched a lengthy and contested battle against ‘non-native’ tenants, most residing in Zone II, to replace kiwanja tenure with Rights of Occupancy for terms of 33, 50, or 99 years, with land rents determined by public auction. The imposition of a more coercive land tenure system contingent on capital investment resulted in the state-guided gentrification of Dar es Salaam’s Indian neighborhood. The Provincial Commissioner reported that the introduction of more secure land tenure in 1927 had given ‘a fillip to the building trade in the town’. Indian speculators cheaply acquired several desirable plots with dilapidated buildings in anticipation of their rising value. The most valuable sites were obtained by bidding competitions. In one typical contract, Ghulam Haidar acquired a plot for 33 years at Shs. 200/- annual rent if he constructed a building worth Shs. 4,000/- within two years. Average annual plot rentals increased from Shs. 60/- under the year-to-year kiwanja tenure to Shs. 194/- under the long-term Rights of Occupancy tenure. Enforcement of these building covenants eventually produced a neighborhood predominated by expensive stone buildings by the mid-1930s. The gentrification of the Indian quarter undermined the segregation of the African quarter, popularly known as ‘Kariakoo’. Several Indians in Zone II could not afford the substantial improvements brought about by Rights of Occupancy leases, and renters faced impossibly high rents. A District Officer observed in 1929 that, despite the on-going building boom, rents still remained ‘at a fictitiously high figure’, while housing conditions for most Indians ‘can only be classed as scandalous and worse than the slum areas of European cities’. South Asians seeking cheaper plots and rents moved to Kariakoo. E. C. Baker noted that Indians could ‘obtain greater privacy and more attractive surroundings at a lower debt’ in the African quarter than in Zone II. Between 1931 and 1939, the number of ‘native’-owned houses in zone III rented by Indians rose from 32 to between 200 and 300. The influx of Indians into the African quarter revealed the limits of segregationist zoning laws, and confronted officials with an enduring contradiction—how to manage interactions between ‘native’ Africans and ‘non-native’ South Asians in the theoretically exclusive ‘native’ zone of Kariakoo.
Kariakoo and competing visions of urban development, 1920-1940

Major segregationist public works such as the clearing of the ‘neutral zone’ and Kisutu village were exceptional for their unambiguous consequences – Africans were simply removed from non-native or ‘neutral’ areas. Far more important to the social history of Dar es Salaam, however, were the contradictory results that segregationist laws produced when they intruded upon inevitable interactions between Africans and Indians. These interactions challenged the intent and viability of housing, trade, and land laws. More importantly, the interaction between Indians and Africans, and the enduring African urban presence, forced officials to confront the implications of the colonial vision that inherently communal ‘natives’ needed protection from the predations of the inherently individualistic ‘non-natives’.

The establishment of the central market in Kariakoo in the early 1920s stimulated the development of Dar es Salaam’s most vital neighborhood. In stunning contradiction to the logic of racial-cum-occupational zones that guided Dar es Salaam’s urban planning, the administration not only relocated the city’s central market from the Indian to the African quarter, but also established a ‘non-native’ trading area surrounding the new market. The old market in the ‘Asiatic’ quarter was too small and could not meet growing demand for stalls. In the eyes of medical director R. R. Scott, the market premises were ‘disgraceful and insanitary blots on our otherwise fairly presentable town’ whose congestion drove small traders onto the streets to hawk foodstuffs in unsanitary conditions. The market was moved in August 1923 to the eponymous Carrier Corps building (in Kiswahili, ‘Kariakoo’), built originally by the Germans in 1914 as a market to stimulate the area’s development, but immediately converted into a depot for German and later British military porters during the war. The British resuscitated German plans by surveying over 600 plots in the native zone along a grid plan with the new market as its focal point, dramatically raising property values in its proximity. In the wake of the new market’s opening, Indians emigrated in large number to Kariakoo to seize trading opportunities. In early 1931, Indians legally owned 142 of the 2,035 houses in Zone III on Rights of Occupancy tenure, most located around the market or along Msimbazi and Kichwele (today Uhuru) Streets; a further thirty-two African-owned houses were rented by ‘non-natives’, mostly South Asians. As a group, ‘non-natives’ occupied over 9 percent of the houses in the African quarter. E. C. Baker observed at this time that “[i]t is hard to foresee the future of Zone III the population of which is becoming very mixed”.

Kariakoo grew amidst contradictory expectations between many Indians and Township Authority officials on the one hand who hoped that the neighborhood would become a commercial area with a strong ‘non-native’ presence, and many Africans and District Office officials on the other hand who hoped that it would be an exclusively African residential neighborhood. The former view was anchored by the swift domination of Indian traders
between segregation and gentrification

Over Kariakoo’s commercial life during the 1920s. By 1927, ‘non-natives’, nearly all of whom were Indians, occupied 396 of the 420 trading sites in Zone III. The protectionist land tenure system that forbade ‘non-natives’ from acquiring ‘native’ property was thus regularly circumvented in Dar es Salaam over the inter-war period by building in the exempted ‘non-native’ trading zone within Kariakoo. Beyond the central market, Indian acquisition of African-owned housing required the Governor’s approval. Over the early and mid-1920s, the protectionist-segregationist view had few effective advocates, as very few Indian requests for the Governor’s approval to obtain ‘native’ property in Kariakoo were denied or even contested. As a result, the major economic development of Kariakoo during the inter-war period was the dramatic increase of property and rental values created largely by the influx of Indians willing and able to pay considerably higher purchase prices and rents from African house-owners.

Opponents of the Indian incursion into Kariakoo discovered that segregationist urban planning laws offered little in the way of positive protection for African interests. One of the administration’s chief instruments to effect urban segregation was building codes, which were the legal basis in defining Dar es Salaam’s ‘non-native’ European and Asian zones. The relevant clause in the township rules stated only that the ‘native’ Zone III should be reserved as ‘an area for native quarters only’, without specifying zonal building regulations. The Township Authority’s planning committee, no longer able to square this ideal with the reality of a multi-racial Kariakoo, moved in 1932 to substitute this clause with ‘an area in which buildings of a type to be approved by the competent township authority may be erected’, on grounds that ‘[t]his practice of allowing non-Native businesses to become established in Zone III is one of long standing and, though contrary to law, it has the advantage of providing convenient shopping facilities for the Native residents’. A District Office official stated his reservations to the committee’s suggestion:

However, as land becomes more valuable that native may get gradually squeezed out of the area which has, for practical purposes, been allocated for his use. It seems to me that in the natives interest we should import the racial question to some extent and say that Zone III is confined to native quarters and such other premises, approved by the Township Authority, as that Authority considers necessary to serve the needs of the residents in the Zone.

A Township Authority official agreed that rising land values were pushing poorer African inhabitants from Kariakoo, but countered that ‘nothing we can do will enable people with Whitechapel incomes to live in Mayfair . . . [i]t may be unfortunate, but it is inevitable’. Imposing maximum building standards, he warned, would be a mistake of the first order, as better buildings benefit everyone, Africans included. The Chief Secretary agreed with the Township Authority’s planning committee that the clause ‘an area for native quarters only’ should be altered, and added that the new description should be phrased to permit any type of quarters in Zone III. He justified this decision by arguing, rather disingenuously, that ‘it has not been the intention of the
government to prevent Natives from building elsewhere than in Zone III, or that persons other than Natives should not build in that zone if they have the land and wish to do so. Government revised the building ordinance for Zone III the following year to allow for the construction of any type of building instead of ‘native’ types only, retroactively legalizing ‘non-native’ building types in the area. The administration proved unwilling to sacrifice either the improved building standards or substantial land rents and license fees generated by Indians in Kariakoo.

Township Authority officials – whom the government had allocated the task of general urban improvement – approved of South Asian penetration into the ‘native’ quarter because their capital investments raised tax revenue and building standards. In response to Indian commercial predominance in Kariakoo, the Township Authority re-zoned Zone III along its main thoroughfare, Msimbazi Street in 1925. It declared the area east of Msimbazi a commercial zone, and the area west of Msimbazi (despite already having several shops) a residential area, effectively shifting the division between the Indian commercial zone and African residential zone from the ‘neutral zone’ to Msimbazi Street. The commercial successes of Dar es Salaam’s burgeoning South Asian population made possible this extension of the commercial to residential, east to west, higher-status to lower-status, lighter to darker pattern of zoning that in practice valued the principle of gentrification over segregation. In a half-hearted attempt to reconstruct a protected ‘native’ zone further west of Kariakoo but still within Zone III, the Township Authority declared plots around the new market in Ilala reserved for ‘natives’ in 1932, but also agreed that Kariakoo already had too many shops and too few residential plots. Africans were thereafter regularly refused trading permits west of Msimbazi in Kariakoo.

District Office officials—whom the administration had allocated the task of protecting urban ‘native’ interests—were unwilling to leave Kariakoo and its largely African population to the whims of Indian-dominated market forces. In 1929, Dar es Salaam’s District Officer appealed to the Land Officer that: ‘You are doubtless perceiving the fact that native owned land in the township of Dar-es-Salaam is rapidly passing into the possession of non-natives who are mostly of Asian nationality. This general process is causing me some uneasiness. The growth of land monopoly of such a character is not good and I submit to you that it is wrong to regard it as a natural course of events.’ Despairing to prevent Indians from further entering Kariakoo, District Office officials retreated their expectations westwards in hopes of maintaining Ilala as an exclusively ‘native’ area. In 1934, however, this policy was unexpectedly changed after a Land Officer refused an application by an Arab (considered ‘non-native’) to buy a house from an African in Ilala, on the understanding that everything west of Msimbazi Street was reserved for natives. The Chief Secretary over-ruled him on grounds that it was ‘never the intention of the government to establish a racial standard in this or in any similar area, nor to prevent a native from selling his plot to a non-native, when he could
advantageously do so.37 Upon later discovering through the courts that township notices establishing separate residential and trading areas within Zone III were ultra vires (beyond legal authority), the administration in 1937 declared the whole of Zone III a trading area. One effect of these constant policy shifts was, unsurprisingly, administrative confusion. Though now Africans could legally trade in their own houses in Zone III if a proper license was obtained and the buildings met township standards, this information appears to have been either ignored or not effectively communicated, for officials continued to deny Africans permission to trade from their own residences.38 Itinerant commerce, meanwhile, lay mostly in the hands of African traders, many of whom were supplied by Indian shopkeepers taking up buildings in Kariakoo—reflecting the complicated and intertwined nature of relations between Indians and Africans, as well as the futility of regulating economic and residential behaviour through zoning legislation that attempted to segregate the Indian and the commercial on the one hand from the African and the residential on the other.

Sacrificed in the struggle between rival official visions of Kariakoo as a ‘native residential’ or ‘non-native commercial’ area were the fortunes of Dar es Salaam’s embryonic African commercial class. The re-zoning of Kariakoo into residential and commercial areas had been nominally intended to protect Africans from entering into agreements with non-natives that, many officials believed, ended inevitably in Africans’ displacement from their residences. Instead, this re-zoning prevented Africans from establishing shops in the most convenient locations possible—their own premises. In the early 1920s, the government offered plots in a ‘native’ trading area around an open square in Kariakoo to Africans willing both to erect cement-floored buildings suitable for a foodstuff shop and to pay an economic rent of Shs. 100/- per year, but none were taken up.39 Although a number of Africans opened up small shops in Zone III during the 1923 Indian commercial strike (hartal) with the government’s encouragement40, the number of African shopkeepers (as distinct from market stall-holders and doorstep vendors) in Dar es Salaam had decreased to only two by mid-1931.41 ‘The town’s Executive Officer concluded that Africans from this coastal region ‘have not the trading instinct sufficiently developed to run the business of a shop in competition with non-natives already established’.42 E. C. Baker explained that African traders did not take up plots in the trading lay-out because of steep ‘economic’ rents—i.e., land rents set in proportion to the anticipated value of permanent structures to be built on the plots—and the proximity to Indians, ‘with whom he feels that he is unable to enter into competition’.43 Government appears to have prohibited native and non-native traders alike from establishing shops on the township’s borders to avoid this proximity to fierce competition.44 African traders in 1923 had asked for legal concessions in this theoretically ‘native’ zone from non-native sanitary laws that required produce retailers to have cemented verandahs that discouraged vermin, something generally affordable to Indians alone.45 These traders were initially exempted from building codes for trading everything but green food and fish, but by the late 1920s, public health concerns prevailed over what little official prerogative to cultivate an African commercial
class had existed. Both native and non-native traders were routinely prohibited from trading by medical authorities who found their premises unsatisfactory, even though trading licenses had been taken out. By 1939 there were only twenty African shops in Zone III, all holding small values of stock, and twelve of which were in the restricted area of Ilala.

African landlords, Indian tenants

Geographic declarations were blunt and ineffective tools in shaping Kariakoo’s development. Officials tended to rely more heavily, if no more effectively, on regulating interaction between individual natives and non-natives on a case-by-case basis. Their chief legal mechanism was granting or denying permission for either the transfer or sub-letting of plots in Zone III by ‘natives’ to ‘non-natives’. The influx of Indians willing to pay high purchase prices and rents went largely unchecked during the 1920s, but even Township Authority officials began to reconsider the implications of this during the 1930s. The most important figure was E. H. Helps, a South African who served as Municipal Secretary of Dar es Salaam’s Township Authority from 1929 until 1945. Helps supported the general project of Indian-led gentrification, but feared its excesses would leave urban Africans without a stable residential centre. He warned in 1932 that ‘the constantly increasing number of traders in the Native Area is depriving Natives of their residential holdings in the Township’, and later noted that:

Properties leased by natives to non-natives are almost invariably purchased by the lessees at a later date. Non-natives are interested in all properties in Zone III which are valuable for trading purposes but no others. I am personally in favor of natives being given every encouragement to trade among themselves in Zone III, possibly to the exclusion of non-natives whose true locale for trading purpose is Zone II. My reason for this is that natives are gradually surrendering all the best plots in Zone III to non-natives. They cannot resist the temptation of a good offer for their premises, but not infrequently the riches thus acquired become dissipated within a short time.

Case by case, District Office officials and Helps attempted to preserve the African position in Zone III by enforcing regulations that increased the cost of doing business with non-natives. Kariakoo housed a large class of African house-owners whose main livelihood was their lodgers’ rent; Baker called the house ‘the one form of investment of the urban native’. In 1931, these house-owners could charge ‘non-natives’—almost invariably South Asians—as much as Shs. 120/- per month for a whole house, while the average room rent paid by an African was Shs. 5/- per month. By the late 1930s, the government required Africans renting to non-natives to take out ‘non-native’ Rights of Occupancy at economic rents, rather than continuing to profit from paying low annual fees of kiwanja tenure while receiving high rents from ‘non-native’ tenants. Many such lease agreements between African landlords and
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Indian tenants, however, were entered into ‘without reference to and without knowledge of the government’.54

House-owners had profited handsomely during the boom years of 1926 to 1930, but economic depression put the ‘floating population’ of lodgers on which house-owners depended for their income, as well as many house-owners themselves, out of work—one-third of adult African males in Dar es Salaam were unemployed in 1931.55 Mama Nurdini, an African landlady, complained that she did not rent to ‘Waswahili’ because they cannot pay even half of what Indians could, they did not stay in one place for long, and they were often repatriated from town by the government for not paying their poll taxes.56 E. C. Baker similarly noted that ‘native rents are often one or two months in arrears and the lodger not infrequently decamps at night in order to avoid paying his debts’.57 In 1936, the Director of Medical Services demanded that the government no longer brook Africans’ chronic failure to finish their houses, and called for the vigorous enforcement of a long-standing law requiring that all African houses be of ‘approved type’ and completed within twelve months. ‘The time has come’, Scott announced, ‘when a higher standard of construction can fairly be insisted upon’.58 Better-off African landlords could most easily meet these standards through the rents of Indian lodgers. African homeowners positioned to profit from the Indian presence in Zone III seized those opportunities and often circumvented paternalistic policies designed for their protection in the process. Living costs, not landlessness, had long been the principal concern of Africans in Dar es Salaam. By the late 1930s, it had finally become the principal concern of British colonial officials as well.

Crises in food and housing and the origins of popular racial politics, 1940-1950

Dar es Salaam expanded rapidly in the 1940s. Annual population growth rose from roughly two percent to eight percent. Pressured by spiraling urbanization that strained the provision of basic minimum living conditions, and work stoppages that protested the unaffordability of urban life, the colonial government began a thorough-going intervention into the urban economy, abandoning its ad hoc system of urban growth management. The regulation of living costs replaced segregationist town planning as the major feature of Tanganyika’s urban policy. During the Second World War, food and piece-good imports fell while urban immigration from upcountry increased, intensifying the state’s desire to maintain minimum urban living conditions for Africans while minimizing their presence. The result of subsequent state intervention was to further politicize and racialize the distribution mechanisms of Dar es Salaam’s economy. 59

Racial inequities in the supply of urban housing and food formed the foundation of popular racial politics in Dar es Salaam. Food had been rationed throughout the city from 1943 on a racial basis, causing enormous resentment among Africans towards Indians’ higher ration standard.60 The end of the war did little to alleviate conditions, as the immediate post-war years proved
the most difficult in the town’s history for urban consumers – the Provincial Commissioner declared that 1946 would be remembered as ‘one of the bleakest in living memory’. Although wheat and butter rations had been discontinued at the end of 1945, drought and locust attacks in 1946 forced the government not only to re-introduce the rationing of these items, but also to reduce existing maize and rice rations. Tensions between African consumers and Indian merchants escalated, becoming ubiquitous during these crises. Tanganyika’s intelligence officer reported that the steady rise in post-war living costs and black marketing stood as ‘a definite and continued threat to Indo-African relations’ because, while the government was ‘not unreasonably blamed for this, the African’s primary reaction is anger against the Asians whom he considers, with considerable justification, to be exploiting his essential needs’.

Nowhere was this simmering racial resentment more clear than in public debate over access to housing. The severe shortages and dramatic gentrification of Dar es Salaam’s housing market intensified the racial meaning of urban space while serving to mask class conflict between African landlords and African renters. Home ownership and landlordism presented the most viable business opportunity for the town’s African population, and subsequently became site of the sharpest intra-African class differentiation. Yet consciousness of this class differentiation dissipated in the face of racial resentment that emerged from the paradoxical ‘failure’ of urban segregation. The most important development in Dar es Salaam’s housing market during the 1940s was the increased influx of Indians into the theoretically ‘native’ Zone III area of Kariakoo and Ilala. African landlords often played a cagey game, standing by quietly as African tenants protested this racial ‘takeover’ by Indians, yet simultaneously exploiting burgeoning demand through raising the rents of both remaining African and newly-arrived Indian tenants. The result was a sharpened sense among Africans that they were entitled to certain urban space by virtue of their shared racial identification.

A major part of the problem was the failure of housing construction to keep pace with population growth. Building practically halted during the 1940s because of a dire shortage of materials. While the number of African houses had at best increased eleven percent, and perhaps even dropped during this period, population grew from 33,000 to 45,000 between 1939 and 1943 – raising the African area’s population density from ten to nearly fifteen people per house. Moreover, Asians grossly overpopulated Zone II, where building new homes and repairs to old ones had ceased since 1939 for want of cement and iron, and many existing houses had been converted for military or commercial purposes. By March 1945 the urban population had increased to 55,000. The colonial government attempted to ameliorate the housing crisis by erecting a sufficient amount of its own housing, but this came too little and too late. The years 1946-48 were particularly severe owing to a crisis in land availability and property speculation, which only eased in the early 1950s. New housing construction was driven by property investors. The well-entrenched class of African landlords – who wielded sufficient capital to purchase 150 of the first 500 plots sold at the new neighborhood of Magomeni, and by 1956 numbered 8,000, forming 19 percent of the town’s
Indian ‘immigration’ into Kariakoo became a full-blown political crisis during the 1940s. African residents had already witnessed over twenty years of official racial zoning that on the one hand had resulted in the displacement of Africans from Zones I and II, while on the other hand turned a blind eye to the unauthorized erection of Indian-owned buildings in Zone III.68 Indians had also purchased a number of ‘native’ properties in Zone III in the years preceding the war, numbering 53 houses between 1936 and 1939, bringing the total of Indian-owned properties there to 147.70 This rate of influx had increased dramatically during the Second World War. Indian renters, either bachelors or families, turned to African landlords as an affordable solution to the spiraling rents of Zone II.71 A 1945 survey of 400 buildings in Zone II found that 126 of them had been condemned, yet still housed 2,258 people who were ‘crowded into dark, dismal, insanitary buildings’.72 By 1947, there were 338 ‘non-native’ households, numbering perhaps over 1,000 people, renting accommodation in Zone III.73 African tenants were turned out of their rooms to make way for wealthier Asian tenants. They moved either to peri-urban settlements or into vibanda or huts, numbering over one thousand in 1945, which African landlords had constructed in their backyards.74

Lacking the resources to create sufficient housing to meet demand, colonial officials relied instead upon regulatory cost controls to manage Dar es Salaam’s housing crisis in the 1940s. The government passed a Rent Restriction Ordinance in 1941 that limited rental increases to ten percent of the rent paid on 3rd September 1939, the date of the war’s outbreak. However, enforcement depended on parties bringing disputes to the township rent control board. Officials soon came to consider the rent restriction board ineffective. In the first seven months of 1948, only one case was brought before the board seeking rent reduction – most cases involved either landlords seeking to dispossess tenants, or tenants complaining of illegal acts by landlords to induce them to leave, such as removing part of a room’s thatch roofing in order to allow rain to pour in. One African renter complained that African landlords not only charged black-market rents, but threatened to evict anyone who reported the illegal rents to government—in one case, some one hundred lodgers reported illegal rents to the liwali, upon which they were evicted by their landlords and ‘are now residing at shambas’. In the tribunal following the 1947 general strike, the District Officer reported that owners had threatened tenants with witchcraft if they did not pay higher rents and, through fear, many tenants agreed.75

While few Africans took up representations to the government rent board to gain redress, African landlord and tenant together embraced racial politics, offering polemics against the Indian ‘invasion’ of Kariakoo. The African independent newspaper Dunia located the forces of housing exploitation in the transgression of established racial boundaries. The paper’s editor, R. M. Plantan, observed that high rents were driving Indians out of Uhindini (literally, ‘place of Indians’) and into Uswahilini (‘place of Swahilis), depriving Africans of their racial urban home. Pandering to the state’s own visions of racial
order, Plantan rhetorically asked if the government would ‘agree to the mixture of your palm leave-roofed houses with those of Indians’, and speculated, ‘[w]ill it not be necessary to embark on a new move to the cracking creeks? Who is to blame? Well, we must not cry against a move—we must only go on until we reach Pugu’. Plantan did briefly consider African complicity in the housing crisis:

The housing difficulties are caused through the greed of the wenyeji (‘natives’). They turn out their fellow natives who pay Shgs 6/- p.m. for a room in order to obtain large rents by leasing the whole house to Indians or whites, and so it continues, until many people are homeless, and the Indians have spread to every quarter of the native area. So let this Government take notice and remove the whites from the houses in the native areas, returning them to the Europeans or Indian quarters, for by living in the native area they avoid payment of high rents and their evasion damages the native.

Elaborating racial invectives, however, proved more attractive to Plantan and most of his readers than investigating the exploitation of African landlords. While a government worker argued that wages should be raised ‘to pay house rents as an Indian can pay in African quarters’, he emphasized that Indians should be removed from Zone III, except those with shops, in order to free up housing for Africans. Plantan’s solution was to re-establish urban racial order—if the government would only remove Indians from Uswahilini, then ‘Africans themselves would be able to live in comfort in their buildings’. He later declined to publish a letter critical of both African landlords and the ‘agitating African’ who sought to prevent the former from realizing his or her investment by refusing higher rents. The Tanganyika African Government Servants Association, representing the salaried group most sharply affected by the housing crisis of the 1940s, understood the problem in wholly racial terms. They protested that Indians were ‘overflowing into the African portion of the town’, and that it ‘should consider some way of reducing and/or expelling the number of Asians now residing and/or occupying houses in African quarters area’. A Kisutu resident wondered when ‘Indians in our town will be given the order to leave our buildings’, to which Plantan responded by imploring his readers to buy a building plot in the area himself to prevent further Indian expansion. Few residents, landlords, or officials publicly took the cool view of Abdulwahid Sykes, who described rental increases as ‘a boon rather than a menace to house owners irrespective of race’ because it raised needed capital for further housing construction. In other words, few could accept arguments in favour of gentrification at face value. For many, reviving racial zoning was a sufficient solution to a difficult economic problem.

Officials were increasingly sympathetic to popular African demands to re-segregate Kariakoo, but remained unclear about the legality of non-native tenancies on African property, as the question was entangled with poorly understood commercial zoning policies. As late as 1944, the highly competent District Commissioner Dick Bone had to ask Municipal Secretary Helps where the ‘so-called “Trading Area”’ in Zone III was located, and what was the
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authority for restricting trade—to which the veteran Helps scribbled ‘not sure!’ and ‘none’, respectively. The planning sub-committee of Dar es Salaam’s other local governing body, the Township Authority, recommended that trading in Zone III be restricted to Africans only, which S. B. Malik – the board’s president and an imposing business figure in Dar es Salaam – refused on grounds that such segregation opposed the principles of the Mandate. In 1945, the government attempted to effect a compromise of sorts between non-racialism and ‘native’ protection by allowing Africans to gain three-year rights of occupancy over trading plots at a standard rent while ‘non-natives’ had to pay rent determined at auction.

The September 1947 dockworker’s strike – caused in large part by the housing crisis – moved officials to seek a more immediate solution. The Labour Commissioner recommended mass Asian evictions from Zone III and to appoint an African Rent Restriction 

baraza.

In January 1948, the government halted further leasing by natives to non-natives, as well as property sales to non-natives, in the Kariakoo area except on extraordinary grounds. The District Officer wrote that the African housing problem ‘is in reality not so much the problem of African housing as it is of Asian expansion into African areas’, and, with considerable exaggeration, claimed that ‘the lure of high rentals paid by Asians has virtually meant that 90 percent of Kariakoo, once a purely African area, is now either owned or leased by Asians’ – his successor reduced the figure to 60 percent. Even officials who viewed the housing crisis in primarily economic terms understood that popular racial understandings made it an immediate question of political stability. The arrival of building materials in the early 1950s finally eased the housing crisis somewhat, and the subsequent increased enforcement of building codes led to the more efficient removal of African squatters. In the words of an anonymous intelligence officer, this ‘combined to create a general impression amongst African residents that there is a drive to oust them from the Municipality in favour of Asians and Europeans. . . . this feeling is at the moment widespread, and the cause of considerable discontent’. The town’s District Officer also noted that rumors were circulating among Africans that the purpose of new town planning proposals was to demolish African houses overnight to give the plots to Indians. Reflected in both the rumours of the street as well as in the articulated policies of African bureaucrats, reversing this pattern of Indian-led gentrification had become a central goal of incipient African racial populism in Dar es Salaam on the eve of nationalist politics.

Conclusion

The British colonial state devised a rather modest and ineffective tool kit for guiding urban development in Dar es Salaam. Spatial urban policies that sought to segregate Dar es Salaam between ‘native’ Africans and ‘non-native’ immigrants through building codes and land tenure proved sufficient to facilitate the removal of inconveniently-located Africans living in Zones I and II, or what were firmly to become the European and Indian neighbourhoods
of the town during the colonial period. But colonial urban growth also relied heavily upon the investment of private capital, the lion’s share of which lay in the hands of Indians living in a small and tightly circumscribed location. The urban policy of gentrification provoked political resistance when it aided and legitimated the expansion of Indian households into majority African neighbourhoods. Although few in government were committed to urban segregation as a policy of positive protection for Africans from being priced out of their ‘zone’, embittered African tenants embraced this implied promise by demanding that government support the racial integrity of neighbourhoods such as Kariakoo and Ila. The state’s abandonment of spatial segregation in favour of an urban policy centred on managing urban living costs through rationing and rent controls in the 1940s only strengthened the resentment held by emerging African politicians in Dar es Salaam towards Indian interlopers, although many African landlords quietly benefited from these developments. The colonial government had entangled itself by its simultaneous reliance upon Indian commercial wealth and African political consent, and proved increasingly powerless to mediate the growing conflict between the two during the 1940s and 1950s.

Notes

1 This production-side definition of gentrification focuses on the relationship between urban space and capital flows. For an important theoretical elaboration from this perspective, see Neil Smith, *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City* (London, 1996).
3 The translation of the German building ordinance was finally carried out in 1921, and was easily available only by 1923. ‘Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam’ by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority’, 18 May 1931, Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 12589/I/134.
4Minute of Hollis to Byatt, 22 December 1920, TNA 3152.
5 Allen to Chief Secretary (hereafter CS), 15 October 1920, TNA 3152/1.
7 Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 18 May 1931, TNA 12589/I/136; E.C. Baker, ‘Memorandum on Dar es Salaam (1931)’, copy held in SOAS library special collections, p. 10.
8 ‘Minutes of extraordinary meeting of the Township Authority 18 May 1928’, DSM Township Authority minute book (hereafter DSM TA), copy of notes on this book made by Martha Honey and in the author’s possession. I am greatly indebted to Martha Honey and Robert Gregory for allowing me to use these notes on the DSM TA, for which I was unable to locate the original minute book in Dar es Salaam.
9 See the discussion by Kironde in the preceding chapter.
10 Ronayne to Provincial Commissioner (hereafter PC) Eastern, 2 April 1929, TNA 61/250/45. Ila had grown in 1930 from a village of 20-30 people to a suburb of 1,500-2,000 residents. Executive Officer, DSM Township Authority to CS, 19 September 1930, TNA 12227/I/13; Fryer, Dar es Salaam District Annual Report (hereafter DAR) 1930.
12 Extract from revised draft circular by Attorney General, n. d., ca. 1923-24, TNA 3125B/3.
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13 The administration rejected *kiwanja* tenure because it considered the ground rent it generated paltry (2.5 percent of the structure’s value), and the utilization of Zone II’s limited space by shabby, single-story buildings inadequate. Griffith to CS, 19 October 1930, TNA 61/94/A/93. On *kiwanja* tenure, see Kironde’s contribution in this volume.

14 Brett [?], Dar es Salaam DAR 1924, TNA 1739/26; Dawkins, Dar es Salaam DAR 1927, TNA Library.

15 Eastern Provincial Annual Report (hereafter PAR) 1927, TNA 11676/I/5.

16 Owen to CS, 7 December 1927, TNA 7841/187.

17 Acting Land Officer to CS, 12 November 1929, TNA 10063/II/34/1.

18 Land Officer to CS, 18 November 1929, TNA 10063/II/62. Rights of Occupancy in townships were issued for 33 years for buildings worth less than Shs. 10,000; 50 years for buildings worth between Shs. 10,000/- and 20,000/-; and 99 years for buildings worth over Shs. 20,000/-, Sayers, pp. 244-245.


20 Fryer, Dar es Salaam DAR, 1929, TNA Library.


22 Ibid., pp. 14-17; Baker, Amendments to ‘Memorandum’, enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1A.

23 Brett, Dar es Salaam DAR 1921, TNA 1733/7; Scott to E. E., 12 April 1920, TNA 2712; Scott to CS, 6 May 1920, TNA 2712/6.


25 ‘Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam’ by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 18 May 1931, TNA 12589/I/135. Although figures are not available for the increase in property values around the Kariakoo market, around the old market in the Indian quarter, two-roomed shops rented out at Rs. 50/- to Rs. 72/- per month were expected to drop to Rs. 20/- to Rs. 25/-, Skelton to CS, 18 November 1920, TNA 3088.

26 Baker, ‘Memorandum’, p. 16; Baker, Amendments to ‘Memorandum’, enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1a/16. In 1931, Arabs owned 41 houses and ‘other non-natives’ owned 3, for a total of 186 of the 2,035 houses in Zone III, or 9.1 percent.


28 Eastern PAR, 1927, TNA 11676/I/53.

29 Secretary, Central Town Planning and Building Committee to CS, 28 September 1932, TNA 11150/II/285.

30 Hartnoll to CS, 6 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/287.

31 Minute of L. L. L. to CS, 6 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/289.

32 CS to Secretary, Central Town Planning and Building Committee, 13 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/290.

33 This was done by a 1933 amendment to Township Rules of 1930 Ordinance. Kironde, ‘The Evolution of the land use structure’, p. 161.

34 ‘Notes on Building Plots in the Native Quarter of Dar es Salaam’ by Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, ca. June 1931, TNA 12589/I/140.

35 Minutes of special meeting of DSM TA, 8 June 1932, DSM TA minute book; minutes of 467th meeting of DSM TA, 13 July 1934.

36 Ronayne to Land Officer, 30 July 1929, TNA 61/324/I/46.

37 Hartnoll to CS, 6 October 1932, TNA 11150/II/287.

38 District Officer (hereafter DO) Dar es Salaam to PC Eastern, 28 March 1939, TNA 26862/2A; minutes of 594th meeting of DSM Township Authority, 5 January 1939, DSM TA minute book; Pike to PC Eastern, 2 June 1939, TNA 61/490/363. For an example of co-existing but diametrically opposed understandings of policy towards trade in ‘residential areas’ of Zone III, compare Pike’s position of 2 June 1939 cited above with Marchant’s minute to CS, 3 October 1938, TNA 61/490/302, cited below.

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41 ‘Notes on Building Plots’, ca. June 1931, TNA 12589/1/140. This document states that there are only two (formerly four) African shop keepers in town. Baker, writing in February 1931, states there are four native shops that sell foodstuffs other than fruit, vegetables, firewood, etc., all situated outside the trading layout and admitted by oversight to the residential area. Baker, ‘Memorandum’, p. 30

42 ‘Notes on Building Plots’, TNA 12589/I/140.


44 CS to PC Eastern, 21 December 1936, TNA 61/299/1/64.

45 See for example the letter from ‘Native Observers’, ca. August 1923, TNA 2712.

46 Buckley to CS, 30 August 1923, TNA 2712.

47 Minutes of 282nd meeting of DSM TA, 30 January 1929, DSM TA minute book; minute of Helps to CS, 16 November 1932, TNA 10849/188/4.

48 Baker, Amendments to ‘Memorandum’, enclosed in Deputy Information Officer to CS, 10 January 1940, TNA 18950/II/1A; Helps to PC Eastern, 14 August 1936, TNA 61/18/I/314. Helps wrote that ‘not more than twelve dukas run by Asians fall within this category [of carrying less than Shs. 600/- stock]. These latter dukas are of a very humble type’. *ibid*.

49 Minute of Helps to CS, 16 November 1932, TNA 10849/188/3.

50 Helps to PC Eastern, 29 September 1938, TNA 61/490/300.

51 Property transfers from Africans to non-natives not only required government permission but also cost Shs. 10/- per annum, whereas transfers between natives cost only Shs. 2/- p.a. Foyer to PC Eastern, 18 February 1930, TNA 540/11/A/73/10.


53 Baker, ‘Memorandum’, pp. 16-17. The most common type of accommodation, the ‘Swahili’ house, generally comprised of six rooms.

54 Helps to PC Eastern, 29 September 1938, TNA 61/490/300.


56 Petition of Mama Nurdini to CS, 21 August 1931, TNA 10849/1.


58 Scott to CS, 14 August 1936, TNA 61/534/1. The ‘approved type’ house required windows, plastering, and lime washing. PC Eastern to CS, 1 September 1936, TNA 24387/I/5.

59 This paragraph summarizes the arguments in Brennan, ‘Nation’, chapter 3.


61 Eastern PAR, 1946. See also Bone, 1944 Uzaramo DAR, TNA 61/3/A/11; and Eastern PAR, 1945.


64 Of the 3,123 ‘native’ houses in Dar es Salaam township, 2,084 were in Kariakoo and Ilala, 173 were in Zones I and II (including Kiutura), and another 806 were in Chang‘ombo and other outlying areas. ‘Memorandum on proposal for extension of Zone III, 22nd July 1943’, by Molohan and Pike, TNA 24387/II/10G; Jackson to Stanley, 27 November 1943, TNA 24387/I/10. For figures that show an actual decrease in housing, see Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime & Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam*.
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65 Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/2; minute of Bone to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/6, and other correspondence in this file.


67 On this see Brennan, ‘Nation, Race and Urbanization’, chapter 4.


69 Minutes of 611th Meeting of DSM TA, 26 January 1940; minutes of 623rd meeting of DSM TA, 15 November 1940; minutes of 640th Meeting of DSM TA, 14 November 1941.


71 Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 14 November 1944, TNA 61/4/14/2. The Intelligence Director identified 88 male Indians [which he conflates, accurately or not, with ‘Asians’] renting from Africans in Kariakoo, and another 23 in Kisutu. These figures excluded duka owners and small traders, and found typical Indian resident to ‘occupy one or two rooms each and in some cases the whole house. Most of them are bachelors, but there are also several with families. Africans who own good houses are being approached daily by Indians who are offering them Shs. 100/- and more per month if they will turn out the present native occupants and let them have the entire building on a two or three year agreement with payment of up to one half of the amount in advance’. Ibid.


73 DC Uzaramo to Municipal Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 22 August 1947, TNA 61/255/45.

74 ‘Causes for disaffection amongst natives in Dar-es-Salaam’, n. a., 25 January 1945; enclosed in Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 27 January 1945, TNA 61/4/14/8. African-owned housing was most expensive in Kariakoo, where a derelict thatch hut could fetch up to Shs. 3,000/-, and other houses as much as Shs. 15,000/-; Ilala houses cost between Shs. 1,000/- and 3,000/- but up to Shs. 5,000/- along Kichwele street; houses in the Zone II area of Kisutu cost only up to Shs. 3,000/- because plot leases were terminated after the building’s (inevitable) collapse. DC Kisarawe to PC Eastern, 3 March 1949, TNA 29538/9B.


77 ‘Extract from Dunia of 27 October 1944’, in Director of Intelligence and Security to PC Eastern, 30 October 1944, TNA 61/4/14/1. Original not in file.

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wenyewe waweze kustarehe katika majumba yao'.

79 Minute of Bone [?] to PC Eastern, December 1945, TNA 61/4/14.
80 Notes of an interview given by the Chief Secretary to the President and the Secretary of the African Government Servants Association on the 29th March, 1946, TNA 11889/II/ 75. Indian boarders fueled spiraling rents—'The Asians occupying African houses have generally to pay fantastic rentals, e.g. a room in an African house for which a reasonable rent in 1939 would have been Shs. 8/- and for which at the moment a rent of Shs. 15/- per month is definitely on the generous side, is being let to Asians at anything between Shs. 40/- and Shs. 100/- per month'. Minute of Nayar to CS, 21 November 1949, TNA 32697/I. Emphasis in original.

81 Honorary Secretary, Tanganyika African Government Servants Association to CS, 5 February 1945, TNA 61/4/2/II/2.
84 Bone to Helps, 6 October 1944, TNA 540/6/40/1.
85 Minutes of 673rd Meeting of the Dar es Salaam Township Authority, 14 December 1944; ‘Notes from Land Officer on memo prepared for Provincial Commissioner’s Conference, 1946, Appendix D’ by P. H. Hutchinson, Land Officer, 3 June 1946, in PC Conference Minutes, UDSM East Africans Collection; Municipal Secretary to Mohe Din Karim Din c/o Baluchi Community, Arab Association, 17 May 1946, TNA 540/11/12/17.
87 PC Eastern to DC Uzaramo, 19 November 1948, TNA 61/255/97; DC Dar es Salaam to Land Officer and PC Eastern, 8 November 1948, TNA 61/255/95.
88 Dar es Salaam DAR, 1951, TNA 540/1/4/B/5. In Leslie’s 1956 survey of the African areas, he found that 94 percent of all ‘non-Africans’ surveyed (almost entirely Indian or Arab) lived in Kariakoo, and that only 2 percent of all Indian households in Kariakoo own a house. Leslie, ‘A Survey of Dar es Salaam’ (1957), Appendix B.
89 East African Command Fortnightly Intelligence News Letter No. 64, 5 January 1951, CO 537/7218/1.
90 Dar es Salaam DAR, 1951, TNA 540/1/4/B/5.
Dar es Salaam is above all a site of juxtaposition between the local, the national, and the cosmopolitan. Older coastal cities of Mombasa and Zanzibar struggle to match Dar es Salaam in its diversity and, paradoxically, its high degree of social integration. Swahili in Dar es Salaam has served as the lingua franca in the mosque, the church, the recreational club, the football team, and the musical group. In contrast to nineteenth-century patterns of urban growth along the East African coast, Dar es Salaam’s colonial expansion was driven by state investment in administration and military security, rather than by private commerce. Imperial confidence in the new capital ran well ahead of the town’s economic viability, at least until railway commerce began to bear fruit in 1907. The strict tests for gentrification and displacement in this study and the limitations of the data available likely undercounted instances of gentrification and displacement. Most low- to moderate-income neighborhoods did not gentrify or revitalize during the period of our study. Gentrification was most intense in the nation’s biggest coastal cities, yet in medium to small cities of the nation’s interior it was rare: Most of the nation’s cities and towns did not experience gentrification as measured in this study. Neighborhoods experience gentrification when an influx of investment and changes to the built environment leads to rising home values, family incomes and educational levels of residents. Dar es Salaam is, and always was, a majority African city. The city’s African population was 90 percent in 1894 and 63 percent in 1957. Both the German and British colonial governments implemented building ordinances that divided Dar es Salaam into three zones based on the standard of construction allowed within each area. This paper examines the process of house building in Dar es Salaam through a survey of 90 house-owners in nine low-income settlements in the city. It is shown that in the past decade the price of manufactured building materials has risen steeply following the implementation of liberalisation policies. Under German colonial rule and the British mandate, Dar es Salaam was a racially segregated city. As segregation tightened and racial oppression escalated across the U.S., black leaders joined white reformers to form the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Early in its fight for equality, the NAACP used federal courts to challenge segregation. Job opportunities were the primary focus of the National Urban League. The women and children dressed in white and the men in black suits, marched behind a row of drummers carrying banners calling for justice and equal rights. The only sound was the beat of muffled drums. Enlarge. Dar es Salaam city is changing structurally by replacement of old building with new. Thus, the city is facing challenge on conservation of built heritage due to demolition of historic building and the area surrounding historic monument. Historic building are demolished to pave way for construction of new building for housing and office spaces to meet the free market economy demand. According to the existing legislations, buildings are protected as national monuments by listing individual building, group of buildings or conservation of area.