Abstract
The chapter reviews Britain’s troubled history of police relations with immigrant communities to consider lessons for positive police approaches to integration today. At the practical level of local community policing it describes partnership mechanisms introduced under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act intended to allow local police, among other things, to better engage with and positively respond to ‘hard to reach groups’ such as immigrant communities. By reference to the 1999 Macpherson report into the failed police investigation of a racist murder in London, it considers the ways in which the immigrant’s negative experience of policing has, in Britain’s past, driven wider democratic reform of the police. With regard to the long-term social changes to any host society that immigration inevitably brings, it concludes by questioning the currency of the term ‘integration’ and discusses changing ideas of multiculturalism that may affect contemporary views of policing and the police role.

Note:
This chapter is developed from a series of lectures on the UK police race-relations experience first given by the author to command course students at the Police College of Finland in Espoo on 12 October 2004.
Policing and Integration in Britain: A Question of Social Change.

“A truly multicultural society is one which is composed of multicultural individuals; people who are able to synthesize different worlds in one body and live comfortably with these different worlds. In order for a society to tolerate such individuals the society must by definition be open, fluid and confident. In other words, the society must be everything that Britain was not when the first Caribbean migrants stepped off the ships in the 1940s and 1950s.”

(Caryl Phillips 2002. The Pioneers)

Introduction
Born in postcolonial St Kitts, Caryl Phillips reflects deeply upon what it means to be both of and not of Britain as the country of his parent’s migration in the late fifties. His argument, in a collection of essays that acknowledge the continued legacy of racism in Britain, is that there is ‘a new world order’ of cultural plurality emerging – one that is being promoted by the increasingly central role of the migrant and the refugee in the modern world. This may be a challenge for policing: for where the police role is to maintain the status quo, at a societal and symbolic level that can also include conservative ideas of national identity and related values. Thus policing may find itself in conflict with a culturally diverse society and contemporary ideas of multiculturalism.

In an anthology of positive police roles for immigrant integration in Finland, the contribution of this chapter is to reflect upon the long and deeply troubled experience of policing and immigrant integration in modern Britain. It is told primarily, but not exclusively, through the post-war experience of West Indian/African-Caribbean migration to Britain. The central argument, however, is that contemporary policing – in Britain, Finland or elsewhere – needs to see itself as presiding over a period of significant social change characterized by the cultural plurality brought on by today’s global migration flows. This is not confined to countries with colonial histories. Countries with strong national histories may also feel their sense of identity challenged by European integration on the one hand and immigration from around the world on the other. To be sure, eastern European immigration is fast becoming a populist scapegoat for the present array of perennial social ills. Moreover, the far right British National Party have been predictably quick to exploit this as an insidious campaign issue in rural areas.

For immigrant integration, then, a positive police role in the 21st century may be to help facilitate the process of social adjustment towards multicultural living required of both native and migrant alike in a changing society. Such adjustment may well encounter resistance and conflict between groups. The police will often need to intervene, with force if necessary (for that is the essence of their job), and in so doing assert the democratic values of the state and ethical rule of law. For a state that recognizes the cultural plurality of the society it governs and the potential local conflict this transition

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1 (Phillips 2002) page 279
2 (Phillips 2002)
3 (Dowling 2007)
might entail, the simplest form of police intervention would be positive law enforcement responses to racist violence. But, as the British police race-relations history shows, this is not so easily achieved. That past narrative is offered to this anthology for critical reflection on Finland’s present and future policing condition.

**Police Race Relations in Britain**

The long-established literature on police race-relations in Britain continues to grow. Michael Rowe’s edited collection *Policing beyond Macpherson*, for example, and his own work *Policing, Race and Racism*⁴ are among the more recent to engage this troubled history and its implications for contemporary police reforms. So, too, do edited works such as Basia Spalek’s *Islam, Crime and Criminal Justice*⁵ in taking the race-related question of policing a cultural plurality into the post 9/11 realm of religious diversity (see also Colin Webster’s *Policing British Asian communities*⁶).

And it is only now, some twenty years after the 1986 *Public Order Act* eventually made ‘incitement to racial hatred’ a specific criminal offence in Britain, that the 2006 *Racial and Religious Hatred Act* affords religious groups similar legal protection by creating the criminal offence of ‘incitement to religious hatred’. This is despite three strongly opposed attempts since 2001 to pass it into law and thereby protect Muslims. For Muslims are not covered by the ‘racial hatred’ offence since the British courts do not recognize Muslims as a ‘race’ in the way they do Jews and Sikhs⁷. Such seems to be the slowness of the state to positively provide for the forms of social conflict thrown up by the observable reality of immigration and its ensuing cultural plurality. One might review the effective operational reach of similar laws in Finland.

The unfairness of omitting Muslims and recommendation to amend the 1986 legislation to include religious hatred was raised as early as 1997 in an independent report *Islamophobia*⁸. As a legal loophole, its racially divisive exploitation by far right groups had also been known to the courts since that time. A British National Party (BNP) activist in London (Croydon), for example, distributed ‘rights for whites’ leaflets and stickers in a campaign against the building of a local Mosque. This led to abuse against local Muslims but the high court rejected the local authority’s attempt to get Muslims legally recognized as a ‘racial group’. Thus, the BNP could not be prosecuted for ‘incitement to racial hatred’ and Muslims were left under-protected by the law⁹.

Yet in Britain, contemporary works such as Rowe’s and others are inescapably produced in the light of the 1999 *Macpherson Report*, Rowe’s explicitly so. The report is a crystallizing moment in British police race-relations history. Its catalyst was the failed Metropolitan Police investigation into the racist murder of black London teenager, Stephen Lawrence. It found the police to be institutionally racist. This now largely

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⁴ (Rowe 2007; Rowe 2004)
⁵ (Spalek 2002)
⁶ (Webster 2004)
⁷ (Addison 2007)
⁸ (Conway 1997) page 60
⁹ (Dyer 1998)
defines the reform agenda of the police, and other state institutions, nationally in that they must learn to value the undeniably diverse cultural mix of the public they serve and respond to their local needs accordingly. Most centrally, this means recognizing and responding positively to racism and racist violence as a matter of core policing. It also means having the dedicated community consultation mechanisms with which to do it.

**Before Macpherson**

It is important to acknowledge the preceding history of police race-relations in Britain. And in doing so recognize that while an understanding of racism in Britain can only be understood through the history of its immigration policies, the term ‘immigration’ in Britain has often been wrongly used to refer only to black people. This said, it is the experience of black and Asian people as immigrants in Britain that has most readily, but not exclusively, articulated racism and the slowness of police race-relations as a problem to immigrant integration. The detail of the narrative holds lessons applicable to white and non-white refugee and migration flows around Europe since the nineties.

“A depressing chorus of unheeded prophecies of doom” is how leading authority in police studies, Robert Reiner, described the growing body of literature on the subject of police race-relations in the 1980s. Reiner offers his description in the year when Britain unavoidably witnessed the worst of its inner-city riots on London’s Broadwater Farm housing estate. It was a riot aimed directly at the police resulting in the brutal murder of community police officer, PC Keith Blakelock. It ensnares a bitter history of wider police conflict with immigrant groups and mixed communities.

Reiner notes “complaints about police harassment of black people stretch as far back as the end of the second world war and become a regular, ever increasing flood by the late 1960s”. It must be born in mind that Reiner was writing at a time when much of the problem of police racism was being denied and in need of exposure. This was despite nationwide inner-city riots in 1981 sparked by the disproportionate use of street searches of black youth. The influential Scarman Report on those riots made key recommendations to strengthen the development of community level police consultation with immigrant groups over policing. Unlike Macpherson, though, it fell short of addressing the underlying problem of institutional racism.

Reiner points to an early anti-racist leaflet from 1966 entitled *Nigger Hunting in England*. The leaflet pre-configures the key issues that were later to become sources of controversy in the 1970s: police raids on black clubs, the stereotyping of black people as suspected offenders, racist abuse and, significantly, inadequate police protection against racist attacks. Indeed, the problem of racial discrimination within the police and senior management’s failure to address it during this period is acknowledged by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1987 - 1993), Sir Peter Imbert “I think we were at fault, that we ignored it when we saw it or heard it. We weren’t big enough to say.

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10 (Skellington 1996) pages 64 & 68
11 (Reiner 1985) page 149
12 (Reiner 1985) page 149
13 (Scarman 1981)
‘That’s not acceptable. It’s out of order.’”¹⁴ In Britain at least, one could not therefore assume that implementation of a positive police role in immigrant integration would be in any way unproblematic. Self-reflection as an institution was a neglected key. But as observers point out, it is always difficult to report back institutional racism to any institutionally racist institution. This is because it necessarily involves the wider society that bares those institutions recognizing the racisms born of their own white culture.¹⁵

**White Policing against a Black Presence**

The immigration spoken of by Reiner is mainly that of Black Caribbeans in the 1950s. These are the ‘pioneers’ of a cultural plurality to come and referred to earlier by Caryl Philips. But they also include Asians from the Indian Sub-continent during the 1960s and later, Asian refugees expelled from Idi Amin’s Uganda in the early 1970s. By the 1980s, these represented the main post-war migrations to Britain and the visible targets of indigenous white racist violence. As such, the problem of race-relations became politically defined as “the presence of black people in Britain, and not the response of white society to that presence.”¹⁶

Reiner observes that in the history of race riots in the UK (and in the US), it is at best police indifference and at worst police partisanship with white aggression against a black presence that can be seen as a common point of similarity. He charts UK examples as far back as 1911 where Cardiff’s Chinese communities in South Wales suffered racist attacks. Similarly, in 1919 there were organized attacks in ports where many West Indian black people had either settled during World War I or were staying temporarily pending a return home. Reiner’s main observation is that the police were half-hearted in response or even openly partisan in defence of the attackers. The problem continues after World War II where, in 1948 for example, hostile white crowds attacked black cafes in Liverpool. The perceived solution to this problem was for the police to remove the black presence rather than arrest the white attackers.¹⁷

A notorious case is the sustained police harassment, assault and ensuing death of David Oluwale in Leeds in 1969. Oluwale appears as the first of 79 entries up to 1991 in a roll call by the Institute of Race Relations of suspicious black deaths in British police, prison or hospital custody.¹⁸ The full story of this racist crime at the hands of the police has recently been told in a book poignantly entitled *Nationality: Wog*. The book was so titled because a police charge sheet from three months prior to the day his body was pulled out of the river had ‘BRIT’ for nationality crossed out replaced with a handwritten ‘WOG’. Two police officers, an Inspector and his Sergeant, were eventually tried for his manslaughter in 1971. They were, however, only convicted of earlier assaults as part of a sustained and somewhat personal campaign of harassment.

¹⁴ Interviewed 2002 in (Whitfield 2004) page 50
¹⁵ (Keith 1995) page 556
¹⁶ (Gordon 1983) page 11
¹⁷ (Reiner 1985) page 50
¹⁸ (Sivanandan and IRR 1991) page 47
¹⁹ (Aspden 2007)
The case of David Oluwale is relevant because it exemplifies a number of things. Firstly Reiner’s argument that, at a local level, the police tended to see the presence of the black immigrant as a problem to be removed rather than integrated. Secondly, the fact that police racism and culture of silence over malpractice was in no way confined to just the Metropolitan Police in London. Thirdly, an underlying narrative of public disbelief and denial of police racism in overtly racist times: “Even in these racist times, the idea of the police going for a man simply because he was black would have been repugnant to Middle England, with its deep conviction that Britain was synonymous with fairness and the rule of law.”

But fourthly, captured in the book’s title, the very difficulty Britain was having with accepting the fact that black people were part of their own national story and identity. And this points to the problem of immigrant integration. For immigration can confront traditional ideas of national identity often represented by the uniformed street police in the public imagination. For where the uniformed police have served as a cultural expression of nationhood, this has often been an unspoken ‘white’ identity.

1958 Notting Hill: Riots, murder and denial of racial tension

Yet it is in 1958 that the problem of race riots gains national notoriety. Racial tension erupted in violence in London’s Notting Hill and Nottingham. White mobs attacked black groups. These attacks, Reiner notes, now began to involve white teenagers and fascist political elements. They also took place in the political context of growing issues around immigration and the need for racial integration in Britain. It was only a few months after the late summer disturbances in Notting Hill that black resident, Kelso Cochrane, became Britain’s first racist murder victim in May 1959 at the hands of white ‘teddy boys’.

Kelso Cochrane was a 32 year-old carpenter from Antigua. Encouraged by the government’s need for immigrants to fill labour shortages, Kelso came to Britain in 1956. He lived in a flat with his fiancé in London’s Notting Hill as one of the few places West Indian immigrants could find accommodation. A BBC investigation in 2006 reveals how serious racial tension in the area had become fertile recruiting ground for the National Labour Party. This was a far right party that later merged with the White Defence League in 1960 to form today’s British National Party (BNP). Shortly after midnight, on Saturday 17th May 1959, Kelso was returning home from working at the local hospital. A few yards from his door, he was attacked by a gang of about six white youths and fatally stabbed in the heart with a stiletto knife by one of them. The youths ran off when three men came to help him but he died an hour later in hospital. To the dismay of the local community, the police readily dismissed racism as the motive, claiming robbery or attempted robbery instead. There is little, if any, evidence of this as the motive. More likely, and now widely accepted, is the claim at the time of many in the local community, both black and white, that it was the first racially motivated killing in modern Britain.

For Reiner, the characteristics of attacks such as that on Kelso Cochrane (the combination of white youths and far right politics) prefigure the growth of individualized white racist

20 (Aspden 2007) page 119
21 (Hadley 2004)
22 (Whitfield 2004) pages 50 & 116, and (Anim-Addo 1995) page 113
23 Summary of BBC media coverage (Rowe 2006)
attacks after the late sixties. They characterize the conflicts in the 1970s surrounding anti-racist demonstrations against the National Front in South London, namely those in Lewisham in 1977 and Southall in 1978 and 1981. It was also the case that community consultation with the Metropolitan police on the problems facing black immigrants during the fifties and sixties were unproductive. To be sure, it seems that formal West Indian community liaison arrangements with senior police management were virtually non-existent until after the racist murder of Kelso Cochrane\textsuperscript{24}.

As Benjamin Bowlings’ thorough study and analysis of racist violence in Britain shows, the black and Asian community’s experiences of assaults and the failure of the police in respect of them have a long history that often goes unrecognised\textsuperscript{25}. Importantly though, Reiner comments on the key difference between examples of collective racial violence prior to the 1960s compared to those after, both in the UK (and the US). The difference, was “the centrality of policing as both a background condition and the immediate trigger” of that violence\textsuperscript{26}. That is to say, white youth itself were increasingly less the cause of the race-relations problem. In many cases it was now white youth joining black youth over the issue of bad police race and community relations. This was particularly so during the ‘anti-police’ riots of the 1980s that prompted a reluctant process of police reform.

**The 1980s Urban Riots**

Simon Holdaway, a police officer turning sociologist in 1975, argues that for the British police the post-war failure of race and community relations culminated in the murderous inner city riots of the eighties and beyond\textsuperscript{27}. Emerging reluctantly in the sixties, police community-relations policy of the seventies was slow to recognize the increasingly multicultural nature of society as one shaped in its diversity by the growth of immigrant communities. The Home Office and the police were even slower to respond to the problems of (white) racism that reacted to it. Instead, they believed (or hoped) that in time a process of cultural assimilation would solve it\textsuperscript{28}. That is to say, immigrants would abandon their own cultural identities and adopt that of the host. As later discussion as to what is meant by multiculturalism and ‘integration’ will explore, the reality of today’s cultural plurality shows assimilation and even ideas underpinning integration, to be a mistaken and unrealistic expectation for national authorities to pursue.

Yet in Holdaway’s analysis, police community relations ultimately failed because of its set up as a *specialism* rather than a *general duty* of everyday patrol officers\textsuperscript{29}. This is a key learning point: positive integration activity (however conceived) needs to be mainstreamed within routine police work as an everyday police attitude and practice. For by otherwise maintaining an arguably white monocultural public order inherent in traditional ideas of an indigenous national identity, the patrol officer will continue to *over police* and *under protect* Britain’s black, Asian and other immigrant communities. This,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[24] (Whitfield 2004) page 79
\item[25] (Bowling 1998) preface xvii
\item[26] (Reiner 1985) page 150
\item[27] (Holdaway 1996)
\item[28] (Holdaway 1996) page 106
\item[29] (Holdaway 1996) page 109
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
for Holdaway, whose major academic publications on police race-relations in Britain were seen (with others) by the Stephen Lawrence inquiry\(^\text{30}\), is what led to the devastating urban confrontations of the mid 1980s. Indeed, as a problem to the changed and multicultural nature of British society, it is echoed in Reiner’s criticism that police reform cannot just result in the restoration of the police as beloved symbols of national pride\(^\text{31}\).

Since the eighties, though, police reform remained problematic. Firstly, though well meant and intended for a positive police contribution to immigrant integration, ‘race awareness’ training focused simply on familiarization with other cultures, rather than \textit{racism} itself as a political ideology\(^\text{32}\) and the politics of immigrant community representation that had been so absent in the preceding decades. Police officers often failed to see the relevance of such race awareness training to routine police work and police trainers found it difficult to integrate into an essentially law based curriculum. The result was patchy, if not negative progress\(^\text{33}\). Indeed, Eugene McLaughlin reminds us that a new generation of officers were being socialised at this time into a resentful ‘anti-Scarman’ police culture: one insistent upon a race and criminality relationship and supportive of tougher policing responses to the perceived lawlessness of black neighbourhoods. This is what fed into, and was further fuelled by, the later 1985 riots\(^\text{34}\).

Secondly, the nature of Police and Community Consultation Groups (PCCG’s) as recommended by and emerging from the \textit{Scarman Report} on the 1981 riots, was flawed by the notion that a history of cultural conflict could be simply ‘talked away’\(^\text{35}\). While one of the objectives of a PCCG was the management of conflict between police and minority ethnic groups, there was a danger of simply legitimising existing police arrangements rather than challenging the controversial courses of police action (or inaction) fuelling further conflict\(^\text{36}\). Indeed, in studying the nationwide urban riots of 1981, Michael Keith\(^\text{37}\) underlines the problem of historical conflict and institutional constraint on the task of policing. From this experience, it is important to regard any positive police roles in new forms of immigrant integration as operating beyond consultation alone and result in routine police patrol activity. Perhaps the most typically called for but unheeded request in this respect was simply to stop over-policing immigrants and take the racist violence seriously. Is this not simply all the basic positive police action any modern day migrant in any new country would expect?

Thirdly, though, the ensuing style of public order policing emerging from the eighties riots was of that of \textit{overt} force\(^\text{38}\). In contrast to occupational resistance over race awareness and community relations, officers at all ranks \textit{readily} took to riot training. There consequently developed an association of urban black youth with wide scale public

\(^{30}\) (Macpherson 1999): appendix 18 
\(^{31}\) (Reiner 2000) page 215
\(^{32}\) (Bowling 1998) preface xvii
\(^{33}\) (Holdaway 1996) page 126
\(^{34}\) (McLaughlin 2007) page 19
\(^{35}\) Keith in (Holdaway 1996) page 131
\(^{36}\) (Holdaway 1996) pages 129-130
\(^{37}\) (Keith 1993)
\(^{38}\) (Holdaway 1996) page 133
disorder that adversely affected the routine patrolling of black people. As a point of severe public criticism to come later in the *Macpherson Report* it was noted that patrol officer’s (wrongly) stereotyped Stephen Lawrence’s friend, Duwayne Brooks, as an ‘unhelpful and hostile’ young black man rather than the victim and valuable witness to a racist attack that he actually was.

As the 1999 *Macpherson Report* was to officially acknowledge, racism had beset both the occupational culture and the institutional practices of the police. Yet by the mid eighties, nearly forty years since the first generation of migrants from the Caribbean entered mainland Britain, their first descendent were coming of age and British society was beginning, tentatively, to recognise and value the hybrid nature of its changing national identity. Counter to this, though, the era had also produced extreme right wing expression in the form of racist attacks and political activism against immigrants during the seventies. Lamentably, the policing of racial tension had been ignored for too long and police race-relations deteriorated too far to result in anything other than murderous hostility vented on the police riot shield. The lowest moment came on 6th October 1985.

**1985 Broadwater Farm: The Murder of PC Keith Blakelock**

The 1980s riots each have their own particular histories as well as similarities as ‘disruptive community protest’. Documented in the British literature, they can be read in conjunction with a more generalised ‘anti-police’ mood across sections of society at the time in multicultural Britain. Indeed, Paul Gilroy’s incisive consideration of these inner city riots, particularly in 1985, observes that “the human targets of crowd violence seem to have been almost exclusively police and media workers”, both being seen as violators of the community’s right to control it’s own existence. This is not to excuse the violence, but to help explain it as the failure of integration in preceding decades.

The utterly brutal murder of PC Keith Blakelock during one of these riots is somewhat unique. It is unprecedented on mainland Britain during the 20th century. Many officers have been seriously injured during riots but none actually murdered as part of them. What distinguishes PC Blakelock’s death, is its commission as an act of, or at least in the course of, localised but large-scale civil disorder aimed directly at the police. This was the 1985 Broadwater Farm riot on a racially mixed and socially deprived housing estate in Tottenham, North East London. Seen as one further act of oppression, it had been sparked by the fatal heart attack of local black woman, Cynthia Jarrett, during a police raid on her house on the 5th October. The following day a crowd of three hundred demonstrated outside the local police station, dispersing peacefully later.

Yet on the nearby Broadwater Farm estate (which the police considered extremely dangerous) patrol officers were attacked by a group of black youths. Riot police were
called in to close it off while youths built burning barricades. Missiles were being thrown. Police were badly positioned, vulnerable to the attacks and unable to move in to contain the situation. The rioters were a reported mix of 71% West Indian/African, 25% white and 5% Asian/other. Firearms were apparently used against police riot shields. By 9.15pm that evening the use of CS gas and plastic bullets (for the first time on mainland Britain) was authorised by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Up to 1300 police officers were available for deployment but only a few hundred were actually used. The rioting went on until after 2am. It caused over £293,000 of damage, including the destruction of one building. Seventeen civilians and 163 police officers were injured, including the murder of Police Constable Keith Blakelock.45

PC Blakelock had become separated from his unit after they entered the estate to help fire fighters. They were violently confronted by a group of rioters. Knives and machetes hammered down onto their plastic shields and beat them back amid tormenting screams of ‘Kill! Kill! Kill!’ In a television documentary, Blakelock’s surviving colleagues recall seeing a small ‘vulture like’ group of people around a shield on the floor amid the chaos and the body of a police officer lying there. He sustained forty separate wounds including a severe blow to the side of the head with a machete. This led to some media stories that rioters intended to display his severed head on a pole.47 A Police Superintendent who witnessed the recovery of his body by firemen trying to resuscitate him testifies elsewhere “He was covered in cuts, you couldn’t see his face. They turned his head over and there’s a knife in his throat. You know he’s got to be dead.”48

The riot shield here, though only a few millimetres thick, is a paradoxical articulation of the insurmountable distance between police and community either side of it. Archive media footage of a local black youth’s response to the murder is telling: “We see the police, and this is black youth in England in general, as being the front line of oppression. They are the force we always have to face when anything happens. But I can’t say I’m going to show any sorrow or remorse for him. I can’t weep over the death of an oppressor”.49 Testimony to the anti-police feeling at the time, and etched in the bitter memory of police race-relations in Britain was local black councillor (later MP) Bernie Grant’s comment the morning after that “the police got a bloody good hiding”.50 How did relations fall so pitifully low? Is there anything in this tragic narrative that a country with a more recent history of immigration can see in itself? There was a time when the police enjoyed high levels of public respect but that age had, by now, gone.

It is important to stress that while institutional police racism, as well as societal and state racism was a significant contributory factor to the 1985 riots (and those of 1981) so too was social exclusion in these racially mixed areas.51 To describe these acts of violent protest against oppressive social conditions of the time simply as ‘race-riots’ would be

45 (Graef 1990) page 77
46 (Davies 1999)
47 (Mason 2003)
48 (Graef 1990) page 79
49 (Davies 1999)
50 (Mason 2003)
51 (Gaffney 1987; Brown 1982)
misleading and divisive. For they were not acts of violence between so called ‘races’ that the police had to intervene in but actually acts of violence by a mix (black, white and Asian) of people united in their localised experiences of disaffection against the police as representatives of what they saw as an oppressive government and, arguably, an underlying white nationalism. It would also be divisive in that the term ‘race’ riots tends to isolate and foreground the discursive category of black as a community above any other as criminal instigators of such violence against such a white nationalism. To be clear, the problem turned out not to be a racially, ethnically or culturally mixed community – for at the local level immigrant integration seemed to largely take care of itself as a matter of everyday life. The problem was the authority’s failure to recognise it as the shape of society to come and respond accordingly to its needs for protection against conservative forces of resistance.

Though told predominantly through black people’s experience of policing in Britain, this has been a wider telling of some of the consequences of failed immigrant integration. Three basic learning points are 1) to treat incidents of racist violence as core police patrol work; 2) to treat far right political activism as a threat to community safety and; 3) ensure meaningful consultation mechanisms with local immigrant communities that lead to satisfactory police law enforcement action in both these areas. Unfortunately in Britain, by 1985 the time for meaningful dialogue had long passed in its lamentable history of police race-relations. It had been formally called for by Lord Scarman some three years prior in the shape of the above mentioned Police Community Consultative Groups. It had been called for even earlier and less formally by local interest groups in the seventies.

With hindsight it could have been responded to better in the fifties. Yet such were Reiner’s ‘unheeded prophecies of doom’ that opened this half of this chapter.

Democratic Police Reform for a Culturally Diverse Society

The 1999 Macpherson Report was the official report of the 1997 public inquiry into matters arising from the death of black teenager, Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Prolonged police investigations had produced no key witnesses or sound evidence against the five prime suspects. Dissatisfied with the police, parents Neville and Doreen Lawrence had taken the unprecedented step of mounting a private prosecution against the prime suspects between 1995 and 1996. It failed. An inquest jury in 1997, however, later returned a unanimous verdict that ‘Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed in a completely unprovoked racist attack by five white youths’. A Police Complaints Authority investigation by Kent Police found that the original Metropolitan police investigation had been ‘bungled’. When the Labour Government came into power in May 1997 the inquiry was commissioned on 31st July 1997 as part of their election manifesto commitment to police reform. Amid massive controversy, the ensuing Macpherson report on the inquiry was published on 15th February 1999.

The basic facts of the murder are that about 22.30 on the 22nd April 1993 in South London Stephen Lawrence was waiting to go home at a bus stop with a friend, Duwayne

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52 (Keith 1996) page 278
53 (IRR 1987)
54 (Macpherson 1999) paragraph 2.5, page 3
Brooks. Stephen went a little way up the road to see if the bus was coming. Brooks saw a group of five or six white youths on the opposite side of the road. He called out to Stephen to ask if he could see the bus. Presumably on hearing him, one of the white youths called out “what, what nigger?” The group quickly crossed the road and engulfed Stephen. Brooks turned and ran, calling for Stephen to follow him. The attack was sudden and short, lasting about 15-20 seconds. The gang, solely and unequivocally motivated by racism, disappeared. Stephen ran to try to catch up with Brooks but collapsed and died. He had been stabbed twice to a depth of about five inches in his chest and arm, severing axillary arteries and causing blood to pump freely from his body. To date nobody has been convicted of this racist murder.

One cannot understate the significance of Macpherson. It is not simply about a racist murder. It is about a longer history of racism in Britain that reaches deep into an identity crisis at the heart of a predominantly ‘white’ nation. Its publication was closely followed by a series of nail bomb attacks in April 1999. These were at symbolic locations for the black community in Brixton, the Asian community in Whitechapel’s Brick Lane and the Gay community in Soho. A number of extremist ‘white power’ groups had notably tried to claim responsibility for the attacks whilst the bomber was still at large. To their full credit, the Metropolitan Police mobilised counter terrorist officers to catch the bomber before he could kill and maim again (other bombings were allegedly planned for Jewish and Muslim communities). He was David Copeland, an unassuming white 22 year-old engineer living just outside London in Farnborough. His campaign left three dead and 139 injured as what he saw as ‘the start of a race and homophobic war’. Though acting alone, he had previously been a member of the BNP and the extreme Combat 18 group.

It must be acknowledged that the constituency from which Copeland came is one among others that gained significant BNP votes in the 1997 general election. While such attacks are, of course, repugnant to the mainstream public their targeting of symbolic sites of multiculturalism in the name of a ‘white nationalism’ does say something of a discernable ‘white backlash’ to multiculturalism more widely. Extensive ethnographic research by Roger Hewitt at Goldsmiths College’s Centre for Urban and Community Research (University of London) reveals a deep hostility among sections of the white working class communities in south London, near to where Stephen Lawrence was murdered, to local government equality policies and multicultural practices. This phenomenon of a ‘white backlash’ to multiculturalism, evident during the 1990s, is not confined to the UK but occupies a larger stage spanning the USA, Australia, Canada and many other European Countries. Within the prevailing neo-liberal context of reduced local government resources that Hewitt’s observations sit, the issue of white backlash to immigrant integration practices should not be overlooked.

Yet overall the Macpherson report helped energize the Government’s radical police reform agenda based on democratic principles of community policing in a multicultural

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55 (Macpherson 1999) summary of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, page 1
56 Widely reported media coverage by (Bennetto 1999; Honigsbaum et al. 1999; Hopkins 2000)
57 (Hewitt 2005)
58 (Hewitt 2005) page 114
society. These specifically included statutory community consultation and crime reduction partnership mechanisms under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. Without overlooking the disaffected white working class communities spoken of, there is a specific emphasis on ‘hard to reach’ groups such as immigrant and minority ethnic groups. And to this end it is worth citing one of the conclusions and grave warnings of the Macpherson report for the future of UK policing before detailing these provisions:

“First and foremost and fundamentally we believe that there must be a change so that there is genuine partnership between the police and all sections of the community. This cannot be achieved by the police alone. The onus is upon them to start the process. All other agencies, particularly those in the field of education and housing must be involved. Co-operation must be genuine and vigorous. Strategies to be delivered under the new Crime and Disorder Act will provide an opportunity in this respect. Training will play its part. The active involvement of people from diverse ethnic groups is essential. Otherwise there will be no acceptance of change, and policing by consent may be the victim.”

The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act – Statutory Consultation Mechanisms

The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act was flagship reform legislation for the new Labour Government. It gave the principles of ‘community safety’ first proposed in the 1991 Morgan Report a statutory basis. Ten years on, local crime reduction partnerships between the police, local authorities and the communities they serve are now an ingrained part of democratic policing in Britain. Inevitably some are better than others across the country. Yet they serve as an effective mechanism through which local people – collectively and as culturally specific groups – are regularly consulted about the nature of community level crime and disorder directly affecting them. They also hold the police and local authorities accountable to actions designed to address those problems.

The Act’s Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) are by no means a simplistic solution to what remain complex social problems. Nor are they the only public consultation and planning mechanisms for either the police or local authorities. Yet in the light of Britain’s police race-relations history, one can see how such a mechanism might facilitate the concerns of immigrant communities (such as racist or hateful violence against them as a community) and help coordinate and drive positive police/local authority action aimed at their integration (such as anti-racist law enforcement to signal their social inclusion and protection by the state). They can also serve to facilitate and alleviate existing communities concerns about new immigrant arrivals. As a democratic forum for action on local crime, they also wrest the initiative for far-right politics that would otherwise divisively exploit spurious crime and immigration connections.

They improve upon the previously mentioned Police and Community Consultative Groups (PCCGs) in four main ways. Firstly by being statutory in nature. This is a simple but most important point. For many public initiatives fail simply because there is no statutory requirement to pursue them. This is particularly so in a neo-liberal regime where

59 (Macpherson 1999) paragraph 46.40, page 326
60 (Morgan 1991)
limits on public spending mean that public bodies will only do that which is required of them by law and not just recommended by Government. Secondly, that they operate at a smaller, more local, unit of administration. They are therefore capable of regularly engaging local officers with local people on the specific issues that affect them in the area that they live and work. This also helps gain a more authentic level of community representation. Thirdly that they require real action to address or prevent the specific problems they identify. They avoid becoming ‘talking shops’ or limit themselves only to discussion. Fourthly, they jointly hold the local police commander (representing his Chief Constable) and local authority Chief Executive to account for their proper operation. In sum, they drive ground level action on crime, disorder and associated issues.

For the purpose of this chapter’s contribution to positive police roles in immigrant integration in Finland the relevant provisions of the UK’s 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (CADA) regarding statutory partnerships will be detailed and discussed here.

It must be stressed, though, that such partnerships are by no means confined to issues affecting immigrant communities or minority ethnic groups. To be sure, they are intended to address local crime and disorder of any nature, be it drugs, anti-social behaviour, vandalism, car crime, etc. They also recognise the need for coordination of clearly defined but separate roles for the police and other agencies involved. But whatever national initiatives the police or other agencies might seek to pursue in relation to modern day immigrant integration, a statutory framework for implementing and coordinating them at a local street policing level would be important where they concern matters such as racial harassment, racist violence and related crimes. To be sure, the Macpherson report points directly to the potential of these local partnerships in its recommendations to increase the trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic groups by preventing racism and promoting the value of cultural diversity in Britain:

“That in creating strategies under the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act or otherwise Police Services, local Government and relevant agencies should specifically consider implementing community and local initiatives aimed at promoting cultural diversity and addressing racism and the need for focussed, consistent support for such initiatives”61

Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships – Legal Framework
The Crime and Disorder Act (CADA) delivered twelve of the Government’s 1997 election manifesto commitments under six broad themes. Besides youth crime and racist crime, one was ‘the promotion of local action’. In this, the creation of statutory authorities responsible for formulating and implementing local crime and disorder strategies was a major, if not the major, element of the entire Act.

Part I of the Act deals with the prevention of crime and disorder. Sections 5 and 6 of chapter 1 then provide the mechanism for crime and disorder strategies. Other supporting provisions appear elsewhere in the Act. In particular section 17’s duty for virtually all public authorities to do all they reasonable can to prevent crime and disorder in their area

61 (Macpherson 1999) recommendation 70, page 335
and section 115’s power for all statutory cooperating partners to share information with what is called ‘the responsible authority’ for the purpose of the Act. This helps avoid resistance due to perceived data protection restrictions.

Section 5 (1) first creates a ‘responsible authority’ for a ‘local government area’. The local government area is defined as the existing local district or unitary council. In practice, these are administrative areas with populations ranging from 50,000 to 250,000. Districts sit within larger county administrative areas of maybe one to two million.

The ‘responsible authority’ is made up of two bodies – the police and the local authority (i.e. municipality). On the police side is the chief officer of police for any police area within the ‘local government area’. Unlike the national structure of the Finnish Police with a single supreme commander, the Police in England and Wales are community based and made up of 44 independent territorial police forces each with their own Chief Constable. However, these are most defined by the larger administrative borders of a county that may contain many separate ‘local government areas’ as defined within the Act. So in practice the Chief Constable is represented by his/her local commanding officer (usually of Superintendent rank) for each ‘local governing area’.

The other body is the local district council (or in some cases, an independent unitary council) defining that area and the county council as well. In Finland a district council might equate to a local municipality and a county equate to a province. Yet again, though, the Chief Executive of a county council suffers the same problem as a Chief Constable and so often delegates representation to cover the numerous smaller ‘local authority areas’. So in practice the Act’s ‘responsible authority’ is made up of the Chief Executive for the district/unitary council that defines the ‘local governing area’, the local police commander for that area and a county council representative (if applicable). To be clear, it is at this very local level area of governance that these crime and disorder reduction partnerships with the police are intended to operate.

Having created a ‘responsible authority’ for a ‘local government area’, the Act’s section 5(2) then creates a two-way duty for this responsible authority and other specified bodies whose authority lies within the local government area to act in co-operation with each other. These are named as a) the Police Authority (i.e. the elected governing body of the operationally independent Chief Constable and his/her Police force); b) the Probation Committee or Health Authority; and c) any other person or body prescribed by order of the Secretary of State. This is to ensure that in practice all significant local agencies (police, social services, education, housing, health and probation), along with anyone else later thought to be significant, form a statutory partnership under a duty to cooperate.

Section 6 (1) then specifies exactly what the statutory partnership has to cooperate over. That is, to formulate and implement, for each relevant period (i.e. every three years), “a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in their given area”.
Mindful of lessons from the disastrous police and community race-relations history, there are important statutory steps to be taken in this process. The first, as stated in section 6(2), is that before formulating the strategy, the responsible authority must:

- Carry out a review of the level of the levels and patterns of crime and disorder in the area (taking due account of the knowledge and experience of persons in the area);
- Prepare and analysis of the results of that review;
- Publish in the area a report of that analysis; and
- Obtain the views on that report of persons or bodies in the area (including those of a description prescribed by order under the Act), whether by holding public meetings or otherwise.

What this means in effect is that the police and local authority have to make a provisional analysis of crime in their area (a ‘crime audit’) that is not limited to their own official figures and interpretations of priorities but also draws on the experience of local people. For local people may accord different priorities to different issues than the authorities might otherwise assume – such as violence against immigrant communities that goes unreported for lack of faith in the police to deal with it. They then have to publish, locally, a report of the results of that analysis and follow it up in a public consultation process that obtains the views of people and interested bodies in that area.

The next step, section 6(3), is for the responsible authority to have regard to the above crime auditing process (i.e. both the analysis and the public consultation) in formulating a crime and disorder reduction strategy. Section 6(4) states that this strategy shall include:

- Objectives to be pursued by the responsible authorities, by cooperating persons or bodies or, under agreements with the responsible authorities, by other persons or bodies, and
- Long-term and short-term performance targets for measuring the extent to which such objectives are achieved.

This means that each party to the statutory partnership will be assigned logical and measurable objectives collectively aimed at reducing crime and disorder in the area as revealed in the initial crime audit and public consultation process. Where such a process properly engages immigrant communities, for example, to reveal their experience of racist violence is not being properly responded to, then in the interest of integration, such strategies should contain measurable objectives assigned to named partners to address this problem. The obvious partner in this respect would be the police but can also include housing and education services in terms of preventative measures, for example.

Then, after formulating the strategy in these terms, section 6(5) states that the responsible authorities must make it publicly available in that area. Namely, by way of a public document that includes details of:
a) Co-operating persons and bodies;
b) The review carried out under subsection (2)(a) above;
c) The report published under subsection (2)(c) above; and
d) The strategy, including the objectives, those pursuing them, and the performance targets by which they will be measured.

This is a statutory process that, since April 1998, takes place every three years in every local government area in England and Wales. It is now in its fourth round and provides the governing framework in which local crime reduction and related community policing is done. Community level police interest in matters affecting new immigrant arrivals would be picked up and dealt with in such partnerships. Section 6(6) further requires that while implementing their strategies, responsible authorities must also keep it under review to monitor its effectiveness and amend it as appropriate. It is not an instrument that can be simply left on paper gathering dust once published. Responsible authorities are answerable to central government for its proper implementation. More than intended, it not only promotes but drives local action as democratic police reform.

Whatever the positive role of the police in immigrant integration is conceived to be, this chapter would recommend to any country consideration of a similar statutory framework to effect related initiatives at a local policing level. Particularly ones aimed to ensure consultation with immigrant communities in relation to the specific needs they may have and problems they may begin to face as a society goes through the pains of adjusting to the changing realities of its 21st century multicultural condition.

Concluding Discussion – Macpherson and Critical Multiculturalism

Macpherson’s primary recommendation was to make ‘the increased trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities’ a Ministerial Priority. This and virtually all of its 70 recommendations (in areas of accountability, racist crime investigation, racism awareness training, recruitment and patrol practices) were implemented. Their impact, however, is not so easy to discern and the identified gulf in public trust and confidence in the police has yet to be bridged.62

Centrally, though, the Macpherson report aims to deal with racism through both the national curriculum in school education as well as police training. Key is the ‘valuing of cultural diversity’ as an organizing theme via the statutory crime reduction partnerships mechanisms already discussed. Clearly it is not a job for the police alone. Yet it is one in which the police role is to protect culturally diverse groups by way of enforcing criminal laws against racist activity and other forms of hatred they may be subjected to because of their difference. With regard to immigrant communities (old and new), the state’s protection in this respect facilitates integration by signalling the state’s valuing of a cultural plurality over hitherto prevailing ideas of homogeneity and a white nationalism that, as the police race-relations history showed, has never been far from the surface.

62 (Rowe 2004) page 1
The locality and particularity of cultural differences can challenge dominant and hegemonic identities. For Paul Gilroy, the presence of post-colonial people in European urban society reminds Europeans of their half forgotten and imperial past and a brittle monocultural national identity. Through art and culture, he argues, selective memories of ‘Imperial greatness’ are drawn upon by neo-fascists to fuel a cultural racism and reinforce notions of absolute difference and cultural incompatibilities. In this sense, Gilroy has noted that across Europe, hostility to difference and fascist enthusiasm for cultural ‘purity’ has remained dormant within a patriotic rhetoric and the promotion of national identities. His concern lies very much with the presence of refugees, asylum seekers and ‘immigrants’ inside fortress Europe’s apparent indifferent and intolerant multi-nationalism. This all leads to urgent questions about multicultural integration.

**What is multiculturalism today?**

Twice leader of East London’s Tower Hamlets Council, and Director of the Centre for Urban and Community Research at the University of London’s Goldsmiths College, Professor of Sociology Michael Keith reminds us that the cities of the 21st century will increasingly be characterised by the challenges of multiculturalism. He notes that in a world where the nation-state is at least weakened, the city is a commonly invoked alternative register of political analysis. And though rarely acknowledged, the demography of the modern metropolis is in large part a product of migration.

For Keith, the city is a site in which newness comes into the world: “a crucible of economic, political and cultural change precisely because old values and orderings are disrupted by the tumult of city life.” Such disruptions to notions of national sovereignty, he foresees, will create new problems in the realisation of cultural differences brought about by the unavoidable multiculturalism of the 21st century city. And so where the police and related institutions might continue to represent the old values and orderings of the nation-state, we may find an inherent conflict with a cultural plurality that drives contemporary social change. Hence the importance of dialogue between state and divergent cultures as a two-way process in which the ways of life of both the indigenous and the immigrant, continually transgress, cross-fertilise and inevitably change.

The epigraph that opened this chapter pointed to the idea of multiculturalism as a state of mind, rather than a demographic make up. That is in Caryl Pillip’s words, ‘the individual that can comfortably synthesize different worlds in one body’. It came from a reading of post-war migration to Britain that, despite the troubled police history charted here, centered on its legacy of a cultural plurality as a sign of radical social change in a country now more at ease with itself than it was with a cultural singularity of ‘white’ nationhood. And in so doing, Phillips makes a point often neglected that concerns discussion on the positive police role in immigrant integration and consequential ideas of multiculturalism:

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63 (Goldberg 1994) page 12
64 (Gilroy 1995) page 4
65 (Gilroy 1995) page 5
66 (Keith 2005)
67 (Keith 2005) page 15
"So fifty years after the SS Empire Windrush unloaded 492 Jamaicans at Tilbury docks, what kind of society do we have in Britain today? Most would probably claim that we have a multicultural society, but do so without stopping to think what they really mean by multicultural."  

The term ‘multiculturalism’ is not a self-evident concept. Paul Gilroy described it as an overloaded and fought over term that has become as powerful ‘master signifier’, reigning in ways that notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘reason’ once did within modernity. Others see it as a ‘slippery signifier’ upon which diverse groups pin their hopes and fears. Yet still, it is has often been uncritically praised and intentionally distorted to condemn, particularly within pedagogical and political usage since the eighties. Nevertheless, whatever is meant by it, ‘multiculturalism’ has become “the central discourse in the struggle over issues regarding national identity.”

**Three basic models of multiculturalism**

Excluding segregationist policies such as apartheid, one can recognize at least three basic models of multiculturalism from critical studies such as those made by David Theo Goldberg during the 1990s. We can call these ‘assimilation’, ‘integration’ and ‘incorporation’. Pertinent to the topic under discussion, they suggest that the current orthodoxy and policy term ‘integration’ is but one of other possible policy responses to immigration and the ensuing cultural diversity it brings. Indeed, if we follow Goldberg’s analysis, ‘integration’ may already be an outdated model no longer fit for the 21st century realities of a truly multicultural society envisaged by Phillips as a lived state of being within a new social order.

The assimilative model is based on the idea of a dominant core culture. Any periphery cultures are forced to adopt the values of the core. Essentialist notions of identity imply that those who cannot or will not be assimilated into the core identity are excluded and exploited and, in extreme cases, exterminated. For Goldberg this is a ‘monoculturalism’ born of modernity that, while purporting to be the outcome of rational choice, actually has its own history of emergence in late 19th century America as a reconstructed reflection of European culture. This American response retains a global pertinence.

By the 20th century, Goldberg argues, assimilation had hardened into a discourse of universal truths promoted through institutional practices in terms of education and social policy aimed at ‘Keeping America White’. Thus, assimilation meant giving up ‘un-American’ values in favour of dominant representations of the Self and renouncing one’s subjectivity in name, culture and, as far as it was possible, in colour. As a discursive

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68 (Phillips 2002) page 279  
69 (Gilroy 1995) pages 2-3  
70 (Stam and Shohat 1994) page 299  
71 (Goldberg 1994) page 1  
72 (Giroux 1994) page 325  
73 (Goldberg 1994) drawing on (McLaeren 1994; Stam and Shohat 1994; Giroux 1994; CCSG 1994) and Amy Gutman’s introduction to (Taylor 1992)  
74 (Goldberg 1994) page 5
paradigm\textsuperscript{75}, it is a moment of essentialist belief in racial ‘difference’ premised on a hierarchical raciology. Or as social anthropologist Ghassan Hage\textsuperscript{76} of Sydney University would put more directly, it is the ‘white racism’ of what a modern day liberal society would regard as ‘bad whites’ in contrast to their own ‘white multiculturalism’ of ‘good whites’.

For Goldberg, the excluded Other who could not be assimilated and were representationally, symbolically (and often physically) destroyed, began globally and locally to self-assert both politically and culturally. Going against the monocultural grain, Goldberg states, the civil rights and counter cultural movements of the sixties signalled a shift from the prevailing assimilative standard to the new one of \textit{integration}. In response to this, an \textit{overt} monoculturalism gave way and new cultural groups, such as immigrant communities, were given autonomous cultural determination and expression. The problem, however, is that they remained marginalized to the dominant core.\textsuperscript{77}

The integrative model retains the same idea of the dominant core culture. Instead of being assimilated though, periphery cultures are tolerated and allowed to exist, albeit as powerless entities and thereby no threat the dominant culture. Although ostensibly liberal in nature, at heart it is still premised on prevailing essentialist ideas of the fixed nature of cultural identity. In Frankenberg’s discursive paradigm it can be conceived as a moment of essentialist belief in racial ‘similarity’ premised upon notions of colour blindness and power evasiveness. This is in line with Hage’s concept of the ‘white multiculturalism’ of ‘good whites’. That is, multiculturalism based upon the idea of \textit{having} diversity as a commodity for consumption rather than a transformed state of \textit{being} as a lived identity.

These two basic models can be seen as sequential policy responses to the growing realities of cultural diversity in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century – assimilation followed by integration. While the former is an explicitly overt monoculturalism, the later is a monoculturalism masquerading as multiculturalism. In practice, both actually fall within a monocultural response to serve the interests of a singular and centrally located dominant ‘white’ Western culture. Neither would seem to have an authentic commitment to the reality of an emerging cultural plurality and the undeniable diversities of modern society in the early 21\textsuperscript{st}century that contemporary thinkers like Michael Keith point to.

The incorporative model is one that democratically dispels the dominant centre amongst the diverse periphery cultures. It also empowers these periphery cultures. In contrast to the essentialist notion of identity inherent within the assimilative and integrative models, the incorporative model takes a constructivist approach. Rather than seeking consensus, it embraces a continual conflict as a healthy motor for social progress. As theorised by Goldberg, it is an \textit{authentic} multiculturalism in which political relations are irreversibly altered. This occurs as new parts attach themselves and work their way into the mechanisms of power and cultural expression that once marginalized them\textsuperscript{78}. In other

\textsuperscript{75} (Frankenberg 1993)
\textsuperscript{76} (Hage 1998)
\textsuperscript{77} (Goldberg 1994) page 6
\textsuperscript{78} (Goldberg 1994) page 9
words, it is a process by which cultural difference seeks to enter the canon of thought and change the values of the dominant culture from within. It is a cultural democracy.

The central, and radical, value of incorporative multiculturalism is ‘hybridity’. All cultures in the incorporative frame transgress to infringe and exceed the norms of the monocultural status quo. They thereby transform the values and representations that have held racist culture together. Discursively this can be conceived in Frankenberg’s terms as ‘difference radically redefined’ premised upon and emerging from the autonomous voices of diverse cultures. This also chimes with Hage’s idea of ‘non-white politics’ and a multiculturalism of being culturally diverse as an identity for living. It is much as Caryl Phillips described a ‘truly multicultural society’ as part of a new world order emerging from the realities of a cultural plurality born of the migrant and refugee that form Michael Keith’s ‘tumult of life’ in the cities of the modern world.

**In conclusion**

The purpose of this concluding discussion has been to draw attention to the fact that the idea of ‘integration’ is not an unproblematic concept as a policy response to immigration. And as the British police race-relations history has revealed, the police role in immigrant integration may itself be inherently difficult. This is primarily because in all traditional senses, the police serve to protect the dominant core culture of national identity that the nation-state depends upon and the cultural diversity of immigration challenges. Yet as the world increasingly acknowledges, increased migration flows, especially through our cities, are fast becoming the characterising norm of our 21st century societies that the state has to form new allegiances with.

I would simply end, therefore, by suggesting that with limited police resources, if cultural diversity is truly valued in a modern society then the only positive role expected of the police by immigrants is their protection via the enforcement of anti-racist laws. In practice this involves consulting closely and continually with the community as part of a wider response to local crime issues via the type of statutory partnerships mechanisms discussed. The activities of dangerous groups, be they right wing extremists or religious fundamentalists, intent of stirring up divisive hatred between different cultures must also be countered in the interest of promoting and protecting a modern democratic citizenship. For that is the role of the police in late modern societies: the articulation, through local law enforcement activity, of the governing values of a human rights based democracy.

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Understanding Immigrant entrepreneurial Strategies: Conditions that enhance and/or inhibit the entrepreneurial behaviour Catarina Reis Oliveira

Immigrants were predominantly. Immigrant Entrepreneurs in European countries Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Share of foreign-born in total self-employment 9.3 12.7 3.6 12.7 12.8 3.7 8.1 38.9 10.3 7.4 5.4 8.1 14.4 18.2 11.6 Source: SOPEMI 2007: 75 Share of. Self-employment in total foreign-born employment 7.5 15.1 24.4 8.5 11.6 10.1 12.1 9 10.8 7.6 14.2 10.3 11.3 10.1 14.4.

Between fragmentation and integration: challenges for legal theory and practice. The author basing on the findings of the International law commission on the development of international law and defragmentation considers the practical and theoretical aspects of the two parallel processes in the international law: fragmentation and integration. The very first reference to a 'self-contained' regime in international law is a case in point, as it was made to explain the relationship between two different sets of rules in one and the same treaty. Likewise, immigrants' civic integration strengthens the social and political fabric of communities. World Education, Inc., and its partners define immigrant integration as a dynamic, two-way process in which immigrants and the receiving society work together to build secure, vibrant, and cohesive communities. The NINA initiative is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education Office of Vocational and Adult Education (OVAE) in order to strengthen adult education programs' ability to 1) improve immigrants' 1. 2008. Lots of positive as well as negative phenomena also gain a global character e.g., the struggle for the preservation of the environment, the antiglobalistic movement itself, drug mafia etc. Any development always means that a certain part of changes makes the situation sometimes worse in comparison with the previous events. In our opinion the reducing of the scope of sovereign prerogatives leads both to positive and negative consequences. Thus, the greater than before openness of boundaries provides not only the increase of trade but also contributes to the expansion of terrorism and facilitates drug traffic. At the same time the balance of advantages and disadvantages looks different for different countries, regions, territories even different social strata. Activation policies targeting newly arrived immigrants exemplifies how the ambition of states to promote functional, individual autonomy is also an important, ongoing process in diverse policy areas of the welfare state and not restricted to early integration instruments. While the Scandinavian welfare states differ on a number of counts with respect to immigration control, national integration philosophies and citizenship policies, the article outlines how activation policies aimed at newly arrived immigrants share several features. One of the key factors in this turn involves path dependency from, among others, a lengthy tradition for strong state involvement and norms about employment. Another factor in this turn involves transnational policy learning.